

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1976

## Spy Inquiries, Begun Amid Public Outrage, End in Indifference

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 11—The Congressional and Presidential investigations into domestic spying and political assassination plots by the intelligence community began 16 months ago amid public outrage but are now ending amid public indifference and Congressional uncertainty over whether there will eventually be adequate reforms.

"It all lasted too long, and the media, the Congress and the people lost interest," commented Representative Otis G. Pike, who headed the House Select Committee on Intelligence. The House voted against publishing his committee's report and ignored its proposals for a basic structural overhaul of the intelligence community.

Administration officials take the position that President Ford has already done enough to reinforce and streamline policy control of intelligence activities and catch abuses, but mostly through changes that are being kept secret, even from Congress.

Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has argued that it is not enough for the President to put the Administration's own house in order. The Church committee has pushed for a new Congressional oversight committee on intelligence, to consolidate and strengthen the current system, which is fragmented among several committees.

What began with sensational publicity accompanying disclosures of the intelligence inquiries is ending now in compromises. Why this happened and how it happened is a case study in the subtle ways in which the politics of this city work.

Perhaps most important, the political climate has changed since the start of the investigations. Congress, once on the offensive, was thrown back somewhat on the defensive by disputes over disclosures of classified information given to Congressional committees and over responsibility for the assassination in Greece of the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency operations there.

Then, as the details of covert operations, illegal wiretappings and mail openings became old news, public interest waned, and Congressional committees and executive agencies turned inward, settling their disputes along the usual lines of committee turf, bureaucratic tactics and access to information.

Equally fundamental, the personalities and strategies of the two Congressional investigating committees diverged sharply, and thus Congress was unable to face the Administration with a solid front.

Mr. Pike tried to operate in the open and to confront the White House, and he lost sup-

port in the House. Mr. Church and his Senate committee made compromises, doing some things in the open and other things in private, and generally tried to get along with the Administration.

### Support Is Sought

Now, he must shepherd support among—and sometimes against—the Senate leaders whose committees have long handled intelligence matters and who are reluctant to surrender these prerogatives to the new oversight committee he proposes.

Throughout, the Congressional investigators have been hobbled by the difficulties of obtaining information on the inner workings of the intelligence community.

Some officials, noting the reluctance of the Administration to share information—and through it, power—with Congress, recalled that former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger once told a White House meeting that sensitive information should not be given to the Pike committee because the committee contained unfriendly foreign operatives.

According to these sources, William E. Colby, then the Director of Central Intelligence, ironically commented that this was a good idea, and he was sure that Mr. Schlesinger had evidence to support his allegation and should turn it over to House Speaker Carl Albert. No more was said.

Even within the executive branch, rivalries and sensitivities affected the flow of information. Vice President Rockefeller reportedly lectured Mr. Colby once for having given too much information to the commission set up within the executive branch to investigate C.I.A. activities. Mr. Rockefeller headed that commission himself.

More common apparently, was the frustration of the executive branch investigators at the refusal of intelligence agencies to disclose enough about their past methods of operation. "There were times when we wished we had subpoena power here in the White House," one official said.

Another said that ultimately the executive branch investigation succeeded, because the White House was able to play off the intelligence agencies against one another. The White House, he said, "was able to pry information out of the agencies, because each agency didn't know what the White House was getting from the others, and they were afraid of getting caught in a lie."

Confirmation that this tactic was effective came from a C.I.A. official. "The biggest fear here," he said, "was the rest of the executive branch more than Congress." Officials from other agencies made the same points. Each was concerned about opening up its secret

sources and methods to the others.

Providing sensitive information to Congressional committees was a separate problem. Early meetings of an inter-agency committee headed by John O. Marsh Jr., the President's counselor, were punctuated by a lot of speech-making on the need for being rough with the committees. Attorney General Edward H. Levi would often interrupt to say something like: "This is a fine speech for Broadway, but how will it sound when they throw you in a cell for violating the law?"

The general view among officials in the Administration and on Capitol Hill who have been involved with the various investigations is that the main obstacles to turning over information came from those concerned with policy at the State and Defense Departments, from the National Security Council staff and from the heads of operational staff.

Generally on the other side were the White House staff, which believed that President Ford had nothing to hide, and the leaders of the C.I.A., who believed that their agency could be saved only by being candid.

The President decided early to be more forthcoming with the Church committee than with the Pike committee. This was a reflection of the very different ways in which the committees sought to get information.

Mr. Pike was made chairman of the House committee largely because of the majority's conviction that representative Lucien Nedzi, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, had not been tough enough in his oversight. Mr. Pike hired a young staff with few Washington ties, and together they confronted the Administration at each step. Committee unity fell apart when Mr. Pike recommended citing Mr. Kissinger for contempt when he did not turn over certain policy papers.

Mr. Church, on the other hand, gave high priority to holding his committee together. He built a staff of experienced Congressional aides, and their approach was to cajole and cooperate with the Administration.

Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee, who was a member of the committee, said that its unity had been threatened only briefly during the investigation of assassinations.

"There was a predisposition on the part of some to protect the Kennedys or not to sully the reputation of an Eisenhower," he said. "In the early stages of the assassination investigation, the committee gave the impression of a carnival atmosphere."

Although unity was restored when the committee's proceedings became less public, information-gathering techniques

were always a double-edged sword.

For the Church committee, getting all the assassination material set an important precedent for obtaining additional documents. But the very volume of the assassination material forced diversion and delay. Months were spent preparing that report before the bulk of the committee got down to its assigned business.

For the Pike committee, the problem was that it could obtain no information without a confrontation, but unity and House support were eroded by confrontation.

Mr. Pike's being "out on the point," as one Senate staff member put it, made it easier for the Church committee to obtain information and helped the Senate group to "look more reasonable" in the short run.

But in the long run, the Pike committee's confrontation tactics may have hurt, leaving the Senate committee's campaign for stronger Congressional oversight of intelligence activities without a corresponding effort in the House. The tactics also changed the focus of debate in Washington from how much Congressional oversight is necessary to whether Congress can keep a secret.

Mr. Pike sees some advantage to his tough stance, however. "I think Church paid a price for cooperation," the Representative says. "Less information was made public."

In this respect, there was a dovetailing of strategies between the White House and the Church committee. "The President's attitude was that there was no reason to keep information respecting mistakes and abuses from Congress," one White House official explained, "but at the same time, the President felt he had the responsibility that it not be made public if it would damage the country."

Most Administration officials maintained that the President had no grand strategy for dealing with Congress, except to avoid any appearance of a cover-up and to conclude the investigations as quickly as possible. "The longer it went on, the more rocks would be turned over, the more worms would be found," one key participant said.

Delay was inherent in the practical steps taken by the Administration to insure its concepts of secrecy. One who took part in the process of negotiation said:

"If the committee asked for information, we'd brief them. If they demanded the documents, we'd give them a sanitized version. If this wasn't enough, we'd give them the rest on the condition they would not publish without consent."

Others in the Administration

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1976

# Is Oversight Enough?

By Tom Wicker

The Senate has reached agreement on an independent committee to oversee the budget and operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, and to share such power over the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other security agencies. That's better than doing nothing about the documented abuses of the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and others, but skepticism about the new committee still is in order.

For one thing, it's a compromise between those who supported the Church committee's recommendation for an independent committee to oversee all the security agencies, and those who wanted oversight to remain essentially in the hands of the Judiciary and Armed Services Committees. That such a compromise was necessary, despite the proven inability or unwillingness of these committees to exercise control in the past, shows how little real determination there is in the Senate to prevent security and intelligence abuses in the future.

The likely reason is the decline in public interest in such abuses—at least the decline in Congressional perception of public interest—and the success of the Administration, the security agencies and their supporters in shifting the burden of guilt. Now it is not the agencies that are under fire for abusing their powers, but members of Congress and the press for airing "secrets" and supposedly endangering national security.

That climate does not augur well for Congressional oversight, no matter by which committee conducted; and in any case, the history of oversight suggests that those responsible for it have almost invariably been co-opted by those supposed to be overseen. The watchdog has become the agency pet and, so far from protecting the public against the agency, ended by protecting the agency from the public.

The compromise committee agreed upon by the Senate, moreover, will have to share its authority—save in the case of the C.I.A.—with Armed Forces and Judiciary, those toothless tigers who saw no evil, heard no evil and certainly spoke no evil while carrying out their myopic "oversight" in the past.

Establishment of the new committees will force the Administration to submit an annual intelligence budget for Congressional review. But it is doubtful that any oversight arrangement, no matter how diligently pursued, could prevent all the myriad forms of abuse and violations of rights recently documented. An oversight committee,

at best, is not much more than a useful first step in controlling the operations of security and intelligence agencies.

Another needed step is passage of a perfected version of a bill by Senators Edward Kennedy, Charles Mathias, Robert Byrd, Gaylord Nelson and others, to require a Federal court order to authorize electronic surveillance for purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence. The bill would require also that such surveillance be limited to "foreign powers," or to those for whom there is "probable cause" to believe that they are "agents of a foreign power." This measure is aimed at closing the last loophole by which security agencies can wiretap and bug American citizens on their own authority, under the guise of seeking "foreign intelligence."

Gerald Schneider, a political scientist on leave from the University of Delaware for study at the Brookings Institution, has proposed two further steps to several members of the Senate. Since many Senators and others are genuinely concerned that security

## IN THE NATION

agencies not be hamstringing in combating terrorism and subversion, he would not flatly ban certain activities but would require that any "intrusion" by them on the constitutional rights of American citizens be authorized, if at all, by a Federal court order, on a showing of evidence that a crime was about to be committed.

In the further belief that heads of agencies and high officials will usually be able to protect themselves against criminal responsibility, Mr. Schneider has proposed that lower-level employees of the security agencies be made subject to stiff mandatory penalties for committing any act that would be a felony if a private citizen committed it, and that there be no statute of limitations on such offenses for at least 25 years. Put in that kind of jeopardy, Federal employees would be far more likely to refuse to carry out illegal acts that might be ordered by their superiors.

On that point, for example, the Department of Justice has decided that it will not defend two F.B.I. agents accused in a civil suit of carrying out burglaries at the New York offices of the Socialist Workers Party. Like some of Richard Nixon's "plumbers," those who carried out the F.B.I.'s burglaries might not have followed orders had they known they would not have the full protection of the Government if caught in the act.

sought delay, one official said, "much the same way a lawyer plays for time, hoping something will come up to save his client." Things did come up.

"Pike, Welch and Schorr, those were the three names that caused us to pull back, not because our constituents said you're going too far, but because those names came to have important symbolic importance in the currency of Washington," said a senator who did not want to be identified.

Richard S. Welch was the head of the C.I.A. office in Greece. He was murdered shortly after a magazine identified him. Daniel Schorr was a reporter for CBS who obtained and arranged for publication of the still-classified Pike committee report.

Senator Walter F. Mondale, Democrat of Minnesota, who was a member of the Church committee, said: "There was a sense of anarchy over in the House. Then came the Welch murder and what I believe to be the careful orchestration of the Welch funeral to tie the murder to the Congressional investigations."

Administration officials denied any orchestration, maintaining that all of the funeral arrangements were made by the Welch family.

"The Schorr matter," Mr. Mondale said, "further undermined confidence in Congress to deal with secret matters."

As the public became "numb with bad news," in Mr. Mondale's phrase, some members of the Pike committee apparently sought to revive public attention through unauthorized disclosures of information. Meanwhile, the Church committee continued to keep to show that Congress can do so and that Congressional oversight can work.

From the start, the Church committee's goals, according to committee members, was to generate support for standing Congressional oversight committees, with full legislative and budgetary authority and new laws governing intelligence activities.

To some members of the Pike committee, his goals, in some respects, went much deeper—to a basic restructuring of the intelligence community—and much beyond what the House and the Administration seemed prepared to support.

The Pike committee wanted to know how much intelligence costs the taxpayer and whether the results were worth the costs and the risks. The committee's report, which has been criticized by many people, came to the conclusion that the taxpayer was not getting his money's worth. The national intelligence budget is estimated at \$4.5 billion.

The Senate is now about to consider the Church committee's plan for a standing oversight committee that would supersede the three existing committees—Armed Services, Appropriations and Foreign Relations—with authority over intelligence agencies.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
10 MAY 1976

## CIA Abuses Over: Bush

San Antonio, Tex., May 9 (UPI) — CIA Director George Bush says abuses committed by the intelligence agency have been cleared up and will not occur in the future.

"I will not condone the things that were wrong in the past," Bush said in a news conference on his first trip back to Texas after taking over as head of the CIA.

"In my view those abuses have been cleared up," he said, "and I'm determined that they remain cleared up."

Los Angeles Times

Sun., May 2, 1976

# Public Apathy on CIA Abuses Criticized

## Reform May Be Doomed by Complacency, Senators Fear

BY JACK NELSON

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—The head of a university professors' association worries about the academic community's indifferent reaction to the Senate Intelligence Committee's finding that the CIA continues to have covert relationships with hundreds of academics at more than 100 American universities and institutions.

A member of the Intelligence Committee wonders whether the public can be convinced that the lawlessness of the FBI and the CIA that is documented by the committee in two voluminous reports actually occurred.

Two other senators say that the lessons of Watergate and other disclosures of domestic political spying have been forgotten—or never learned—and that no significant reforms have been adopted.

All of this raises the question of whether America has become so inured to disclosures of government wrongdoing that public opinion—a vital element necessary for reform in a democracy—is paralyzed.

Despite the Intelligence Committee's recent report disclosing a 40-year pattern of political spying and deceptive practices by the FBI, with the knowledge and sometimes the encouragement of Presidents and attorneys general, there has been little public reaction.

This apathy has led some committee members to wonder whether the recommendations for reform the committee made as part of its report are doomed.

A deeper and perhaps more significant question is whether principles Americans have assumed were part of a free society will be sacrificed by the public's passive acceptance of practices heretofore considered anathema.

Will America tolerate covert arrangements between intelligence agents and academics, authors, journalists and publishers?

Although these questions are being asked in some quarters, there has been little public debate. Some see this as a reflection not so much of public apathy but of the feeling of helplessness on the part of a people bombarded with so many disclosures of wrongdoing.

Dr. Joseph D. Duffey, general secretary of the 85,000 member American Assn. of University Professors, has been astonished by the lack of outrage or even concern by most of the academic community to the disclosures about the covert relationships on campus.

"I find a bland acquiescence to what's really a total change in what we always assumed were the ground rules of a free society," he said.

Duffey was with a group of college

presidents when he first read of the committee's finding about covert CIA relationships on campuses.

"No one expressed any alarm," he said. "Nothing shocks them any more. We've had a change in our level of consciousness. If 10 years ago one had described these kind of activities going on he probably would have been dismissed as an alarmist or paranoid."

Duffey said he was sending information from the committee's reports to members of the association's executive committee in the hope that it would take some action demanding an end to covert CIA relationships on campuses.

The association, he said, also may consider using the Freedom of Information Act as a means of exposing the names of academic institutions at which such relationships exist.

In documenting covert relationships, the Senate committee decided against identifying any individuals or institutions in the media, publishing or academic fields.

The committee found that hundreds of foreign journalists and more than 25 American journalists were working covertly with the CIA in a worldwide propaganda network.

The FBI, it found, had covertly influenced the public's perception of persons and organizations by disseminating derogatory information to the press through contacts in American journalism.

It found that intelligence agencies had influenced both domestic and foreign policy through such covert relationships.

At the time the committee was releasing its reports of such findings, however, the Senate Rules Committee, by a 5-4 vote, was crippling the key recommendation for preventing future abuses by intelligence agencies—the creation of a permanent congressional oversight committee.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has received no reaction from academicians or any other groups either supporting the committee reports or protesting the action by the Rules Committee, according to a spokesman for the Intelligence Committee.

Despite the lack of public support, the spokesman said, committee officials believe they may be able to muster enough support on the Senate floor to override the Rules Committee and provide for an oversight committee.

However, Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who sponsored the legislation creating the Intelligence Committee, expressed concern that opponents of the committee may have the power on the floor to defeat legislation creating an oversight committee.

"Frankly, it's in for a lot of trouble," Mansfield said. "Other committees with vested interests in the in-

telligence community will fight to maintain their interest and may have the votes on the floor to do it. If they do, what we have been trying to do will have been wasted and more than a year's work will have been for naught."

At least one member of the Intelligence Committee, Sen. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.), believes that before public opinion can be marshaled, the public must first be convinced that the intelligence abuses actually occurred.

In its report on domestic intelligence activities, the committee noted an unwillingness on the part of most persons in the past to believe allegations from victims of intelligence activity abuses. It said the following comments by Hart to a witness during committee hearings, "aptly described this phenomenon".

"As I am sure others have, I have been told for years by, among others, some of my own, that this is exactly what the (FBI) was doing all the time, and in my great wisdom and high office, I assured them that they were wrong—it just wasn't true, it couldn't happen," Hart said.

"What you have described is a series of illegal actions intended squarely to deny First Amendment rights to some Americans. This is what my children have told me was going on. Now, I did not believe it. The trick . . . is for this committee to be able to figure out how to persuade the people of this country that indeed it did go on. And how shall we ensure that it will never happen again? But it will happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept that it did go on."

Looking back over Watergate, the Nixon impeachment inquiry, wholesale bribery and illegal campaign contributions, intelligence abuses and other disclosures, Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) said no substantial reform had been accomplished despite "three years of fact upon fact upon fact."

"The media, the public and most of our leaders are all too willing to say that sensational revelations and successful prosecutions are enough," Weicker said. "I know they are not. The real work of reform in the sense of procedures that protect our institutions and Constitution has yet to advance one iota."

President Ford's staunch defense of the intelligence agencies and his program of reorganizing the intelligence community and protecting government secrets through executive orders also have been cited as factors militating against reform by Congress.

Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) said emphasis in Washington was shifting



from the defense of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms to protection of the intelligence community and maintenance of government secrets.

"After Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola and Watergate, we are again told—and are apparently willing to believe—that the crucial issue is maintaining secrecy in government," Nelson said. "It is unclear whether the lessons of the past five years have been forgotten already or whether they were never learned."

Congress' failure to exercise oversight also is viewed as a factor in the desensitizing of the public to disclosures of wrongdoing.

"The public has a certain numbing reaction or feeling of helplessness about such disclosures," Norman Birnbaum, an author and sociologist

at Amherst University, said.

"And the behavior of certain people in Congress encourages that," he said. "Certain centers have represented the CIA to the people instead of the people to the CIA."

"Even the Intelligence Committee couldn't bring itself to release intelligence budget figures or to release the names of people and institutions involved in covert relationships," Birnbaum said.

"All of this represents a very grave danger to a free society. It is disruptive of that fabric of trust that is indispensable to academic freedom."

The Intelligence Committee's report that "well over 1,000 books" have been written or published at

the instigation of the CIA has met with little reaction from the book publishing industry.

Townsend W. Hootes, president of the Assn. of American Publishers, whose members account for about 85% or more of the nation's book market, said, "I haven't seen any reaction yet, but it may be premature."

Hootes said he had asked for a copy of the report and wanted to "study it carefully."

"I share the disappointment expressed by a number of people that Congress has muffed a unique opportunity to establish serious and meaningful oversight," said Hootes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

WASHINGTON POST  
14 MAY 1976

Charles B. Seib

## Spies Under Media Cover

The American press treasures its freedom, and is quite willing to use its muscle when it perceives a threat to that freedom. A current example of such a reaction has been the massive media battle against the so-called Nebraska gag order, which is now before the Supreme Court.

Yet the news business has been strangely undisturbed by a threat to the whole idea of a free press posed by some of its own in cahoots with the CIA. The attitude seems to be: If we pretend that this little internal scandal doesn't exist, maybe it will go away. But it keeps coming back.

Its latest manifestation was in a report of the Senate intelligence committee. The report, issued April 27, revealed that until early this year the CIA had undercover "relationships" with about 50 American journalists or employees of American media organizations, and that more than half of those relationships still existed when the report was written.

The report also noted that more than a dozen U.S. news organizations and publishing houses have provided cover for CIA agents abroad, most of them knowingly. These disclosures came on the heels of earlier ones with different figures but the same message.

In January a leak from the report of the House intelligence committee revealed that the CIA had 11 full-time secret agents working as journalists overseas last year. It revealed also that 12 television, radio, newspaper and magazine companies provided cover for these agents.

And back in 1973, William Colby, then the CIA director, let it be known that the CIA had three dozen American journalists working abroad, some of them as fulltime agents.

Each disclosure has brought an almost promise from the CIA that it would mend its ways. The most recent one came last Febru-

ary from the present CIA director, George Bush. He said his agency would not "enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any United States news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station."

That seems fairly definite, although there may be some sleepers in it—that word "accredited," perhaps.

The Senate committee, which noted that it received only limited information and no names on the CIA's use of the media, says that covert use of staff members of general circulation U.S. news organizations "appears

### The News Business

to be virtually phased out." But, assuming that appearances can be trusted, there is plenty of room for relationships with freelancers and stringers and with staffers of other than general circulation organizations.

In the face of the disclosures, the press has shown little of the investigative zeal so in fashion these days. After the leak from the House report, there was an effort to shake the names loose, but the CIA stonewalled and the effort soon died. And the cloud of suspicion continued to hover over the heads of all American journalists overseas.

I have seen just one specific result of the Senate report: The executive board of the National Conference of Editorial Writers passed a resolution opposing the clandestine CIA employment of any journalists, American or foreign, and noting the polluting effect of CIA material planted in the media anywhere in the world.

It also called on the CIA to release the names of American journalists employed by it now or in the past.

So what should be done? The editorial writers are right. The names of the journalists and the news organizations that have engaged in covert operations with and for the

CIA should be disclosed. I am referring to the journalists who have accepted payment from the agency and the organizations that have permitted CIA operatives to use them for cover or who have permitted their own people to work for the agency.

It should be noted that many journalists have contact with the CIA, as they do with all the other agencies of government. These contacts, and even the occasional trading of information such as constantly goes on between reporters and sources, are not what we're talking about here. We are talking about the deliberate subversion of the news business for the CIA's espionage and propaganda purposes.

Publication of names would solve part of the problem, but not all of it. The CIA apparently views the use of foreign media for propaganda and other purposes as a proper agency function. But this corruption of the foreign press has a fallout effect in this country. Inevitably some of the material CIA plants overseas trickles back to Americans in the form of wire service dispatches, special articles, reprints from foreign publications and the like.

So in addition to publicizing the names of American journalists and news organizations involved covertly with CIA, consideration should be given to ending the agency's use of foreign media as well. A presidential order would do the trick.

Even without the fallout problem, we should reject the idea that all will be well if the taint of CIA can be removed from American journalism.

The concept of a free press is not the special property of Americans. In the perfect world that lies too far beyond the horizon, all people will enjoy its benefits.

That millenium is a long, long way off. But is it right for an agency of the American government, of all governments, to work against it by subverting the foreign press? And is it right for the American news business to fail to oppose such activities tooth and nail? To ask such questions is to answer them.

WASHINGTON POST  
14 MAY 1976

# Motives Sought in JFK Death

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate intelligence committee voted yesterday to recommend a congressional investigation of the motives behind the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The committee took the action at a closed meeting called to discuss the results of its special inquiry into the shortcomings of the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency and other government agencies that helped investigate the murder.

As chairman of a two-member subcommittee that took up the controversial issue, Sen. Gary W. Hart (D-Colo.) told reporters that he had seen no evidence to invalidate the Warren Commission's finding that Lee Harvey Oswald was Kennedy's lone assassin.

But he added that "the remaining question, which the Warren Commission did not answer, was 'why?'"

"It's in that area," Hart said, "that I think the lingering doubts remain."

The other subcommittee member, Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), predicted that the committee would release a fairly detailed and, he hinted, troubling report later this month on failures of the original investigation of the President's death and nagging issues that need to be pursued.

Schweiker indicated that he was not persuaded that Oswald acted alone or even that Oswald fired any of the bullets that day in Dallas. "I have always questioned the Warren Commission finding about who did it and how it was done," he told reporters. "My six months on this subcommittee reinforce and strengthen those doubts."

The committee, which is about to go out of business, recommended that the new inquiry be undertaken by the permanent Senate intelligence oversight committee the Senate is considering establishing.

Meanwhile, documents just made public by the CIA in response to a freedom-of-information lawsuit showed that CIA officials were talking of assassinating Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and his closest advisers in early March of 1969, apparently

just a few days before secret planning for a Cuban invasion was approved by the Eisenhower administration.

Some critics of the Warren Commission's work have suggested that Kennedy's 1963 murder may have been in retaliation for the CIA's reported sponsorship of plots to kill Castro.

Others have contended that the assassination could be traced to anti-Castro Cuban exiles bitter at Kennedy for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and for his secret gestures toward rapprochement with the Cuban premier just before he was killed.

In a 1975 memo drafted for the Rockefeller commission, a presidentially appointed panel that looked into CIA abuses, and made public last month, CIA counterintelligence officials said they still felt, as they did in 1964, that the Warren Commission report should have given more credence to the possibility of a foreign conspiracy in light of promising leads that were not pursued.

The Senate intelligence committee's investigation of CIA-sponsored assassination plots showed that the scheming against Castro continued after Kennedy's death.

Even on Nov. 22, 1963, the day Kennedy was shot in Dallas, a high-ranking CIA official was meeting in Paris with a secret agent who was a Castro intimate to offer him a pen rigged with a poison hypodermic needle for use on the Cuban premier.

The heavily censored CIA assassination documents made public yesterday touched not only on Castro, but also on other foreign leaders killed in coups or attempted coups with various degrees of U.S. backing.

The documents were released by Robert Borosage of the non-profit Center for National Security Studies as part of a freedom-of-information project jointly sponsored with the American Civil Liberties Union.

The records were all made available last year to the Rockefeller Commission and then to the Senate committee, presumably with fewer deletions.

One six-page document, dated May 13, 1961, titled "CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic," had everything excised but one paragraph. It pointed out that the CIA had supplied "internal opposition leaders" with three .38 cal. revolvers, three carbines and accompanying ammunition as "personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo."

According to authoritative

sources, the CIA told the White House in that same May 13, 1961, report that it also had some submachine guns and grenades in Ciudad Trujillo which could be provided to the anti-Trujillo group if the go-ahead were given.

The spy agency, however, deleted this from the document it gave Borosage.

ACLU national staff counsel John H. F. Shattuck said yesterday that he would continue pressing in court for more details.

He said he would "suspend judgment" as to whether the Rockefeller Commission got still more documents that have yet to be acknowledged in any fashion.

According to the records released yesterday, Castro's assassination was mentioned as early as March 9, 1960, during a meeting of the CIA's "Branch 4 Task Force." Presiding was Col. J. C. King, the chief of the Western Hemisphere Division within the CIA's Directorate of Plans.

He told the meeting that then-CIA Director Alan Dulles was "presenting a special policy paper" to the National Security Council's 5412 Committee, which supervised covert operations.

The heavily censored memorandum for the record added: "Col. King stated that (deleted) unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package—which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force."

Following the 1961 de-

bate at the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy approved an all-out secret war of sabotage and propaganda against the Castro regime under the code name "Operation Mongoose," whose de facto boss was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

Reporting on a "Mongoose meeting" on Oct. 4, 1962, shortly before the Cuban missile crisis, then-CIA Director John McCone noted that Robert Kennedy, as chairman, made plain his and the President's "dissatisfaction with lack of action in the sabotage field."

The documents showed that the legacy of assassination involvement continued to pursue the CIA even after last year's investigations were starting to bring them to the surface.

In early April of 1975, a few weeks before the final U.S. evacuation of South Vietnam, for instance, CIA headquarters here was evidently told of a "potential coup" being planned against South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu in hopes that the change would bring continued American support for the beleaguered country.

The CIA reacted with deep alarm, fueled by memories of the 1963 coup that resulted in the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

"With Diem precedent and current allegations against our agency," then-CIA Director William E. Colby cabled Saigon on April 4, 1975, "it would be both institutional and national disaster if there were any remote connection between us and such an event. . . . If things get complicated at all, advise and I will recommend strongest effort to facilitate Thieu and family safe passage and haven."

NEW YORK TIMES

4 MAY 1976

## Not 'Deep Throat'

To the Editor:

On Jan. 29 you published on your Op-Ed page a piece by J. Anthony Lukas, "The Bennett Mystery," which contained a number of inaccuracies. After an early, unsuccessful effort to have a letter in response published, I decided to let the matter die.

Yesterday, however, another publication picked up much the same theme, indicating that Mr. Lukas' errors are now assumed as truth, and that my "silence" has been accepted as proof.

Simply put, I am not Mr. Woodward's "Deep Throat." I have never been a C.I.A. operative, and I have never done the things that uninformed journalists like Mr. Lukas are telling the general public I did. And I wish all these "experts" would read the Rockefeller Commission Report before they rush into print with things they've heard but really know nothing about.

ROBERT F. BENNETT  
Woodland Hills, Calif., April 21, 1976

BALTIMORE SUN  
30 April 1976

# Castro, Kennedy plots tied

## Mathias tells of possible Paris contact

By JIM MANN

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R., Md.) disclosed yesterday the Senate intelligence committee will soon publicly report on the "strong likelihood" of connections between American plots to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

If such a report were issued, it would become the first time that any branch of the federal government ever linked the Kennedy assassination to the Central Intelligence Agency's designs on Mr. Castro's life, which were first confirmed by the Senate intelligence committee last year.

The senator, a member of the intelligence committee, said there are now "indications" that a Cuban official and CIA operative code-named Am-Lash—who was in Paris November 22, 1963, secretly receiving from the CIA a poison pen directed at Mr. Castro—was an "insecure" contact. Mr. Mathias suggested the man might have been a double-agent reporting back to the Cubans.

For the first time in his career, Mr. Mathias, in a luncheon address, publicly expressed strong doubts about the Warren Commission report, which concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in killing former President Kennedy. The senator said he thought the commission members "were simply denied information that might have had a bearing on their judgment." He later said both the CIA and the FBI held back information from the commission.

"If the Warren Commission had known that Am-Lash was in Paris receiving a poison pen the day Kennedy was assassinated, we would have had a 24th [additional] volume to their report," the senator said. In addition, he said, Americans would have been "alerted" at that time to CIA activities.

At the time of the CIA plots against Mr. Castro, Mr. Mathias said, "There is reason to think Cuban intelligence was aware something was going on.... The degree they were willing to retaliate is unclear." But

he pointed out that in 1963, Mr. Castro publicly threatened to retaliate if there were plots against him.

Mr. Mathias also told a reporter the subject of the Kennedy assassination came up briefly during the recent trip he and Senator James G. Abourezk (D., S.D.) made to the Middle East. He said Syria's president, Hafez el Assad, asked them when the American people were going to be told the truth about the assassination. But, he said, the conversation quickly returned to affairs of the Middle East.

Though Mr. Mathias has not previously questioned the Warren Commission report, another member of the intelligence committee, Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R., Pa.) did so last year. Since that time, Mr. Schweiker and Senator Gary Hart (D., Colo.) have been conducting their own investigation of the assassination for the intelligence committee.

A spokesman for Mr. Schweiker said yesterday that five staff members have been working full-time on the Kennedy assassination and that they may receive help soon from other members of the intelligence committee who have now finished the major portions of the committee's report.

The report was released this week, but the addendum to it, concerning the Kennedy assassination, will not be released until the end of May, Senate staff members said.

The intelligence committee reported in November that Am-Lash, a Cuban agent, on the day of the Kennedy assassination was meeting in Paris with a high-ranking CIA official, Desmond Fitzgerald, who offered him a poison pen rigged with a hypodermic needle for use against Mr. Castro. According to the report, Am-Lash rejected the offer, telling the CIA he thought they "could come up with something more sophisticated than that."

It was only one of a long series of CIA plots against Mr. Castro, according to the report. Mr. Castro himself, in an interview with an Associated Press correspondent in Havana on September 7, 1963, warned, "United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

The final report of the Warren Commission said the members had investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Cuban government" but was unable to find any substantial evidence of contact.

Mr. Castro, both in a television interview and reportedly in a meeting with Senator Abourezk, has denied any involvement in the Kennedy assassination. In the television in-

terview he said he was "under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States...."

## Levi finds no FBI tie to slaying of King

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Edward H. Levi, the Attorney General, announced yesterday that a preliminary inquiry by his department turned up no evidence of any connection between the FBI and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., but he ordered another, more thorough review by another branch of the Justice Department.

The King assassination was studied for several months by an assistant attorney general, J. Stanley Pottinger, of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division. Mr. Pottinger said yesterday he reviewed the FBI's "core files" regarding Dr.

King and found no evidence of FBI involvement in his assassination, although he said there was considerable evidence the FBI had sought to discredit the civil rights leader.

Mr. Pottinger originally had recommended that an independent commission be established to review the King assassination more thoroughly. But the attorney general instead assigned that task to the Justice Department's office of professional responsibility.

The full review of the King files requires so much work, Mr. Pottinger said, that he could not "do his job" as assistant attorney general for civil rights and complete the inquiry at the same time.

He said Mr. Levi felt the integrity of the Justice Department was strong enough so that it could itself investigate the King assassination and the FBI without assigning the task to an independent commission.

NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1976

## 125 Questioned by Investigators On Intelligence Study Disclosure

By RICHARD D. LYONS

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 13—The detectives hired by the House ethics committee to investigate the unauthorized disclosure of the report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence have questioned 125 persons but have yet to identify the source, the chairman of the inquiry said today.

Representative John J. Flynt, the Georgia Democrat who heads the ethics committee, said it would probably be a month before his force of 12 retired agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation completed their inquiries.

Mr. Flynt said it was possible that, once the investigation was over, the ethics committee, formally named the House Committee of Standards of Official Conduct, would hold public hearings on the matter.

At issue is who transmitted a copy of the report to newsmen, including Daniel Schorr, a correspondent here for CBS News.

For six weeks, the former F.B.I. agents have been questioning representatives who served on the select committee, headed by Representative Otis G. Pike, Democrat of Suffolk, their staff aides and personnel who served on the committee, now disbanded.

David Bowers, the former F.B.I. inspector who is directing

the investigation, gave a two-hour progress report to the ethics committee today in a closed session.

When questioned by newsmen after the meeting, Mr. Flynt said "I am not going to get into a numbers game" when asked how many suspects had been turned up. He also declined to say whether Mr. Schorr had been questioned.

"The release of the progress report would compromise the remainder of the investigation," the chairman said, adding that he expected the investigation to be completed "well within six weeks."

The intelligence committee prepared a report highly critical of the Central Intelligence Agency and other Federal intelligence-gathering groups after a long investigation. Reports of the document's contents appeared in The New York Times and on CBS News. Last Jan. 29, the House voted not to make the report public.

But in February, Mr. Schorr made a copy of the report available to The Village Voice, a weekly newspaper in New York City. The breach of secrecy enraged many representatives, and the House voted for the investigation that is now being carried out by the ethics committee.

THE NATIONAL OBSERVER  
15 MAY 1976

# Our Passive, Timid CIA Needs Leadership

By Gregory G. Rushford

THE CLASSIC intelligence failure of Pearl Harbor, when U.S. intercepts of the Japanese attack plans remained untranslated in a low-priority "incoming" basket, sparked the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War II. Because the Japanese attack hinged on complete surprise, an intelligence warning would have made a difference. That knowledge remains the driving force behind the billions devoted to foreign analysis by the CIA and its sister agencies in the Defense and State departments.

Despite the billions spent, the United States has been caught unprepared time and time again because—there is no kinder way to put it—our intelligence has failed. Even if we assume the CIA would be able to detect a nuclear attack on the United States in advance, which I do not, continued failures to anticipate important foreign developments make the conduct of a sound foreign policy increasingly difficult. To ignore our intelligence system's flaws—continuing flaws that stem from an uncertain leadership—is to risk our very security.

To examine the record, the House Intelligence Committee selected six major foreign-policy turning points at random: the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam, the 1973 Middle East war, the 1974 coups in Cyprus and Portugal, and India's 1974 nuclear explosion. (Because the House has voted not to release the committee's findings, this article is derived from the public record.)

## Intelligence Failures

We knew that Czechoslovakia had dashed the Johnson Administration's hopes for nuclear-arms talks with the Russians; that Tet cost thousands of lives; that the Middle East war resulted in the Arab oil embargo, a high cost to the U.S. in terms of military assistance to Israel, and risked U.S.-Soviet conflict. We knew that the coups in Portugal and Cyprus had raised the possibility of Communist influence in a NATO ally and hurt our relationships with Greece and Turkey. We knew that India's nuclear explosion threatened the spread of nuclear weapons.

We did not know intelligence failures had contributed to each unfortunate situation. But we know it now.

U.S. intelligence agencies, we found, had collected a considerable body of excellent information, often at great cost and risk. But the information was not always made available to those who needed it. Written estimates lacked perspective. A few courageous analysts who sounded alarms were not fully supported by their more cautious superiors. Technical breakdowns prevented valuable information from reaching Washington until after the event had passed. Policy officials in the State Department, the White House, and Pentagon who were emotionally committed to their particular policies, regardless of facts, hindered analysis. Post mortems of intelligence failures tended to blame mid-level analysts, yet the real problems were caused by the leadership. And the intelligence leadership lacks the stature to withstand political pressures that threaten to corrupt the entire system.

After the 1973 Middle East intelligence failure, the CIA acknowledged that the "machinery" of which the analyst was a part had not always eased an exceedingly difficult task. The two most visible parts of that machinery, or bureaucracy, are current-intelligence publications and national intelligence estimates. Neither runs well.

Gregory G. Rushford was an investigator for the House Intelligence Committee in its recent investigation of the CIA.

Our intelligence agencies cannot report timely and accurate information consistently. The initial and most obvious sign shows up in what the current-intelligence publications said at the time of key foreign events. The morning that Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus was overthrown by Greek strong man Dimitrios Ioannidis, the CIA wrote that "General Ioannidis takes moderate line while playing for time in dispute with Makarios."

The intelligence agencies had observed signs of Arab military mobilization for more than a week prior to Oct. 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. But current-intelligence reporting provided reassurances that neither Egypt nor Syria would go to war.

In the months prior to the April 1974 coup in Portugal, at least four signs of serious political discontent—including an abortive military coup—surfaced in the press. Yet current-intelligence writings followed the sound and fury, not significance, of each "hard news" development. As the director of State Department intelligence, William Hyland, told our committee, "There was enough information to suggest trouble, but it wasn't really subjected to a detailed analysis and a projection of where the trends might be going."

## Too Many Pressures

Current-intelligence publications suffer from lack of depth not because those who write them are unimpressive. Most mid-level analysts who write current intelligence are knowledgeable individuals. But they are victimized by the pressures imposed on able people by the bureaucracy.

There are too many intelligence publications: spot reports, instant summaries, daily reports, morning and afternoon reports for the Secretary of State, Presidential briefs, memoranda, communications-intelligence summaries, national-intelligence dailies, weekly summaries. Analysts have meetings to attend, superiors to please (often by softening bold judgments), "positions" of their office to "co-ordinate" with other offices and agencies, deadlines to meet. There is precious little time left to think and write well.

Those who read current intelligence often complain about its redundancy, duplication, and poor analysis. During Cyprus alone there were 86 messages classified "CRITIC," or critically important, yet "the significance of many . . . was obscure," the CIA found.

The National Security Agency (NSA), which intercepts and decodes foreign communications, produces raw reports that are nearly incomprehensible to the lay reader; the written summaries are understandable

to few. The NSA collects so much data that it must shred or burn more than 30 tons of paper each day; it is literally burying itself in classified information. NSA spews forth so much data that the analyst is burdened with hundreds of NSA reports per week, the CIA complains. During the Cyprus crisis, readers complained about "an excess of cryptic raw reports from NSA which could not be translated by lay readers," as the CIA puts it. The few who can comprehend NSA reports often have no time left to compare them with other intelligence. So intelligence puzzles are left half-assembled.

U.S. intelligence cannot follow trends much better than it follows day-to-day events because of weaknesses in the estima-

live system. Before Tet, U.S. officials had anticipated attacks in Vietnam's highlands and northernmost provinces, but not simultaneous strikes at nearly every urban center. Our intelligence estimates had—in the CIA's words—so “degraded our image of the enemy” that we were unaware the Communists were capable of such attacks.

The CIA's post mortem of the 1974 Cyprus crisis reports that analytical performance “fell quite short of the mark,” particularly because of the “failure in July to estimate the likelihood of a Greek-sponsored coup against Archbishop Makarios.”

After the Middle East war in October 1973, the CIA realized there had been no National Intelligence Estimate—report prepared from time to time—on the likelihood of war since May—and that estimate had only addressed the next few weeks. A brilliant analysis prepared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, also in May, told then Secretary of State William Rogers that the Arabs might well resort to war by autumn. That “wisdom,” as the CIA rightly called it, was forgotten in October.

The latest National Intelligence Estimate prior to Portugal's 1974 coup was prepared in 1964.

The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system at the top of the analytical hierarchy is weak and is responsible for the poor quality of estimates preceding the Portugal, Cyprus, and Middle East crises. NIOs work under the director of the CIA, in his capacity as head of the entire intelligence community. Their influence varies with the CIA director's influence. If he's powerful, their voice is strong. If he's weak, their influence is too.

The NIO for Western Europe, an able man, has more than 20 countries to cover. But he has just one staff assistant. Instead of command authority over the time of analysts in the CIA and other agencies, the NIO must “cajole and plead” for assistance, as one close observer told me. When Turkey was preparing to invade Cyprus, an NIO memorandum that predicted the invasion was never disseminated. The NIO was busy preparing a briefing before the U.S. Intelligence Board on a National Intelligence Estimate for Italy.

Most NIOs have regional responsibilities, yet some crucial issues, such as nuclear proliferation, cannot be covered in regional terms. There has been no NIO for Africa.

The value of the NIO system is considerable to busy policy officials who need quick answers, say before a Kissinger shuttle to the Middle East. But the very closeness of NIOs to policy makes the system vulnerable to pressures that can destroy the independence of their analyses. This is a far cry from the expectations of some of its founders that the CIA would provide independent analysis of long-term trends.

When the Germans began losing World War II, Hitler began disregarding accurate intelligence evaluations that conflicted with the Nazi line. This lesson (fortunately for us) is worth remembering always, especially when thinking of the Vietnam War.

Just as Vietnam tore our society, it caused great pressures inside U.S. intelligence agencies. The basic problem was accurate intelligence that cast doubt on the wisdom of Vietnam policy. That doubt became heresy when the policy stakes rose.

The first National Intelligence Estimate that I'm positive was “shaded” to reflect policy officials' optimism was published in early 1963. That estimate was first weakened during the drafting process to reflect the Kennedy Administration's hopeful views. The draft estimate had forecast long-range problems with our South Vietnamese allies without increased U.S. support. Instead of heeding such sound advice, the Administration influenced the CIA to weaken it.

The CIA uncovered evidence in 1965 and 1967 indicating the U.S. military command had understated Communist strength, that there probably were more than 500,000 enemy personnel, not the prevailing—and public—estimate of fewer than 300,000.

The CIA's efforts to provide honest intelligence ran directly into the overriding public-relations concerns of military and civilian policy makers. Like used-car salesmen, military officials tried strenuously to set the mileage back. If the higher figures became known to those who had an “incorrect view” of the war, the Saigon command cabled to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the command's “image of success” would be undermined.

The military fought so fiercely with the CIA's figures in Saigon in September 1967 that two categories of irregular Communist forces were dropped from the official order of battle. Immediately thereafter the Saigon command prepared press briefings on the war's progress that one CIA official labeled “one of the greatest snow jobs since Potemkin constructed his village.” Another CIA analyst termed the military numbers “contrived,” “phony,” and “controlled by the desire to stay below” the 300,000 public estimate.

After the Tet offensive began, the Defense Intelligence Agency agreed there were at least 500,000 Communist forces in Vietnam, and the Joint Chiefs asked for more American soldiers to fight them.

#### A Rancorous Debate

A good example of policy abuse of intelligence in the State Department is shown in a memorandum State Intelligence was asked to send to Assistant Secretary William Bundy in September 1967. “Unclassified” findings that could be made public said enemy morale and recruitment were declining and Viet Cong defections were increasing. But facts directly contradicting each of these points, and more, were classified secret on “national security” grounds: Enemy morale problems were of no great military import; defections were increasing less than in the previous year; and enemy recruitment statistics were unreliable.

American intelligence still suffers because officials who could not hide their disgust at such tactics found their careers threatened. Those who kept quiet were promoted.

By 1973 the Vietnam debate had become so rancorous it helped destroy the respected Board of National Estimates. The board, an interagency body of intelligence experts responsible for estimates, had become moribund in the eyes of some. Moribund or not, the board fought for the integrity of its Vietnam estimates to the bitter end. Three persons close to the board have told me they knew the battles were nearly finished when one of President Nixon's favorite press leaks wrote that it was unlikely Nixon's sharp eye had escaped the “gloomy” CIA estimates on Vietnam and that changes in the estimative hierarchy were needed. Shortly thereafter a new CIA director—a Nixon “team player” and a Vietnam-policy supporter—abolished the board for the weaker NIO system.

The lesson of Pearl Harbor has not been absorbed by the CIA leadership. The “watch committee” that met to assess the outbreak of war in the Middle East on Oct. 6, 1973—after hostilities had begun—could not discuss certain



classified information because not everyone present was cleared to receive it. Other classified information that would have been helpful to analysis was not disseminated until the war had begun. Similar problems plagued the Cyprus and other crises.

The lack of dissemination of intelligence controlled by Secretary of State Kissinger is disturbing because it reveals the CIA leadership's lack of stature. High intelligence and policy officials recognize the intelligence value in diplomatic discussions. To study the nuances of those conversations for their hidden meanings, and to compare this information with other findings, is essential for accurate intelligence.

Prior to the 1973 Middle East war, Kissinger was engaged in intensive discussions with Soviet, Arab, and Israeli officials. According to *The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger* by Israeli journalist Matti Golan, Kissinger later told Israeli Premier Golda Meir that an Egyptian official had hinted at possible war, but he dismissed this as an empty threat. U.S. intelligence was denied access to the discussions which might have assisted analysis.

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—a notable intelligence success—President Kennedy and his staff worked intimately with senior intelligence officials. Yet Secretary Kissinger did not even consult his intelligence arm in the

State Department prior to the U.S. troop alert of Oct. 24, 1973, which allegedly came in response to Soviet threats to intervene with military force against Israel. Testimony before the House Intelligence Committee that "certainly the technical intelligence available in INR [State Department Intelligence] did not support such a Soviet intention" raises the question: Did the United States risk war without justification?

#### Embarrassed Officials

The CIA complained after the Cyprus crisis that "analysis . . . may also have suffered as the result of the nonavailability of certain key categories of information, specifically those associated with private conversations between U.S. policy makers and certain principals in the dispute." The CIA added: "Because ignorance of such matters could substantially damage the ability to analyze events as they unfold, in this or in any future crisis, the problem is serious and one which should be addressed by the [intelligence] community and by policy makers as well."

Yet CIA officials were so embarrassed when I asked them which policy makers they had in mind that the name of one of Kissinger's principal aides was excised from the House Intelligence Committee copy of the Cyprus post mortem. The phrase "key U.S. official" was typed in its place. Such information is still "nonavailable" to the CIA on such important issues as U.S.

China relations.

#### Third-Level Assistant

In 1973 some intelligence officials were greatly concerned that Kissinger might be suppressing intelligence related to alleged Soviet violations of the SALT agreement. Two of them recommended that acting CIA Director Vernon Walters (who has announced he plans to retire soon) approach the President to ensure that Kissinger's conduct was authorized. Walters, following the pattern he established when Nixon's aides had tried to abuse the CIA in the Watergate affair, never approached the President. CIA Director Colby later got in the habit of writing to Kissinger's aides for permission to disseminate certain intelligence concerning Soviet nuclear-arms matters. Thus the President's statutory intelligence adviser was reduced to a third-level assistant. Kissinger aides justify this by citing numerous leaks that seemed designed to undercut SALT policy.

Such timidity does not encourage one to believe the CIA is equipped to resist the inevitable encroachments from dominating Presidential assistants. The CIA has become not the "rogue elephant" some fear, but a passive circus pony, ridden at will by Presidential assistants. Newly appointed CIA Director George Bush would be well-advised to attract new leadership.

THE MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE

27 April 1976

## Most approve U.S. intelligence work, but not covert activities

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Minnesotans approve of the cloak but not the dagger in United States espionage operations, the Minneapolis Tribune's Minnesota Poll finds.

Nearly six out of every 10 state residents interviewed in an opinion survey last month (59 percent) said they generally approve of spying to gather intelligence information.

Thirty-two percent said they disapprove and 9 percent are not sure.

The figures are the reverse when it comes to the United States conducting secret operations in other countries. Thirty-two percent approve and 59 percent disapprove.

Middle-aged men with Republican leanings who attended college are more likely to approve of U.S. intelligence activities, if the survey

data are used as a guide.

Minnesota women who did not go to college, who are young adults or of senior-citizen age and who are DFLers or independent voters are a good bet to be critics of U.S. espionage efforts.

U.S. undercover operations abroad, normally a subject left to the imagination, have had uncommon public exposure as Congress has scrutinized the work of the Central

### Minnesota Poll

Intelligence Agency and other intelligence units.

A balanced sampling of 593 Minnesota men and women first was asked in telephone interviews taken March 11-14:

"Some people say that gathering intelligence information about other countries through espionage is necessary to protect our national security. Others say that such activities violate the rights of other countries and should not be a part of our foreign policy. In general, do you approve or disapprove of United States espionage activities?"

Men approve by more than a 3-1 margin, while nearly as many women disapprove as approve.

	All adults	Men	Women
Approve .....	59%	72%	47%
Disapprove .....	32	22	41
Not sure .....	9	6	12
	100%	100%	100%

The findings in a carefully conducted survey simply are estimates of the results that would be obtained if all men and women in the state had been interviewed.

The next question was:

"Some people say that our government should engage in secret activities to influence events in other countries, so as to maintain our national security. Others say that such secret activities are a violation of the internal affairs of foreign countries. In general, do you approve or disapprove of secret efforts by the United States to influence events in foreign countries?"

The replies:

	All adults	Men	Women
Approve .....	32%	40%	25%
Disapprove .....	59	53	63
Not sure .....	9	7	12
	100%	100%	100%

Again, more women held negative views than do men, but the difference is not as pronounced as on the earlier question. Opinions also fluctuated by age, political party affiliation and education. The following table shows those differences for both questions with the "not sure" count not shown.

#### United States Espionage

	Gathering intelligence	Secret activities
	Approve	Disapprove
All .....	59%	32%
DFLers .....	57	35
Ind.-Republicans ..	68	27
Independents ..	58	32
Less than high school grad ..	47	34
High school graduate ..	59	31
Some college ..	65	29
35-49 years ..	75	17



NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1976

## Senate Chiefs Back Single Panel To Watch C.I.A. and Its Budget

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 11 — which voted to give the new Senate leaders reached a compromise agreement today on a plan to create a permanent new committee with exclusive authority to monitor the Central Intelligence Agency and authorize funds for the agency's operations.

Despite the continued opposition of some conservative senators of both parties, the plan is expected to be approved this week by a large margin in the full Senate.

The adoption of the compromise by four key Senators apparently averted a full scale floor fight between members of the Senate's old guard and younger, more reform-minded senators.

Such a fight might have had major implications for the contest for the Senate majority leadership next year.

The compromise was devised by Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader; Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, the majority whip; Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut, chairman of the Government Operations Committee, and Howard W. Cannon of Nevada, chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration. All are Democrats.

Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Republican leader, was consulted and agreed to accept the plan.

The critical element of the agreement was the concession by Mr. Byrd and Mr. Cannon that the new committee could have the power to limit the Central Intelligence Agency's budget and restrict its operations.

For his part, Senator Ribicoff agreed that the new committee would have to share jurisdiction over other intelligence agencies with existing committees. Authority over the budget for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for instance, would be shared with the Judiciary Committee, and authority over the Defense Intelligence Agency would be shared with the Armed Services Committee.

The central finding of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities in its report last month was that Congress had exercised far too little control over the intelligence agencies.

The committee recommended the creation of a new Senate committee with broad power to regulate the work and expenditures of all intelligence agencies.

Senator Ribicoff's Government Operations Committee voted to create such a committee. But its work was overturned two weeks ago by Senator Cannon's Rules Committee,

which voted to give the new committee no law-making or budgetary authority. Senator Byrd led the effort in the Rules Committee to strip the new committee of real power.

Sources privy to the negotiations that led to the compromise said that Senator Byrd had become convinced that his advocacy of a weak intelligence oversight committee would damage his prospects of becoming majority leader next year upon Senator Mansfield's retirement.

His candidacy is supported by older, conservative Democrats such as John C. Stennis of Mississippi and John L. McClellan of Arkansas, who would have to give up to the new committee some of their long-held jurisdiction over intelligence matters.

However, the sources said, Mr. Byrd feared that by appearing to carry the spear for the old Guard Senators he would lose considerable support among younger senators, who want to keep tighter Congressional reins on the intelligence agencies.

Senator Byrd was a home in West Virginia today. He is a favorite son candidate for President in today's Democratic presidential primary there.

For a time, since Senator Mansfield announced he would retire, the race to become majority leader appeared to be between Mr. Byrd and Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine with Mr. Byrd the odds on favorite.

However the picture has become complicated by the decision of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey not to seek the Presidency and to run for re-election to the Senate from Minnesota.

Senator Humphrey is possibly the most popular Democrat in the Senate. Many Senate Democrats are now predicting that Mr. Humphrey will run for majority leader, that Mr. Muskie will drop out of the race and that Mr. Humphrey will have an excellent chance to defeat Mr. Byrd.

The gossip around the Senate last week was that, if Mr. Byrd pressed his effort to strip the new intelligence committee of law-making and budgetary power, Senator Humphrey would take an active role on the other side in the expected floor fight.

If the compromise is accepted by the full Senate, as expected, it will mean that Congress will vote each year on the money to run intelligence agencies, something it has not done before.

Persons experienced in drafting legislation said that they could not comprehend how Congress could enact such an authorization bill without making public the amount of funds authorized.

OREGONIAN, Portland  
24 April 1976

## CIA in new hands

The unexpected resignation of Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the nomination of E. Henry Knoche as his replacement indicate that the White House intends that the CIA concentrate on its original mission — intelligence gathering and analysis — rather than on clandestine operations.

President Ford's choice of diplomat-politician George Bush as CIA director pointed in that direction. Bush's two predecessors, Richard Helms and William E. Colby, both rose to the directorship through CIA ranks in the Plans Division, which was identified in congressional hearings as the source of such questionable operations as domestic spying and incipient plots to assassinate foreign officials.

Knoche has been in the CIA for 23 years, but his service has been chiefly in intelligence analysis, with no hint of involvement in "dirty tricks," in the United States or abroad.

It may also be significant that, if the Senate confirms the Knoche nomination, as is necessary under the law, it will be the first time since the founding of the CIA in 1947 that a military man has not filled at least one of the two top positions in the agency. The CIA grew out of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and inherited much of the personnel and the point of view developed in confrontation with wartime enemies.

If the trend suggested by the Bush-Knoche team engulfs the CIA, it will be a very good thing. In the world as it is today, the United States must have an effective organization for the gathering and evaluation of intelligence to aid in the nation's defense. But it does not need an agency that is the source of the kinds of "dirty tricks" that discredit the essential function of intelligence.

President Ford's reorganization of the CIA, announced a few weeks ago, suggested that this is his view of the issue. His latest switch in CIA leadership appears to confirm it.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
6 MAY 1976

### News focus

Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) declares he is satisfied at last that the CIA was not involved in Watergate. As an early Watergate investigator, Baker developed a concern that the agency may have had more than a peripheral role in the affair, so he had investigators work for months on all angles of the matter. He is still disturbed by some "nagging questions" on which no evidence is available. But he declared that in fairness it was time to exculpate the CIA.

When George Bush became director of the CIA, the agency's debugging experts gave his home a thorough going-over to insure that no listening devices had been planted. They found no electronic bugs but they did find termites, a nuisance which they were not equipped to combat. So Bush had to call the termite man like any citizen.

Washington Post  
2 May 1976

## Was the CIA's Man in Havana a Double Agent?

# The Riddle of AM LASH

By George Crile III

**A**M LASH is the cryptonym the CIA assigned to the senior Cuban official it had recruited in 1961 to kill Fidel Castro. The Agency's dealings with AM LASH, which continued up to a disastrous end in 1965, encompassed the longest-standing and, on the surface, the most likely to succeed of its numerous plots on Castro's life. It therefore seems a remarkable suspension of curiosity that the Senate Intelligence Committee, in its investigation of the CIA's assassination activities, passed so lightly over this critical chapter.

To begin with, any examination of AM LASH's history would suggest that he had for many years been far too close to insanity to be relied on in any sensitive operation. And from this a larger question presents itself. Was AM LASH actually a conscious double agent for Castro, or was he perhaps so transparent and emotionally exploitable that he unwittingly provided an equivalent service? And if so, and if Castro had become convinced that the United States would stop at nothing to kill him, could Castro have felt compelled to strike first?

AM LASH has never been publicly named. But his history is well known among Cuban exiles in Miami. He was a Cuban doctor, a former *comandante* of the rebel army, a hero of the revolution: Rolando Cubela, an intimate of Castro. The CIA persuaded the Senate Intelligence Committee not to identify Cubela, who is now in jail in Cuba. It maintains that alerting the Cubans to his role in early CIA plots would expose him to reprisals.

But this argument is specious. The Cuban government is filled with men who know Cubela and his history and who must have read the Church Committee's report. It is difficult to believe that Cubela now has any secrets from his captors. The only people who stand to gain from continued secrecy are those all too eager conspirators at the CIA. For the rest of us this story is essential if we are to begin to make sense of the events surrounding the secret but deadly struggle that was being fought in the autumn of 1963.

### The Tortured Assassin

**T**O UNDERSTAND Cubela fully, it is necessary at once to introduce a Cuban exile in Miami, Jose Aleman, whose assertions are sufficiently important to make it worth reviewing his record for reliability.

Aleman was educated in the United States at Worcester Academy and then at the University of Miami. During the 1940s, his father was perhaps the most powerful man in Cuba. Nominally minister of education, he was a heavily guarded boddler and boss, whose most rewarding coup was to back a truck up to the Cuban treasury and make off with the Republic's foreign reserves. In Miami, he

bought up most of Key Biscayne, retained Sen. George Smathers as his lawyer and invested as heavily in American politicians as in American real estate.

His son chose a different path. A young, handsome idealist, he became, like Castro, a revolutionary against the Batista regime. While Castro was in the mountains, Aleman was helping to direct the most active and dangerous part of the revolution in Havana. He and four other young men — including Eugenio Rolando Martinez, the Watergate burglar — formed an underground cell that provided the arms for the almost successful attack on the Presidential Palace in 1957. Cubela was then one of the leaders of the student revolutionaries at the University of Havana, and he began to work closely with Martinez and Aleman.

"There were many nasty things we had to do to bring on the revolution," Aleman reflects. The most difficult was the decision to kill Blanco Rico, Batista's chief of military intelligence. The revolutionary logic of that day called for sparing sadistic officials because of the hatred they aroused. "Rico treated everyone like a gentleman. He wouldn't even torture people," Aleman explains. So he had to be done away with. "Rolando [Martinez] and I participated in the decision to get rid of him," and the man whom they assigned to kill him was Cubela.

In October, 1956, Cubela shot Rico through the head in the fashionable Montmartre night club. As he died, Rico caught Cubela's eyes and, Cubela believed, smiled understandingly at him. Cubela escaped to Miami where he moved into the Tradewinds Motel, one of the properties (including also the Miami Stadium) which Aleman owned there.

A large number of revolutionaries had been forced to flee Cuba at that time and many ended up staying at Aleman's expense at the Tradewinds. Cubela was now a hero among these exiles, but he was tortured by the memory of Rico's dying smile. He was convinced that Rico was talking to him at night and he had a nervous breakdown. Martinez, who had also gone into exile, shared a room with him and served as his confessor and analyst. After a few months Cubela appeared to have recovered and returned to Cuba to join Castro's second front in the Escambray mountains. Castro made him a *comandante*, then the highest rank in the Army, and when Batista fled Cuba on New Year's Day 1959, he swept into Havana several days before Castro and led the force that seized the Presidential Palace.

### The Plotting Begins

**I**T IS HARD to imagine the confusion that marked the first year of revolutionary government. Not all the revolutionaries supported Castro. Many, and particularly those who had worked in Havana, mistrusted Fidel deeply but not more than he mistrusted

them. Cubela had always been suspicious of Castro. But now he was one of the towering figures of the revolution, with an independent following. Castro needed his support, and Cubela responded to his advances by accepting an offer to become head of the politically powerful federation of students at the University.

Cubela exalted in his new-found status as a triumphant revolutionary. He drove about Havana in a gigantic touring car, drinking and womanizing. He was blissful in his dissipation until he killed a woman in a car accident, and again began hearing Rico at night. As before, he took to calling Aleman whenever he heard the voice.

Aleman, now convinced that Castro was a Communist, had decided that Fidel had to be eliminated. He says that he went with another revolutionary friend to convince Cubela to take on the assignment. "He was very upset when we came to him," says Aleman. "He said, 'I'm a nervous wreck. I'm just getting better, and now you want me to kill Castro. I don't see the Communists, but if I recover, maybe I will — I won't say yes, I won't say no.'" Aleman was then paying for a psychiatrist for Cubela, and he persuaded the analyst, who shared his political views, to try to convince Cubela that the only way to exorcise Rico was by assassinating Castro.

The man who accompanied Aleman was Jose (Pepin) Naranjo, an old revolutionary colleague who shared Aleman's mistrust of Castro. But not long after the meeting Castro invited Naranjo to join his government as minister of interior (director of all the nation's police forces). It was a move on Castro's part to win support among the rival factions of the revolution. Understandably, Aleman was alarmed; he expected to be arrested. But nothing happened. It was a time of political paranoia and Aleman assumed that Naranjo had decided to keep quiet so as not to arouse Castro's suspicion.

When considering the possibility that the Cubans were aware of Cubela's later CIA plotting, it is worth bearing Naranjo's subsequent story in mind. By 1960 he had risen meteorically to a position of total trust with Fidel: it was he who tasted Castro's food to make sure it wasn't poisoned. Today he is constantly at Fidel's side. In a CBS documentary narrated by Dan Rather last year, Naranjo was seen taking Castro's gun and *bandalero* from him when Fidel settled back to relax. Somewhere along the line he proved his loyalty and managed to maintain Castro's trust — a not in-

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considerable feat given the fact that Cubela was his number two man in the Interior Ministry at the time of his recruitment by the CIA. It is of some importance that Aleman told me about his meeting with Cubela and Naranjo a full six months before the Senate assassination report made the first public reference to AM LASH.

In 1960, several months after talking to Cubela, Aleman went into exile in Miami. He was to play no further role in Cubela's life. But Cubela himself had by then become a Manchurian candidate, at least vulnerable to the suggestion of killing Castro, but also a colossal security risk to whoever tried to tap his services, as he was being tapped by the CIA at the time of Kennedy's assassination.

### Taking Risks

OPERATION MONGOOSE, the secret war that the United States waged against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, was not a CIA initiative. It was the product of the Kennedys and soon resulted in the establishment in Miami of the largest CIA station in the world — with an estimated 400 American case officers and about 2,000 Cuban agents — charged with the sole task of destroying Castro. But by 1963 Mongoose was a demonstrable failure. It was at this point that AM LASH emerged as the Agency's last hope to accomplish, with a single blow, the goal that had so stubbornly eluded them.

Cubela's relationship with the Agency had begun at his initiative in 1951 when he contacted both the CIA and the FBI, expressing a desire to defect. But Cubela was the rarest of assets — an agent in the very heart of the enemy system — and the CIA did not want him to leave. His case officer's assignment was to ensure that AM LASH "stay in place and report to us."

At the beginning of September, 1963, Cubela finally agreed to stay if he "could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba." He told his case officer he would like to plan Castro's "execution."

It was very shortly after this, on Sept. 7, 1963, that Castro summoned an Associated Press reporter, Daniel Harker, to issue an extraordinary threat: "United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

"There can be no question," observed Raymond Rocca, the CIA's liaison officer with the Warren Commission, "that this represented a more than ordinary attempt by [Castro] to get a message on record in the United States." Indeed, it was unprecedented — even for Castro, who was in the habit of making all kinds of accusations and threats in the course of his seven and eight-hour-long speeches.

One possible explanation for the

warning was the CIA's recent paramilitary activities in Cuba. After the Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962, Kennedy, living up to the spirit as well as the letter of his non-invasion agreement with Khrushchev, had suspended the massive secret war the CIA had been waging against Cuba. But then in August, 1963, he suddenly reversed his position and authorized 15 new commando raids; by the end of the month the Agency had hit two major industrial targets.

But however infuriating such strikes might have been, they hardly endangered Cuban leaders. Could Castro somehow have learned of the CIA's AM LASH plotting? Cubela was not exactly a good security risk; even his case officers were aware of their agent's instability. One described AM LASH's "mercurial" temperament, telling how Cubela had proposed Castro's "execution," only to become deeply disturbed when the case officer used the word "assassination." "It was not the act that he objected to," the case officer wrote, "but merely the choice of words used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable."

To the frustrated CIA men running the Cuban secret war it must have seemed an acceptable risk to put up with Cubela's disturbed state of mind. It was certainly worth giving him the assurances he demanded as a precondition to carrying out his plan. According to his case officer, he requested military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his plots against Castro were discovered and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

The meeting was set for Oct. 29. Kennedy did not attend, but Desmond Fitzgerald, a social friend of the Kennedys and the CIA man in charge of the Cuban task force, did; he presented himself as Kennedy's personal representative. Cubela was apparently satisfied with Fitzgerald's credentials, for the two arranged to meet in Paris again on Nov. 22, when Fitzgerald was to give him an assassination device and to finalize plans.

At the meeting that day, Fitzgerald gave AM LASH a ballpoint pen rigged with a hypodermic needle the point of which was so fine that its victim would not notice the injection. According to a later CIA inspector general's report, "It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent... and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro."

"This fellow was nothing but a double agent," concluded Sen. Robert Morgan (D-N.C.), a member of the Intelligence Committee who was briefed by William E. Colby, then CIA director, on the AM LASH plot but was told nothing of Cubela's earlier history. "When Colby told us we'd been meeting with AM LASH in Geneva, Paris and Madrid, it occurred to me, how could the guy get out of a little country like this so

easily? Colby said he could do it because he was a high official. I asked Colby who he [Cubela] was really working for and Colby said, 'Senator, that's always a problem.' I was struck by how naive these people at the CIA seemed to have been."

But perhaps a more reasonable conclusion, based on Cubela's instability, is that, even if he were not a double agent, the Cubans were at least able to find out what he was conspiring to do. For one thing, the Cuban intelligence — the DGI — and the Soviet KGB are close working partners, and it is unlikely that one or the other organization would have left so senior and peculiar an official as Cubela unsurveyed on his frequent trips abroad.

Cubela's ultimate fate seems to support this theory. According to the CIA inspector general's report, Fitzgerald left the meeting "to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with AM LASH changed and it was decided that we would have no part in the assassination of a government leader — including Castro — and would not aid AM LASH in this attempt."

But the CIA did continue to plot with AM LASH for another year. Incredibly, the Agency apparently did not try to find out if there was something beyond coincidence in the simultaneous events in Paris and Dallas. A case officer continued to meet with Cubela until a few months later, when a decision was made to cease all direct contact between Cubela and American case officers, choosing instead to work through exile agents as cutouts.

"AM LASH was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the 'first step' of his plan," Cubela's case officer wrote after Kennedy's death. "FYI," he added, "this is where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request."

In the Senate Intelligence Committee's report, B-1 is simply described as the leader of an anti-Castro group. In real life he is Manuel Artime, the political chief of the CIA's Brigade 2306 at the Bay of Pigs and after that Kennedy's designated Cuban leader to organize and direct the large CIA-sponsored commando operations run from bases in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. (Artime is also the godfather of Howard Hunt's son and was actively involved in Hunt's activities at the time of Watergate.)

Up until 1965 Artime's Central American efforts had little if any success. It had taken him months to get organized, partly because of the Agency's esoteric method of doing business. There were meetings in foreign countries, Swiss bank accounts, arms to be purchased through intermediaries in Luxembourg and through cover corporations. When the MRN (Revolutionary Recovery Movement) finally got under way in 1964, it was a well-trained and equipped

force. Artime says that Robert Kennedy sent his congratulations via Artime's case officer after the first commando raid.

But subsequent operations were not successful. Things always seemed to go wrong now that the exiles were left without American case officers to direct them. The Agency provided Artime with up-to-date intelligence, but the raiding parties inevitably would land in the wrong spot, run into bad weather or meet some other obstacle. Morale was low at the camps and there were rumors of smuggling activities and embezzlement of funds. As before, the Cubela plot offered a last hope for a touchdown pass when the game seemed all but lost.

### Planned Rendezvous

ARTIME openly acknowledges his part in the final Cubela plot. His descriptions of the arrangements made with Cubela, which he related months before the Senate assassination investigation, coincide with all of the senators' findings. Ironically, neither Cubela nor Artime knew that their initial contact had been secretly arranged by the CIA. An inspector general's report explained that the Agency "contrived to put B-1 and AM LASH together in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was that B-1 needed a man inside and AM LASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, B-1 might get its man inside Cuba and AM LASH might get his silenced weapon from B-1."

Artime, who faithfully reported all of his plans to his case officer, provided Cubela with a silencer and some "small, highly concentrated explosives." The two men worked out elaborate arrangements for Cubela's role in the new Cuban government after the revolution and for the logistics of his escape. Artime was to land with his commandos as soon as Cubela struck. The assassination itself was to be carried out at Veradero Beach, where Castro was planning to spend the Easter holidays at a house once owned by the DuPonts. Cubela stayed at a house close by; from there he planned to use the high powered rifle.

"I had the U-2 photo of the beach," Artime remembers. "At that moment we had 300 boys [his commandos] and I put them all in the mother ships and in the communication ship with the two PT boats ready for the attack. Cubela was supposed to call somebody in New York and say something like 'Look, the tobacco that they smoke now in Miami is not good. The good tobacco is now in Spain because it's the Cuban tobacco.' That would mean Fidel was in the house and the plot was on." The call was to be relayed to the CIA communications bank in Miami and immediately to Artime's commandos at sea. "But the call never came."

The circumstances surrounding the latter Cubela plot were suspicious from the start. By the time the final arrangements were made in 1963, they had become ludicrous. "I think Cubela's real motive was a desire to continue his playboy life," says Artime. "I met him once in Rome, twice in Spain, and he was always drinking and having a good time. I gave him a lot of money and he spent it like mad." Several of the exiles involved in the plot turned out to be every bit as unreliable. They began to boast about the plan; it became an open secret in Miami.

In June, 1965, the CIA finally terminated all contact with AM LASH and his associates. The explanation cited by the Church Committee report was "for reasons related to security." What apparently alerted the Agency to the questionable nature of the whole enterprise was a strong indication that the Cuban exile agent it had used to put Artime and Cubela together was actually working for Castro.

It was not until the beginning of 1966 that the Cuban authorities got around to arresting Cubela. He was charged with treason, including the attempted assassination of Fidel Castro.

At his trial in 1966 no one condemned Cubela more harshly than Cubela himself. He called for the maximum sentence for himself — to be shot against the wall — and he seemed to confess to everything. But he did not mention — nor did the prosecutors ask him about — his earlier CIA plots. There appeared to be a studied attempt to avoid any public mention of Cubela's plotting before 1964. Finally, Castro himself intervened on Cubela's behalf to ask for clemency. The would-be assassin was sentenced to 25 years in prison but is now reported to be at a state rehabilitation farm.

### The Central Question

ALTHOUGH the events presented here strongly suggest that Kennedy and Castro were locked in a fierce secret struggle until the end, there is another, often cited body of thought which believes the two men were seeking a mutual understanding.

For one thing, in the fall of 1963, Castro had intermediaries approach America's deputy U.N. Ambassador William Attwood with an offer to open talks. Kennedy had authorized Attwood to take Castro up on the offer and they had agreed to a secret meeting in Cuba. Kennedy had even sent an unofficial peace feeler through Jean Daniel, a French journalist who left Washington in mid-November to interview Castro

Daniel, who was lunching with Castro at the moment of Kennedy's death later portrayed the Cuban as being genuinely shocked and bereaved by the news.

But U.S. Cuban policy since the Bay of Pigs had been boldly and consistently duplicitous, and no man knew this better than Fidel Castro. One need only listen to his fury in October after a hurricane had ravaged Cuba and the CIA had followed with a major commando strike: "What does the United States do as we are mobilizing to recuperate from the hurricane?" he asked rhetorically. "They send saboteurs arms and pirate ships and explosives... These were not the ordinary counterrevolutionary bands... The importance is that it is an action carried out by an organism of the United States government."

Later in the month Castro captured two of the Agency's Cuban commandos, but he waited a full week before forcing them to go on television to confess to their assignments. Coincidentally, this was two days after AM LASH's meeting with FitzGerald — the meeting at which AM LASH appears to have become convinced that the Kennedys were backing his plot. The commandos gave a surprisingly full account of their mission; they even gave the names of their case officers and the location of their bases in Miami. Castro was infuriated by the glib U.S. denials of involvement and by the refusal of the American press to report the attacks even when confronted with evidence they could easily substantiate. "You can see," he railed, "that in this free press they boast of, the press, the wire services, the CIA, everyone acts in unison elaborating and developing the same lie in order to disguise the truth."

Perhaps the central question here is whether Castro knew of Cubela's plotting and thus knew that the CIA and probably much higher authority was still trying to kill him. To Sen. Morgan, there is little doubt of this. He thinks Castro, after learning of Cubela's plotting, first tried to deter the CIA with his public warning and that he then retaliated when he learned of Cubela's subsequent meeting with FitzGerald — now believing the Kennedys themselves were responsible. "Just exactly how it happened I don't know and I don't know if we'll ever know," but "there is no doubt in my mind that John Fitzgerald Kennedy was assassinated by Fidel Castro or someone under his influence in retaliation for our efforts to assassinate him."

C 1976 George Cline III

NATION

8 MAY 1976

more than mischief

New York City

Re your editorial, "Night Work" [Feb. 14]: Why do you, and others, persist in referring to CIA clandestine agents as "professional mischief makers"? This "sweet," "lovable," "benign" description of operatives whose function is death and destruction in other countries defuses your positive purpose of exposing these "night workers" for what they are.

Leonard Zimmerman

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 May 1976

## Criminal 'Superpatriots'

To the Editor:

I am adding, I hope, to a flood of protest occasioned by your recent news article about C.I.A. agents who gave LSD to people they picked up in bars. If your readers don't get angry at this sort of grotesque activity, I guess they will swallow anything, including, perhaps, drugs pressed on them by strangers who turn out to be representatives of the Government.

In the recent past I have learned to live with the fact that our Government can kill hundreds of thousands of people in Vietnam for reasons which become harder and harder to understand. The Government can plan the murder of foreign leaders and can be remarkably friendly with members of the Mafia. In view of all this, there should be no reason why I am shocked to find that "employees of the Central Intelligence Agency randomly picked up unsuspecting patrons in bars in the United States and slipped LSD into their food and drink."

Still, I find it hard to get used to this new knowledge. Are the agents still hanging around bars with their deadly sugar cubes? If they have given up this practice, are they sorry about the people they sickened or killed? Or does being a C.I.A. agent mean never having to say you're sorry?

I am convinced that most C.I.A. people are sure that they are superpatriots. As a plain citizen, I must confess that I believe that people who lead the United States into criminal activities are doing their best to weaken our beloved country. I think that such people should be punished, like any other criminals. Are the agents who gave LSD to unsuspecting people in bars going to be brought to justice, along with their leaders, or are they going to be conveniently forgotten, or retired on rich pensions, like the perpetrators of so many of the disasters of the recent past?

SLOAN WILSON

Ticonderoga, N. Y., April 27, 1976

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 May 1976

## Domestic Spying Is Barred by Bush

HOUSTON, May 8 (AP)—

George Bush the director of Central Intelligence, says the intelligence agency is not in the domestic surveillance business and says he is "determined to see that we don't get into that business."

Mr. Bush said at a news conference yesterday that there had been some proved allegations of surveillance of Americans in the past, but it was not happening now.

"We do have some [current] domestic operations," he said, "but they are very open. People come back from business trips are debriefed and I hope they will continue to cooperate with the C.I.A."

He added: "I believe the abuses of the past are indeed in the past. I think the American people support the concept of a strong Central Intelligence Agency, and if they don't, they'd better because we are living in an extremely troubled world."

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, May 8, 1976

Clayton Fritchey

# CIA: 'The President's Private Army'

Despite all the findings and recommendations of the Senate and House investigations of the CIA, it is a good bet that it will continue to be the President's private army.

The congressional committees succeeded in uncovering almost unbelievable abuses in the covert operations of the entire intelligence community, and they have made a number of constructive recommendations for reform, but the question of how to rein in a willful President remains unresolved. Perhaps there is no sure-fire way of resolving it or, if there is, Congress hasn't the nerve to impose it.

The multimillion-word record of the congressional inquiries disclosed plenty of prereading by the agency, but most of the major violations and most of the major extralegal activities have now been traced back to White House pressure of one kind or another over the last two decades, regardless of whether the Democrats or Republicans were in power.

The CIA has often been denounced for its "black" operations, including overthrowing or trying to subvert governments we didn't approve of in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Greece, Laos, South Vietnam and Cuba, among others. The CIA did the planning for the initial Bay of Pigs invasion, but it was John F. Kennedy who put it into effect. All the other operations were also ordered by the White House.

William Colby, the former director of the CIA, had the candor to tell Congress how the CIA used millions of dollars in efforts to undermine the duly elected Chilean government several years ago. At the same time, however, he revealed he was carrying out a formal decision of the White House for the Forty Committee.

The White House has consistently gone to great pains to conceal its pressures on the CIA, the chief reasons being that the pressures were often motivated more by political than security considerations, as in former President Nixon's efforts to subvert the agency in the Watergate coverup. The full story of the CIA's assassination activities is still clouded, but all the evidence indicates these initiatives were essentially White House specials.

It is not easy even for the most courageous CIA directors to resist the determined President when, in the name of alleged national security, he wants something done that may seem improper, reckless or possibly illegal. Who is the director to challenge the Commander-in-Chief?

In any case, as Richard Helms, the former head of the CIA, discovered, un-

cooperative directors can readily be replaced. Helms, who ended up as U.S. ambassador to Turkey, informed the Church committee that in his opinion "there is no way to insulate the director of Central Intelligence from unpopularity at the hands of Presidents or policymakers if he is making assessments which run counter to administration policy...."

So much attention has been focused on the agency's sensational covert operations that little notice has been taken of how the White House can also influence and subvert the CIA's important function of providing intelligence estimates on which critical decisions are supposedly made. The evidence shows that a number of key CIA estimates, ranging from Soviet missile capability to the effect of U.S. bombing on Cambodia, were either doctored or suppressed to accommodate White House policy.

John Guzenga, former chairman of the board of estimates, told the Church committee that a CIA director "who does his job will, more often than not, be the bearer of bad news. When intelligence people are told, as happened in recent years, that they were expected to get on the team, then a sound intelligence policy relationship has in effect broken down."

But Mr. Ford has made it clear that he is going to resist every effort by Congress to tie his hands. In that respect, he is no different than other Presidents. Mr. Ford tried to beat Congress to the punch by appointing his own tame intelligence investigating commission. So did Lyndon Johnson almost 10 years ago when there was an earlier demand for curbing the CIA.

The 1967 Johnson study, headed by then Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, was really intended not to study the nation's intelligence community but to shield it, according to a finding of the Church committee, which said the White House "carefully limited the mandate of the Katzenbach committee's investigation."

Katzenbach himself told the Church panel "that his committee was designed by President Johnson... to head off a full-scale congressional investigation. All covert relationships were to be excluded from the investigation."

For most of its 250 years, the United States got along all right without anything resembling the CIA. But Presidents love the agency. As long as they have their multibillion-dollar private army, they can always throw their weight around covertly, should Congress forbid them to do it openly.

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CAPITAL, Annapolis  
22 April 1976

## Speaking at foreign affairs conference

# Bush discusses China, CIA

By DAVID HUGHES  
Staff Writer

CIA Director George H. W. Bush said he won't release a single name of a CIA agent or a person cooperating with the agency as long as he heads the intelligence agency.

It was the only comment during his speech that drew applause from about 300 midshipmen and guests here Wednesday night. But Bush got a standing ovation at the end of the talk.

Bush got onto the topic of the CIA following his speech on Sino-American relations. He delivered the talks as the keynote of the 15th annual foreign affairs conference at

the Naval Academy.

One student asked if the CIA is going to be divided into two branches: one for overt intelligence collection and one for covert operations.

"I don't believe it should happen. I don't believe it will," Bush said. "What is needed is not the dismantling of covert capability." The director added that the nation should have an alternative to sending in the Marines or doing nothing.

He challenged the students to enumerate more than a handful of CIA abuses which he as CIA director would agree are factual. Even so, the procedures in effect now at the agency are different from those used at the

time the abuses occurred, Bush said.

"The sins of the past notwithstanding, you can't conduct an intelligence business in the open," he said.

The CIA will work closely with whatever oversight procedure Congress prescribes, said Bush, who predicted a new era of openness between the agency and Capital Hill.

Another student asked him to explain China's reason for inviting former President Richard Nixon to visit during the presidential primary vote in New Hampshire.

"I don't think they were trying to influence the New Hampshire primary. They are

not trying to meddle in U.S. internal politics," said Bush. The Chinese could care less about the primaries or the Watergate scandal, and invited Nixon to commemorate the fourth anniversary of an accord between our two nations, the Shanghai Communique, said Bush, who headed the U.S. delegation to Peking before his appointment to the CIA.

The former head of the American delegation in Peking said the Chinese Communists are more interested in reaffirming the ties established between the two nations during the Nixon administration.

At the end of the presentation, the CIA director received a standing ovation.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
23 April 1976

## Diplomats 'working for CIA'

Dar es Salaam,  
April 22

Two US diplomats and one American employed by the Tanzanian Government were today named in letters from the American-based "Committee to Expose Agents" as CIA agents.

The letters, posted in Philadelphia, were received by reporters and government officials here three days before Dr Kissinger was scheduled to arrive as part of his first African tour.

The letters said the exposure of the government employee was "particularly important" because he is a "deep cover" agent who "has been quite successful in his work and has remained undiscovered during eight years of work in Tanzania."

The alleged "deep cover" agent has just completed his contract in Tanzania and planned to return to Iowa tomorrow. UPI.

THE WASHINGTON STAR  
2 May 1976

## CIA Reported Funding Dewey

SAN FRANCISCO — The CIA pumped more than \$1 million into the 1948 presidential campaign of Thomas E. Dewey and provided crucial evidence used by Richard M. Nixon against Alger Hiss, according to Rolling Stone magazine.

In a copyright article in its issue dated May 20, the magazine says the CIA was twice instrumental in securing evidence used by Nixon against Hiss, the State Department official accused of being a member of the Communist party.

HOUSTON CHRONICLE  
8 MAY 1976

## Bush Says CIA Disclosures Have Damaged Foreign Ties

BY JANET SANDERS  
Chronicle Staff

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Bush said here Friday that recent disclosures about U.S. intelligence operations have damaged his agency's friendly relationship with intelligence services in other countries.

Secret agents in Latin America, Africa, the Mideast and Eastern Europe "are holding back intelligence information they used to give us because of the risk they will be exposed to in the United States," said Bush. "They simply don't trust us anymore."

Bush spoke at the 90th annual meeting of the Greater Houston Area YMCA Friday night at the Rice Rittenhouse Hotel. About 500 members of 20 local YMCA branches honored the top volunteers of 1975.

Bush said that "the CIA has taken a tremendous battering" in the past year that has hurt its image both at home and abroad. "People are frightened about what we do," he said. "But we're just plain citizens that go about life without always sneaking around spying on people."

Bush said recent reports of past CIA activities singled out "peculiar aberrations" and "sensationalized" them. He agreed that foreign operations, such as the attempted sabotage of Fidel Castro's beard and CIA domestic spying were wrong, but said that those "mistakes" have been corrected.

"There are some grubby things we have to do but not many," said Bush. "And the public never hears about our successes."

Bush said the public is slowly beginning to realize the importance of the CIA despite the recent Congressional criticism of his agency. "The pendulum is starting to swing back in favor of us," he said.

A Senate Select Committee headed by Sen. Frank Church handed down a comprehensive study of the CIA last week illustrating certain past covert operations that the committee said violated constitutional rights and wasted taxpayers' money. The committee also outlined 123 recommendations for changing the CIA and suggested that a special Senate panel oversee CIA operations in the future.

Bush said Friday that he agrees with some of the committee's recommended changes but does not favor creation of the oversight panel.



NEWS & OBSERVER, Raleigh  
14 April 1976

# The Case Against Covert Activities

One of the problems with covert actions abroad by the Central Intelligence Agency is illustrated in the Sam Giancana articles by Nicholas Gage of The New York Times. That problem: the sorry company sometimes kept by our spooks.

Gage recounts how the CIA enlisted Mafia hoods in plotting fruitless attempts on the life of Cuba's Fidel Castro. Once in bed with the underworld, the agency found it hard to get out, and later got caught in the absurd position of shielding hoodlums from prosecution by other arms of U.S. government.

Such an embarrassing embrace of criminality wouldn't be quite so offensive if it were clear that covert CIA operations were essential or productive. But that isn't at all clear. In fact, the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine offers a strong, pointed argument by an expert against any covert CIA actions, defined as "operations to

secretly influence foreign governments, groups or individuals, often by illegal means."

Herbert Scoville Jr. served the CIA for eight years in scientific intelligence and research. In his article, he expresses little faith in secret spy activities for any CIA purposes except limited counterintelligence work. Other, modern methods of gathering information, including satellite photography, are more honorable and accurate and have just about rendered cloaks and daggers obsolete, Scoville argues.

Nowhere is he more emphatic than on the futility of outright CIA meddling as notoriously practiced in Cuba and Chile, where instead of collecting data the agency was trying to wreck governments. Scoville thinks the CIA should get out of that sort of covert-action business — period. It's possible to score limited, local successes at the game, he says, but ultimately there's no way to win.

Scoville's practical objection is that secret operations nowadays stand little chance of staying secret for long, and so they just aren't very feasible. But even if they were, they ought to be banned. Over the long haul, he contends, the nation's reputation and security would be better served if it fought "hostile influences by using the good qualities of our democratic society, not by copying the reprehensible tactics of those we are opposing." He might have added: And not by consorting with some of the worst elements in our own society.

In the push for a CIA cleanup, the Ford administration is stressing closer supervision of the agency, without significant curtailment of its activities. Scoville makes a good case for going further than that. Congress, which has yet to wrestle with intelligence reform, could profit by studying Scoville's comments.

BALTIMORE SUN  
5 May 1976

Garry Wills

## CIA Makes Mafia Look Like Jaycees

Spokesmen on the right have for a long time been saying our government is soft on crime. Now we have proof that they are right. We can read, put down in black and white, the lenient sentence given to the largest crime syndicate in our history.

Imagine a super-Mafia financed by untraceable raids on the United States Treasury, one that teaches men to murder and cheat systematically. But this organization does not steal money. It steals governments. It takes and gives governments, apart from the knowledge or will of those being ruled by the governments. It does not put out contracts on rivals or police authorities. Its "hits," accomplished with LSD and other debilitating drugs, were random—people in bars or at parties, people of all sorts. This organization was a fair employment pusher and killer; it did not distinguish Americans from foreigners or blacks from whites.

In movie mythology, crusading newspapers fought organized crime, rallying pub-

lic opinion to the cause. But this organization took over much of the press, writing its own reviews, hiring newsmen all over again and not letting their first employers know about it.

The funniest thing of all is that the organization has been asked, repeatedly, to investigate itself and turn itself in if it finds it has committed any crime. When was the last time you heard a judge send a convicted felon out of court with the request that he come back if he decides he has committed any new crimes?

I am talking, of course, about the Central Intelligence Agency. It is hard to imagine any crime, public or private, it has not committed, and on a scale brand new to history. Yet Senator Frank Church's pussy-cat committee meekly let the criminals say what crimes could be reported, and asked the CIA to co-operate with Congress after documenting that it systematically deceived Congress and the public and even the President for decades. The committee writes a dreary history,

then re-enacts that dreariness, as if it were composing a script for itself, not an investigation of the agency.

The report tells us that President Johnson issued guidelines in 1967 meant to keep the CIA from suborning academicians to agent work under the guise of independent research. The report also tells us that the CIA just used the President's guidelines to speed up a program it had already launched for making the subornation less obvious, dealing with individuals instead of institutions, making its influence less traceable.

There is no reason to think the Senate's report will be used any other way. It just gives the agency clearer rules for deceiving us. The committee's submission to CIA direction led to the cutting of material that was in no way dangerous to national security—what criminal would not like to rewrite the judge's sentence on him? Even the blatantly unconstitutional suppression of budget information was acceded to by the committee.

The committee found no basis in law for CIA covert ac-

tivities, yet discovered 900 "major or sensitive" covert projects, despite CIA noncooperation and destruction of records. As a result, the committee asked the agency not to undertake such activities unless it considers them necessary—yet the agency obviously felt all its "major or sensitive" projects were necessary, and there is no reason to think it has changed its own norms.

The committee was obviously unable to face up to the fact that covert activities are the real reason for the CIA's existence—as opposed to more conventional intelligence work carried on by other agencies, which are larger and better financed than the CIA.

The fight to save the CIA is not a fight to save good intelligence work, which is performed by at least a dozen other parts of our government. It is a fight to save just those activities the committee has called illegal, inefficient and dangerous to ourselves. And in that fight, the cops have formally joined the robbers. The judges are mere tools of our official crooks.

READER'S DIGEST  
MAY 1976

## Let's Stop Undermining the CIA

If the United States is to continue as a flag-bearer against totalitarianism, says this former Secretary of Defense, it must protect and preserve our international intelligence network

BY MELVIN R. LAIRD

**W**HERE AMERICANS are on the verge of doing ourselves what our worst enemies have been unable to do: destroy our intelligence services.

Last year, Senate and House committees began searching investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency. The investigators' intent was honorable, and they have brought to light malpractices that must be curbed. According to Congressional findings and CIA admissions, during the 29 years the CIA has existed—1947 to 1976—agency personnel perpetrated the following questionable acts of domestic espionage: They illegally entered four homes or offices, tapped the phones of 27 people, placed five U.S. citizens under surveillance and infiltrated ten agents into the anti-war movement. For over two decades, they opened private mail received by Americans from communist countries. Additionally, in examining possible foreign influence on the anti-war movement, the CIA accumulated files on approximately 10,000 American citizens.

The side effects of these investigations, however, have proved much more harmful to the country than the ills that Congress sought to remedy. As CBS commentator Eric Sevareid recently declared: "We've had Congressmen breaking solemn agreements with the Executive by leaking classified information in the name of higher laws of their selection. We have had journalists breaking their word on information received off the record by leaking it to other journalists, which is morally the same as publishing it themselves. And, worse, we've had zealots publishing the names of American intelligence personnel—which, in this time of terrorists everywhere, increases the risk of kidnapping and murder. To do this is to commit the moral equivalent of treason."

The dubious acts committed by the CIA have been distorted and magnified, while lurid charges flour-

ished, often without a scintilla of substantiation. For example:

**Allegation:** The CIA jeopardized public health by conducting biological-warfare experiments in New York City subways. **Fact:** The Army, to assess vulnerability of the transit system to sabotage, placed some innocuous powder in a subway, then measured how far it was wafted down the tunnel. The test menaced nobody. The CIA had no part in it.

**Allegation:** The CIA placed secret informants on the White House staff to spy on the Presidency. Its chief White House "contact man" for a while was Alexander P. Butterfield, later director of the Federal Aviation Administration. **Fact:** Butterfield never had any connection with the CIA. For the past 20 years, like other agencies, the CIA, at White House request, has routinely assigned specialists to the Presidential staff.

**Allegation:** The CIA has assassinated foreign leaders and perhaps even some Americans. **Fact:** More than a decade ago, when a *de facto* state of war existed between the United States and Cuba, the CIA involved itself in unsuccessful plots to kill Fidel Castro. It also considered poisoning Patrice Lumumba of the Republic of the Congo. But the prosaic truth, as established by the skeptical Senate investigators, is that the CIA never assassinated anyone anywhere.

**Hemorrhage of Secrets.** As the CIA's legitimate secret operations are exposed and its sensitive intelligence-gathering methods irresponsibly illuminated, our first line of defense against attack—and our only defense against covert attack—is becoming increasingly paralyzed. In foreign parliaments and press, the feasibility of confidential collaboration with America has been publicly questioned. Some countries have stopped confiding in us almost entirely for fear their confidences will be broken by Congress or the press. Individual foreigners who have risked their lives to secretly

serve the United States—including agents well placed in the Soviet bloc and the Third World—have quit out of fear of identification. The difficulty of enlisting reliable new foreign sources has increased greatly.

Meanwhile, scores of gifted American men and women in the CIA possessing priceless expertise and experience have been disgusted at the pillory with which their patriotism has been rewarded, and many have even left. Important intelligence undertakings, approved

by Congressional committees and the President as essential to the national interest, have collapsed in the glare of publicity. For instance, disclosures that the United States has used submarines in Soviet territorial waters to monitor Russian weapons tests have greatly diminished the flow of this vital intelligence.

The hemorrhage of secrets is also destroying the CIA's capacity to act covertly in Western interests. Sometimes the discreet provision of money, information, advice and other requested help affords the only practical means of countering subversion abroad. Repeatedly, the Soviet Union has sought to subvert other nations by buying control of politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and trade-union leaders, by surreptitiously supplying vast sums to build the local communist party into the dominant political force. Plans to combat such subversion lose all effectiveness if announced. If identified, recipients of our assistance forfeit credibility and become instant targets of venomous attack by communists and others.

**Record of Success.** In an ideal world, we would need neither intelligence services nor armed forces. But we must have both if we are to survive in the real world of 1976, which has become very unsafe for democracy and the United States. Of the earth's 158 nations, only 39 presently maintain democratic, representative governments and open societies. Many of the totalitarian nations are fanatic in their hostility to freedom and to America. Our access to many indispensable natural resources depends upon fragile regimes. The complex daily functioning of our society is threatened by the phenomenon of international terrorism. Meanwhile, the Russians—besides their worldwide subversion, fomenting of revolution and support of terrorism—persist in an enormous, costly effort to attain undisputed military supremacy with which they hope to intimidate the West into further retreat.

To cope with all these threats and

uncertainties, we must keep ourselves continuously and accurately informed as to what is happening, especially in those areas shrouded in totalitarian secrecy. To repel covert aggression, we must resort at times to covert methods. President Harry Truman and Congress recognized this when they created the CIA in 1947. And this unchanged reality has been recognized by every subsequent President—and Congress, except the present one.

Having served first on one of the Congressional committees that oversee our intelligence apparatus, and later as Secretary of Defense, I am familiar with some of the accomplishments of our intelligence services. Consider:

*During the past 25 years, the Soviet Union has not developed a single major new weapon without our knowing it well in advance.* Without such knowledge, we undoubtedly would have wasted untold billions preparing to counter threats which did not actually exist. Current efforts to negotiate curtailment of the nuclear-arms race are possible only because our precise intelligence enables us to count every Soviet missile, submarine and bomber, and to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaties achieved. If we destroy the effectiveness of the CIA, we will destroy with it whatever hope there is of negotiating any significant disarmament.

*Timely intelligence has helped avert war.* During the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflicts, U.S. intelligence—live agents and technical surveillance—detected Soviet preparations to dispatch troops to the Middle East. Thus alerted, we were able to initiate urgent diplomatic and other actions that persuaded the Russians to forgo military intervention.

A few years ago, our agents—or spies, if you will—ascertained that one non-communist country was about to attack another. Details cannot yet be made public. But we quickly and privately brought the countries together, laid out the facts, induced them to negotiate. CIA espionage thus prevented a war.

Since late 1973, U.S. intelligence has given both Israel and Egypt considerable sense of security by continuously showing each what the other is doing militarily. Given proof that neither is about to pounce on the other, the Arabs and Israelis have been willing at least to try to devise a formula for Middle East harmony. Our intelligence has bought the necessary time.

*Through infiltration of various terrorist movements, the CIA has aborted numerous plots.* On at least two occasions, the CIA has fore-

stalled assassins bound for the United States with orders to kill elected public officials. It has also thwarted plans to kill prominent American Jews with letter bombs.

While Israel's premier Golda Meir was visiting New York City on March 4, 1973, police rushed to busy midtown intersections and hauled away two cars with enough Soviet-made explosives to kill everybody within a 100-yard radius. The terrorist explosives were timed to detonate at noon, when streets would be most crowded. The disaster was prevented because we had advance warning of it.

Shortly before Christmas, 1973, the CIA learned that six small, hand-carried Soviet SA-7 missiles—extremely accurate against low-flying aircraft—were being smuggled in Libyan diplomatic pouches to Black September terrorists in Europe. The terrorists planned to shoot down a 747 landing in Rome. However, acting on CIA intelligence, European governments disrupted the operation and spared the lives of hundreds of holiday travelers.

*The CIA has frustrated communist subversion of other nations.* After World War II, the Soviet Union sponsored a massive clandestine effort to impose communist dictatorships on a weakened Western Europe. Communist operatives, dispensing millions of dollars, organized strikes to block Marshall Plan aid and engender chaos. They infiltrated the press, tried to buy elections. By providing intelligence, money and counsel, the CIA gave anti-totalitarian factions a fighting chance to resist. Given this chance, the Europeans proceeded to build healthy democracies, indispensable to our own welfare.

During the 1960s, with Soviet backing, Cuba tried to ignite guerrilla warfare and violent revolution in Latin America. While quietly urging needed social reforms, the CIA offered Latin Americans the

intelligence and training they needed to repel Cuban aggression. The communists were defeated in Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. Much the same pattern was repeated in sections of Africa where the Russians sought to establish new colonies for themselves. In the Middle East, too, the CIA has repeatedly aborted Soviet plots to seize control of Arab nations.

In retrospect, it is obvious that not all of the covert actions undertaken by the United States in the past 20 years have been wise or justified. I strongly believe that we never again should attempt to use military force covertly. Military action can succeed only if understood and endorsed by the public as well as Congress. However, if we abandon our capacity to discreetly help those who wish to resist externally inspired subversion—totalitarianism of either the left or right—we will reduce ourselves to a choice of abandoning them entirely or sending in the Marines.

**IN SUM:** If we allow our intelligence services to be rendered impotent, we will signal friend and foe alike that we lack both the will and the means to compete with totalitarianism. Unable to protect ourselves, or our friends abroad, America will shrink into isolationism, and our economy, denied essential foreign resources, will shrivel. Then we, and certainly our children, will discover too late that there is no place to hide from totalitarianism.

As a former Secretary of Defense, I believe that we should maintain armed forces stronger than those of any potential enemy. But without an equally strong intelligence service, our nation can never be secure. I know that. So do our friends and antagonists throughout the world.

MELVIN R. LAIRD was a U.S. Congressman from Wisconsin for 16 years, before serving as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973. He is now Reader's Digest's senior counsellor for national and international affairs.

#### FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW

APRIL 16, 1976

**THE CIA IN TOKYO:** Claims by former US State Department official Roger Hillsman that the American CIA has interfered in Japan's domestic politics confirmed long-standing Japanese suspicions. The CIA is thought to have been infiltrating the country's top political, business and cultural circles since the end of World War II. American intelligence agents reportedly relied on Japanese officials to help them keep tabs on leftist movements in Japan, as well as to monitor military and political developments in China and the Soviet Union, and passed on anti-communist funds to conservative groups in the country via various US foundations set up in Japan after the war. According to one source in Tokyo, a section in the US Embassy called the Regional Programme Analysis Office is the current base for CIA operations.

THE TULSA TRIBUNE  
16 April 1976

## The other side

Congressional investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency uncovered some juicy stuff — assassination plots, unauthorized snooping in private mail — but there was little balance to the probes.

The result has been a weakened intelligence community at a time when it should be at its strongest. While most people obey humane instincts, there is still a strong undercurrent of savagery threatening to undercut the foundations of civilized society.

Thus, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's article written for the Reader's Digest in defense of the CIA, is needed, if belated, testimony. Laird writes of terrorist plots to kill masses of people with bombs and assassinate political leaders and of the CIA's successful efforts in heading off disaster.

A crucial point worth noting in

Washington Post

7 May 1976

### Cuba Plans Fiesta To Honor Its Spies

MEXICO CITY, May 6 (AP)—The Cuban government is planning a fiesta June 6 in Havana to honor Cuba's secret agents and counterspies.

The Cuban news agency Prensa Latina said yesterday that the fiesta will be one of several commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Interior Ministry.

"The efficient work of the ministry has permitted the Cuban revolution and their top leaders to survive over the years," it said.

It listed among the ministry's achievements the foiling of several plans by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to assassinate Prime Minister Fidel Castro and overthrow his government.

It did not say if any of the spies would attend the festivities.

NEW YORK TIMES

7 MAY 1976

### C.I.A.: The 534 Confidants

To the Editor:

The Church Committee's recommendation to have future covert C.I.A. operations cleared in advance by Congress (news story April 27) must come as a great relief to our undercover agents abroad. If put into law, only 534 persons (all Senators and Representatives) will have advance knowledge of their dangerous missions.

HERBERT LOEBEL

Sherman, Conn., April 29, 1976

his account is that the terrorists were prepared to kill hundreds of innocent people to get their twisted messages across. This is savagery in its finest form. Yet, in the face of this kind of threat, politicians who should know better have been arguing that the CIA be put on a short leash. It is as if being gentlemanly were more important than being successful in dealing with terrorism.

There should be limits, of course, to the kinds of intelligence activities the CIA can undertake. But at the same time those limits should be placed with the understanding that the other side won't bother with degrees of propriety.

While the debate on limits continues, so does political violence. As New York Times columnist C. L. Sulzberger noted on this page

Thursday, West Germany, France and Britain have become so concerned about it that they are forgetting their differences to cooperate more closely. They may not be able to unite economically, but on the issue of terrorism they are one.

Even so, they know that any effort to combat the waves of violence will be more successful if the United States' intelligence resources are brought to bear. That is why they express amazement at the attacks on the American intelligence community.

The CIA has made mistakes, some of them serious. But it has also performed well in its missions.

And it is one of the hazards of the game that all of its successes may never become known. Laird's disclosures of a few of them should suggest that there have been more.

THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD

28 April 1976

## Threats to security

*THE ISSUE: The Senate intelligence committee's recommendation for reforming intelligence agencies.*

THE DEMOCRATIC majority of the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence is ready to endanger the security of the United States to prove a point — that intelligence gathering agencies, and especially the CIA, have gone to extremes and committed abuses which go far beyond the intent of their creation.

This majority would prove the point by passing detailed restrictive legislation for monitoring and controlling the operations of the agencies, again especially the CIA.

The intent of the committee regarding hamstringing of U. S. intelligence is apparent from recommendations in its report covering investigation of the spy agencies' foreign activities.

Certainly, the committee performed a service in revealing excesses, abuses and waste in the operations of the nation's intelligence apparatus. These lapses should be corrected.

But in its welter of recommendations — 86 of them — the committee would not merely impose needed reforms, it would so straitjacket the agencies as to strip them of their effectiveness.

The core recommendation, in particular, is untenable on this

ground. It proposes the creation of a single congressional committee with virtually unlimited powers in the monitoring and control of the intelligence agencies.

This oversight super committee would be kept informed in detail on the activities and operation of the CIA and other spy agencies and would be authorized to release this information to the public if it elects to do so.

The experience with congressional committees foretells clearly what would happen if that recommendation becomes law. What information the committee did not formally release — and that no doubt would be considerable — it would leak.

The result would be to keep the whole world informed on U. S. intelligence activities and the knowledge this nation possesses about adversaries' plans and intents.

Also, the committee would be informed in advance of foreign covert operations which would just about nullify the possibility of such operations.

Efficient, effective foreign intelligence is vital to the security of this country. The Senate committee's proposals, if enacted into law, would effectively guarantee the absence of anything more than a token U. S. intelligence program.

WASHINGTON STAR  
27 April 1976

# Mary McGroary

## Lots of Life Left Yet In 'Rogue Elephant'

Just before the Senate Select Committee presented, amid conspicuous self-congratulation, Volume I of its report on the intelligence community, the CIA scored yet another coup.

Director George Bush hurried up to the Caucus Room for a secret session with the senators and implored them to keep the intelligence budget a secret. The committee voted a typical compromise: They would pass the buck to the full Senate.

So on page 270 of the report, where the numbers ought to be, there are blank spaces. Considering that last week the Supreme Court ruled that it's okay for the Feds to look at your bank account, you have to say that government secrecy is, in this Bicentennial of our liberty, gaining over individual privacy.

The Senate could, of course, gather up its courage and assert that people who can't keep their own bank records a secret have the right to know how money they give to the government is being spent by the spooks.

One of the arguments made by some who voted against immediate disclosure was that it might make it easier to persuade the Senate to create an oversight committee. The fact that there is any question at all about such a committee — one which might include a soul or two who would not melt at the mention of "national security" — suggests how splendidly the CIA has weathered the

LONDON TIMES  
29 April 1976

## The Times Diary

### CIA settle a heated argument

One of the revelations in the latest report on the Central Intelligence Agency settles an old dispute. The CIA did, indeed, fabricate the "Penkovsky Papers". These were the alleged memoirs of Oleg Penkovsky, a senior Russian official who spied for the West, was caught and shot.

The report says: Another CIA book, *The Penkovsky Papers*, was published in the United States in 1965 "for operational reasons", but actually became commercially viable. The book was prepared and written, by writing (sic) agency assets (sic) who drew on actual case materials.

"Publication rights were sold to a publisher through a trust fund which was established for that purpose. The publisher was unaware of any US Government interest."

*The Penkovsky Papers* were serialized by *The Observer* when the book came out and many reviewers had doubts about their authenticity. Not so Robert Conquest, who devoted an article last August, in his news-sheer *Soviet Analyst*, to a defence of the authenticity of the papers and an attack on our Washington correspondent, Patrick Brogan, who had mentioned them in an article as a palpable fake.

storm of congressional investigation.

FIFTEEN MONTHS AGO, when the "rogue elephant" was dragged into public view for examination of its ugliness, some people said there was nothing to do with the beast but shoot it. But as the revelations mounted about its domestic spying, its consumption of banks, newspaper and airlines, its habits of buying foreign elections and foreign officials, a Watergate conditioned citizenry turned away. People didn't want to hear about it.

Now there is no doubt about the beast's survival. The committee did not even recommend an outright ban on covert activities, although it did suggest less promiscuous use.

Nobody has been punished, either, for what was done, or for failing to tell the truth about it.

The secretary of state and the former director of the CIA, Richard Helms, who is our ambassador to Iran, made contradictory — to say the least — statements about Chile and domestic spying to congressional committees.

Chairman Frank Church, who is running for the presidency, has not made a federal case of it. The record, he said was sent to the Justice Department. Nothing has happened.

Atty. Gen. Edward Levi went before the committee just before Bush. He was trying to censor some language in Volume II relative to illegal domestic spying. That suggests whose side he is on. No prosecutions, particularly in an election year, seem likely.

THE COMMITTEE wants the attorney general to be added to the National Security Council. He would presumably warn the plotters when they were about to break the law. Neither of two previous attorneys general, Robert Kennedy and John Mitchell, seemed particularly sensitive on this point. Kennedy was involved in Cuban plots. Mitchell appears

never to have read the Constitution.

"We are trying to deepen accountability," says Sen. Walter F. Mondale, D-Minn.

Accountability was a word unknown at CIA headquarters. Things were set in train on one man's orders to a chosen few. He did not tell his associates or the inspector general. When things went sour, the papers were destroyed and all kept mum.

Nothing quite illuminates the ice-cold arrogance of the agency better than a memo written by Richard Helms during the period when the CIA was conducting experiments with LSD on unwitting subjects.

"While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities on the manipulation of human behavior and maintain an offensive capability."

SO DR. FRANK OLSON, unbeknownst to himself, was given a glass of Cointreau with 70 micrograms of LSD in it on Nov. 19, 1953. Eight days later, he threw himself out of a New York hotel room window.

Nobody was responsible. The individuals involved were shown a reprimand for "bad judgment," one which they were assured would not be made part of their official personnel file.

George Bush says they don't do things like that any more. He says the beast has been housebroken. Many members of Congress want to believe him, just as they preferred not to know what was going on at the time.

There ought to be a law, and Congress may get around to writing one. But as the vote on the money showed, it's not a sure thing.

LONDON TIMES  
29 April 1976

## Spy activities 'undermined constitutional rights'

From Our Own Correspondent  
Washington, April 28

The second volume of the Senate intelligence committees report, issued today, says that "intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens."

It adds that this is because "checks and balances designed by the framers of the constitution to assure accountability have not been applied."

The report contains very little that is new. Earlier reports, notably that prepared by the Rockefeller commission last year, gave most of the details of the use by various govern-

ments of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other instruments of government, to spy on Americans.

Like the first volume, published on Monday, which dealt with foreign intelligence, it gives a detailed account of the workings of the most secret branches of the American Government. We now know far more about the CIA and the FBI and about how decisions in intelligence matters are made in Washington than we do about any other secret service in the world.



WASHINGTON STAR  
28 April 1976

Charles Bartlett

## That's no 'rogue elephant' after all

The rogue elephant turns out to be a harness horse under slack rein in the final chapter of Sen. Frank Church's epic investigation of the CIA.

To Church's credit, he swallows his metaphor, elephant and all, to erase the picture he drew last year of a wild agency on the loose. The CIA is "not out of control," he concedes. It is a tractable agency that has been loosely supervised by a series of presidents and Congresses as it carried out a difficult mandate under a loosely-worded charter.

After spending \$3 million and 185 man-years, the Church committee has made no substantial additions to the abuses cited 10 months ago by the Rockefeller Commission. Since President Ford has already imposed strenuous precautions against repetition of those abuses, the report will merely serve to stir more dust unless it persuades the Senate to organize its surveillance of intelligence under a single oversight committee. This does not

seem likely to happen.

By sober handling of a mass of sensitive material and by negotiating responsibly with the executive branch at every turn, the Church committee has demonstrated that a permanent committee would be valuable in bridging the gap between the secrecy required by intelligence operations and the Congress's need to know.

The committee went off the track only once, in bloodhounding the leads of its chief counsel, Frederick Schwarz, on the assassination issue. This diversion protracted the inquiry by six months, introduced partisan concerns, and fed an impression that Church was bent on drawing attention to his presidential bid. To force the nation to examine its conscience on using assassination as a tool of foreign policy, the committee paid the price of feeding the Soviets some rich propaganda.

A new dust storm will arise from the report's disclosure that the CIA deals

with several hundred "academics" from over 100 American colleges in its pursuit of intelligence. It disturbs the committee that professors who take sabbaticals to interesting places are invited to share their observations with the government. Sometimes they are paid; often they are not. They do not perform as agents, merely as patriotic citizens who have been trained as specialists.

To most people, this will appear a very normal, harmless kind of cooperation. But to the Church committee, it is a transgression of the moral purity which the nation must reflect. The senators want the country to be a model of virtue and self-restraint, not a scarred back-alley scrapper. As Church says, "The United States must acquire a longer view of history."

Happily, the committee checked its impulse to translate this sentiment into a ban on all the dirty covert actions. The senators reacted to a toughening of the national mood and to indigna-

tion over the CIA circus in the House by pulling back from their inclination to proscribe all the activities which may muddy the national reputation. But this is really the crux of the post-Vietnam divergence on foreign policy and it deserves to be debated until a consensus develops.

This is the kind of issue with which the committee and Congress should concern themselves instead of focusing on the details of intelligence management. With Congress so badly organized and unable even to arrange for efficient supervision of intelligence activities, the committee will not be taken seriously when it attempts to shift around the CIA's organizational chart. The committee has tried to behave responsibly, however, and time alone will tell whether its disclosures helped more than they hurt. But a swift test of the Senate's reaction to all it has learned will come on the May 6 vote to create a single oversight committee.

Washington Post  
7 May 1976

## Quakers Ask Abolition of Spy Groups

Religious News Service

PHILADELPHIA — A national Quaker organization has called for the abolition of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Internal Security Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The board of directors of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) also called on Congress to prohibit any successor agencies from engaging in surveillance and harassment of citizen's groups that have not taken part in unlawful activities.

"The repeated violations of these agencies' mandates," it said, "have so unmistakably compromised these two bodies that it is certain they are beyond salvage as agencies in which Americans can confidently place their trust."

It added that "the practices which brought these two bodies into disrepute must be unequivocally ended, for the same methods committed by any successor agencies would be as intolerable as if they were undertaken by the CIA or the FBI."

HERALD, Miami  
24 April 1976

## Senate Report on Intelligence Needs to Name Some Names

ON Monday the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will issue a report on the domestic activities of such agencies as the FBI and the CIA which tells all. Well, some of all. The report, we are told, names no names.

Among the nameless are an uncounted number of newspaper reporters who acted as informants for the FBI. It is not clear whether they were paid off in money, which would be a conflict of professional interest, or whether they were paid off in news tips, which is the same as money in the bank for any enterprising journalist.

Anyone who knows anything about the criminal justice system understands perfectly well that many crimes cannot be solved without the use of informants. Most police agencies maintain funds for this purpose, and it is regarded as legitimate. Further, any citizen who sees a crime committed or has information about a breach of the law should feel obligated to report it to the FBI or any other official investigative agency.

The systematic use of journalists as

informers, then cloaking them in anonymity, is quite another matter. Until a halt supposedly was called around 1973, certain intelligence services were used for political purposes and the informers were not criminal informers but persons reacting to someone's prejudice or pique.

So a whole profession is left under a cloud when only a few unnamed members of it are guilty, as the Senate select committee evidently thinks in bringing the matter up at all, of improper conduct.

Investigations of wrongdoing are less than honest — or worse than that less than useful — when they name no names and nail down no responsibility.

Sen. Frank Church, the select committee's chairman, has won himself a lot of linage, though not much mileage, in weeks of sensational hearings. If these are to be followed by a report which fails to identify the bodies, then it will be as wanting in credibility as it excels in blind damaging accusation. We'll just have to see.



THE DESERT NEWS, Salt Lake City, Utah  
28 April 1976

# Comment

## After probe, CIA looks more like hero than villain

The remarkable thing about the CIA is not the number of abuses for which it is responsible but the fact the agency didn't make considerably more blunders than it did.

If that point in the Central Intelligence Agency's favor wasn't apparent before, it should be now with the release of this week of the results of the exhaustive investigation by the Senate intelligence committee.

The investigation found there is no systematic review by the White House of either sensitive foreign espionage or counterintelligence activities.

For Congress' part, the lawmakers have failed to provide the necessary guidelines to ensure that intelligence agencies carry out their work in accordance with constitutional processes.

Moreover, the FBI — rather than being paranoid about foreign spies within the U.S., as some of its critics charged — has not given enough attention to this problem, partly because of insufficient manpower for counterintelligence.

The Senate committee's report should be read, then, as not so much a criticism of the intelligence community itself as it is a criticism of those elected officials in both the executive and legislative branches who bear ultimate responsibility for controlling intelligence operations.

Keep in mind, too, that when the Senate intelligence committee began its investigation 15 months ago, the investigators were anything but friendly and sympathetic toward the CIA.

When even the CIA's toughest critics find the agency was given insufficient supervision, it seems clear the CIA could easily have committed many more "dirty tricks" abroad had it been of a mind to do so. The very fact the CIA was, in the words of the Senate report, "not out of control" is something of a testimony to the agency's self-discipline and internal controls.

The report contains no sensations or surprises. Its major recommendations — particularly establishment of a permanent intelligence oversight committee

in Congress — have been thoroughly discussed and analyzed before. Most of them represent an objective effort to prevent blunders by making sure the intelligence community gets outside input, and to pinpoint responsibility, which often lies outside the intelligence agencies.

One recommendation which seems highly inadvisable, however, is that the overall budget for intelligence activities be made public.

It's hard to imagine any useful purpose being served by this suggestion. The comparison of intelligence spending during one particular year to that of another year is, in itself, largely meaningless. Figures on intelligence spending can't be evaluated in any meaningful way without also disclosing the specific intelligence programs involved. And those specifics can't be disclosed without impairing the effectiveness of the CIA. If anyone thinks the disclosure of an overall spending figure will help prevent waste in the CIA, such disclosure unfortunately hasn't prevented waste in other federal agencies.

As Congress and the public read the Senate committee's report, the recommendations for tightening control over the CIA should not be allowed to overshadow a little-noticed facet of the study:

Intense attempts by the Soviet Union to get at American secrets require a bigger and more sophisticated U.S. counterintelligence effort than ever before.

The opening of American deep-water ports to Russian ships in 1972, as the committee notes, has given Soviet agents easy access to all of the United States. Frequent attempts have been made by Moscow to infiltrate federal government and congressional offices. An estimated 40% to 60% of the personnel in Soviet embassies are involved in intelligence-gathering activities. Since 1960, Soviet access to the U.S. has tripled and is still increasing.

Clearly, there is a continuing need for the U.S. to maintain a strong and effective foreign and military intelligence apparatus.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN  
19 April 1976

# CIA

## 'kindled Beirut war'

From DAVID TONGE

Athens, April 18

Efforts over a long period to build up the Lebanese Phalangists from Athens, now reportedly the CIA's command post in the Eastern Mediterranean, are alleged in an interview with a former American intelligence officer, Winslow Peck, published here this weekend.

One of the main tasks of Richard Welch, the head of the Athens CIA station who was murdered on December 23, had been to activate the Phalangists and right-wing Palestinian groups. Mr Peck claims in the magazine Anti, adding that his task, "in other words had been to kindle the war."

He says that the CIA now uses American banks in Athens to finance the Phalangists and that the majority of the CIA command here is now working on the situation in Lebanon. The US Embassy refuses to make any comment on these claims.

Mr Peck had been an analyst with America's main information gathering organisation, the National Security Agency (NSA), working for it in Istanbul, Vietnam, and at the Paris peace talks, as well as in the United States. He has now "defected" to the anti-CIA lobby and cooperates closely with the Washington magazine Counter-spy.

He argues that the only guarantee of safety for a former agent is to publish what he knows but that he himself only discloses what he thinks people need to know. He criticises the Cypriot Nikos Sampson for threatening to "reveal all" saying that threats before publication make one a "dead man."

The NSA, in Mr Peck's view, is probably the "most effective espionage organisation in the world," with communications posts including installations at "Checksey," in England — possibly a misprint for Chertsey — at Diego Garcia, on Malta, and in one British base on Cyprus also used by the CIA.

But the CIA he describes as a "secret criminal police force." He attributes to it 25 coups carried out between 1964 and 1973, but says that its various failures have meant that since 1970 the Pentagon has begun to compete with it in this field.

He argues that developments in the Middle East mean that the Athens CIA station, which he claims now has a staff of 170, has taken over the role earlier played by the stations in Cyprus, Beirut and Tel Aviv. The CIA faces no danger from

WASHINGTON STAR  
3 MAY 1976

Charles Bartlett

## Portugal and covert aid

the present Greek Government, he comments. The police services in Greece "were always controlled by the CIA."

Mr Peck argues that the CIA was involved in the 1967 coup. — one US official has told me privately that it had known the exact plans for the coup six weeks before it happened.

Mr Peck also stresses the links between the CIA and the Colonels while, separately, in an interview with a representative of the Pike committee on intelligence, the former US Ambassador, Henry Tasca, was specific about these and in particular about the regular contacts between the former dictator, Ioannides and the then head of the CIA station, Stacy Hulse.

The history of Cyprus he describes as a "typical example of CIA intervention" in a foreign country. The CIA was behind the intercommunal violence which came to a head in 1964, he claims, since it was apparently concerned lest Makarios establish too strong a position.

Mr Peck describes later meeting Mr Welch, who had then been serving for the CIA in Cyprus. He says Mr Welch asked him proudly: "You saw what I did in Cyprus in 1964?"

The accusation that the CIA and Dr Kissinger had planned the overthrow of Makarios — a charge which was being made angrily by Mr Papandreu in the Greek Parliament yesterday — is also made by Mr Peck, though he says they had not foreseen the Turkish landing.

"A Government of Sampson in Cyprus and the Colonels in Greece would have completely served US interests in this part of the world," he says, claiming that Sampson had long been a man of the CIA and EOKA B had been financed by it through the junta.

Police investigations into the murder of Welch have failed to throw up any leads so far. The death occurred after his naming in the Greek press by a "committee of Greeks and Greek Americans concerned to prevent their fatherland being perverted to the uses of the CIA" and this committee appears to have no connection whatsoever with the Counter-spy magazine.

NEWSWEEK

17 MAY 1976

### TERROR IN TEHRAN

Iran's revolutionary underground has been getting guidance from the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George Habash (top photo). One band of Iranians that had marked Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms (bottom photo) for death was trained by PFLP Arab terrorists. The CIA moved in after the Helms plot was uncovered (and three U.S. colonels were murdered) and helped local security forces round up the terrorists. Nine were executed in January and the organization, Tehran says, has been broken up!

In days when covert action is condemned as a resort not worthy of the United States, it is interesting to examine the re-emergence of Portugal as a democratic state.

The elections in Portugal have given the Portuguese assurance they will not be swept into the iron embrace of Communists or oligarchs. They have a shattered economy and a weak tradition of parliamentary rule. But they have at least won a chance to gratify their taste for freedom and democracy.

In a two-year revolution, Portugal barely escaped the steely reach of the Communists and the opportunism of military officers riding the emotions released by the end of the Salazar-Caetano regime. In smashing the oligarchic control, the Portuguese gave vent to an orgy of self-indulgence that left them badly exposed.

Having won 40 per cent of the seats in the new assembly, the Socialists intend to try to rule without coalescing to the left or right. They will not join the Communists, who have 15 per cent of the seats, because they do not trust their commitment to free government. They will not join the parties of the right because they do not share their enthusiasm for restoring the capitalist past.

The Socialists will be toeing a narrow line. They need to keep faith with "the revolution" while they build confidence among investors at home and abroad. They must lure the elite with talent and capital back from Brazil while they keep the masses satisfied that the game is being played in their name. They will need to placate and propitiate the military, who will be lurking in the background as the ultimate guarantors of the new constitution.

The balancing act will be hazardous for the minority of Socialists, unavoidably hobbled by the intrigues and frictions for which Portuguese politicians are especially notorious. The elections gave a majority to the parties of the left but economic recovery will require significant deference to sentiment on the right. The politicians will gain some discipline from their awareness that the nation will land back in an authoritarian basket if they fail to negotiate their differences.

Delicate as it seems, the evolving situation is an impressive tribute to all who struggled through dramatic days to keep the country out of Communist control. And to the extent that outside help was furnished them, it is to the CIA's great credit that the helping hand was agile and light enough to escape detection.

The probings of the Church committee on intelligence have left some Democratic senators highly critical of covert action by the CIA. Noting that the CIA has executed some 900 covert actions since 1961, they complain that these efforts too often bring opprobrium on the United States or weaken the will and self-reliance of the anti-Communists being helped. They suggest these efforts are not worth their costs to the ethics and morality of American leadership.

But it seems reasonable to assume that American intelligence found ways to strengthen the forces engaged against the Communists during Portugal's ordeal. The help that came was unobtrusive, no swash-buckling effort to preserve the status quo or discourage the reformers. The results show that the help was not corruptive or disruptive. It was essentially nourishment for the cause of freedom.

A congressional determination that American foreign policy must not be tainted by the undercover arts could have ruled this help out. The Communists would have been denied their chance to talk of "imperialist intrigues." But the Portuguese might also have been denied their chance to elect a government.

BALTIMORE SUN  
10 May 1976

## The Killing of John Kennedy

The assassination of President Kennedy more than a dozen years ago still haunts and troubles the nation. The Warren Commission report, with its conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, has withstood the tests of time better than the instant attacks on it. But suspicions of a Cuba connection will not vanish. On the contrary, they thrive. When such a non-conspiratorially-minded, responsible and informed official as Senator Mathias speaks of a "strong likelihood" of such a connection, that likelihood must be investigated.

What Senator Mathias did, however, was throw out a teaser, not add to knowledge. The Warren Commission knew that Oswald had been to Cuba. A year ago, the nation understood that President Kennedy, using the CIA, had been trying to assassinate Premier Castro. That was

motive enough, if the Cuban dictator chose to reciprocate, and was withheld from the Warren Commission. What Senator Mathias has added is a lurid spy tale of a contact in Paris in the CIA plot to kill Castro on the day Kennedy died, with "indications" that the Cuban, "Am-Lash," was a double agent who would have told all to Havana.

The Senate intelligence committee, according to Senator Mathias, a member, will soon report on the strong likelihood of which he spoke. If it is more convincing than what he has revealed, and is as convincing as he implies, then a new presidential commission to investigate the first Kennedy assassination will be needed. Its reference must be the Cuban activities of the CIA as withheld from the Warren Commission. That is, of course, a big if.

Christian Science Monitor  
20 April 1976

## Charge denied

# CIA, NSA accused of involvement in Lebanon

By John K. Cooley  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Athens  
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) are now using Athens as a main Mideast headquarters and are aiding the rightist Phalange Party in Lebanon's civil war. So charges a former NSA staffer.

Winslow Peck, interviewed in Paris by the Athens biweekly magazine Anti, is with the Washington magazine Counterspy which sin-

gled out Richard Welch as a CIA agent. Mr. Welch was assigned as CIA station chief in Athens and murdered last Dec. 23. His murderers were not apprehended. Greek judicial authorities forbid discussion of the case in newspapers here.

Mr. Peck says he was assigned to the CIA station here with the mission to keep the fires burning in the Lebanese civil war by moving aid to the Phalange and rightist Palestinians through Athens banks.

(Top U.S. sources in Washington have firmly denied to this reporter that there is CIA help for any Lebanese faction. Christian Lebanese refugees interviewed here said they believe the CIA has made it easier for the Phalange to obtain funds to buy arms. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat has produced no evidence for his frequent charge that the CIA assists Lebanese rightists.)

Mr. Peck, who says he worked at the Istanbul NSA station from 1966 to 1968 and later in Indo-China on communications intelligence, claims that Mr. Welch bragged to him that during his (Mr. Welch's) 1964 Cyprus duty, Mr. Welch had helped instigate Greek-Turkish troubles.

Mr. Peck further charges that Mr. Welch was a CIA case officer for Nikos Sampson, briefly president of the Greek Cypriot administration set up by the Athens military junta after its coup against President Makarios in

July, 1974.

Mr. Peck calls Cyprus a classic example of a CIA-sponsored coup, with overall supervision by U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He says the 1967 Greek military coup also had CIA involvement, but that after 1970 responsibility for overseas coup operations passed largely to the Pentagon.

He calls Mr. Sampson — soon due for trial in Nicosia — a paid CIA agent. He says the CIA also channeled funds through Athens to the anti-Makarios EOKA-B underground in Cyprus.

(Washington congressional hearings last fall disclosed a CIA-EOKA-B connection. Former U.S. Ambassador to Greece Henry Tasca's deposition indicated Secretary Kissinger did not inform Mr. Tasca of the two-way junta-CIA information flow.)

(Prime Minister Caramanlis's government has indefinitely postponed trials of Greek officers implicated in the Cyprus coup. Some of them threatened to disclose CIA links. Sources close to Greek police officials believe the Welch murder probe indicated EOKA-type Cypriot involvement. But like inquiries into the murder of U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies during an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia in August, 1974, they never reached the point of pressing charges.)

Mr. Peck says that during his own Istanbul service, Greeks and Turks often requested and obtained information on each other developed by the NSA.

THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE  
2 May 1976

## Reporting the news

# Even superspies are proper sources if they are right

By David Halvorsen  
Assistant to the editor

Last week's reports of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence activities may have given the impression that scores of editors and reporters were dupes of our nation's superspies. In fact, there are some newspeople who believe this is the case and are quite voluble on the subject.

We have always believed that the highest calling in journalism is reporting and that the best reporters are the shrewd, street-wise men and women who develop solid news sources.

A phone call late at night, a tip passed along over a couple of beers, or secret meetings in some obscure place have resulted in numberless stories that have sent criminals to jails and saved the taxpayers millions of dollars. To me, there was never any doubt that this was what news work was all about.

Furthermore, any reporter with basic skills will promptly ask himself why he is getting tips like those. He will check them out. If the information is correct and he offers the story to his editors, they will challenge its accuracy.

But there is an emerging counterview. Proponents of this view seem to be saying that sources pass on only information which is self-serving. Therefore, such sources cannot be trusted, particularly if they are in government, and more particularly if they are in law enforcement or intelligence.

The holders of this view reason that any reporter friendly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelli-

gence Agency, or state or local police, must be a lackey of the government. Friendly reporters get stories that are planted in the newspapers, it is held.

This argument seems to suggest that there exists a clever propaganda apparatus set up by furtive agents in the abandoned coal bins of gray government buildings. A reporter picks up his telephone to hear Agent Q tell him in conspiratorial tones that all left-handed golfers who drive pink station wagons are Communists.

Then, this view holds that through some journalistic mystique the reporter is able to get the story into the paper without the scrutiny of editors. We are dubious of such an idea.

Such a view seems to say that a reporter should have no sources at all. Rather, he best serves the public interest by sitting in the newsroom and pontificating on how things should be. At the very least, the viewpoint suggests that antiestablishment sources should be heard and official sources ignored.

The Senate committee's reports conclude fairly that United States foreign and domestic intelligence agencies have tried to manipulate the press. There can be no question that some reporters and editors have been used and that some stories unfavorable to the FBI or CIA have been killed.

But the critics of the traditional news-gathering processes are suggesting radical surgery, lopping off the head.

The Senate report includes what apparently is a reference to a story written by Ronald Koziol, a Tribune investigative reporter, about factionalism in the Students for a Democratic Society in

1969. It said the story was planted by the FBI with a friendly reporter to stir up trouble.

Some may think this column self-serving in that it defends a Tribune associate. Koziol needs no defense from this quarter. Subsequent stories bear out the fact that his story was substantially accurate. Furthermore, his information came from non-FBI sources outside of Chicago.

Last year, Koziol wrote stories that were critical of the FBI search for Patricia Hearst. He described missed opportunities to find her. The FBI let The Tribune know it did not like the Koziol stories, but it could not challenge their accuracy. In total, Mr. Koziol's stories were hardly the work of a friendly reporter.

Several years ago The Tribune published a series of articles about police brutality in Chicago. Some of the best work was done by reporters who have close friends in the Chicago Police Department.

If by any measure the so-called establishment has been successful in planting contrived stories in the newspapers, its victories have been few.

The Senate report said the FBI repeatedly and covertly attempted to manipulate the news media. It did not say it succeeded, though assuredly it did in some cases.

It seems that some fellow newspeople are suffering from paranoia. The test is whether the story is accurate and fairly reported, not whether it came from your friendly FBI agent.

POST, New York  
28 April 1976



## Harriet Van Horne

### THE SPY REPORT

If you could combine Grand Guignol horror, comic opera, science fiction and the more brutish tactics of a Fascist police state you would have a generally fair picture of what the CIA has been up to—with our tax dollars—since 1947.

After a 15-month investigation, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has reached the sensible conclusion that new laws are needed to control the superagency that has become a secret state within the state.

In one 14-year period, the report says, this agency, set up to protect us from foreign devils, has broken the law at home, plotted to assassinate heads of state and conducted small, secret wars entirely on its own.

\* \* \*

While noting that the agency had performed some missions "with dedication and security," an average citizen gets the feeling, as he pores over this report, that many CIA operations were carried out with the idealism of Dr. Strange-love and the finesse of Bugs Bunny.

Some of the incidents described would be hilarious were they not so sinister. Others make you wonder how so many depraved minds could have functioned undetected for so many years in a U.S. government agency.

Perhaps the most monstrous operation disclosed in the Senate report concerned the drugging of unsuspecting drunks in bars on the East and West Coasts. It's the sort of story that brings back memories of those insane Nazi scientists who performed unspeakable experiments on pregnant women and newborn infants.

For nine years, beginning in 1954, CIA agents randomly picked up bar patrons and slipped LSD into their food and drink. Great sport! Heroic work in behalf of national security. At least two deaths resulted from this great drug experiment. No follow-up studies were made of the innocent victims. Some, says the report, "may still be suffering from residual effects." There was no medical supervision.

In the late 1950s the Inspector General of the CIA—who must have been regarded by his super-spy colleagues as a Nervous Nellie—wrote that precautions had to be taken not only to protect these drug experiments from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal their existence from the American public. This, noted the Inspector General, "would

RECORD, Hackensack  
18 April 1976

## From gown to trench coat

"The times, they are a-changin'," Bob Dylan sang in the early days of the Vietnam war, and thousands of college students echoed his words demanding that the American Establishment change its ways.

But times keep changing, and the unemployment blues have replaced songs of social protest on campuses. And this has led to an interesting and ironic phenomenon.

At the height of the antiwar movement, the name of the Central Intelligence Agency produced automatic sneers among young idealists. Recruiters for the CIA were not welcome then in academe.

Today, there is more reason to distrust the CIA than in the 1960s. Then, we only suspected the agency of misdeeds. Now we know. Yet the CIA might as well have been printing job recruitment posters and taking out 10-second advertising spots on network TV for all the effect that congressional disclosures and press exposes have had on college students.

Recent reports show that the number of college seniors applying for professional jobs with the CIA went up 30 per cent during the past year, when

be detrimental" to the agency's mission.

The political and moral cost of the CIA's deceit has been high. We have tended, in recent years, to disbelieve the government even when it has been telling the truth. The old excuse for these 30 years of lies is still cited by the super-patriots, the CIA lackeys in the Congress. It goes: We must mislead the American people in order to continue misleading the enemy. Rubbish! The enemy—presumably the Soviet spy apparatus—often knows what is going on when we, the American people, do not. Viewed from any side, it's a rotten game.

If the CIA ever opens a Dept. of Fuller Explanation—and that will be the day!—I'd love to know how our national security was served by having Machiavelli translated into Swahili. And did the translator tarry a moment over the passage that says if you leave a man's honor (and property) alone, he will be reasonably content?

It's easy, of course, to dwell on the wilder aspects of the CIA misadventure. By now we all know about the efforts to kill Castro with exploding cigars and the cheap ruse of sending "wired" call girls into foreign agents' beds. Will our dignity as a great nation ever recover from the CIA's merry pranks?

What troubles me, by hindsight, is how many CIA stories reached the ears of reporters years ago. How shameful that they were not investigated and printed, then and there!

In 1961, for example, our CIA operatives were training—you won't believe this—Tibetan parachutists in Colorado. (Supposedly the Tibetans would be dropped somewhere over Red China—someday.) One frosty morning a bus—windows painted black—skidded off a Rocky Mountain trail, and out fell 15 hooded, stunned Tibetans. Witnesses to the accident were held incommunicado by the Army.

But the news leaked out, and the New York Times had an eye-witness account, according to David Wise in his book, "The Politics of Lying." Then the inevitable telephone call came from Washington, the magic words "national security" were invoked and the story died. I expect we'll never know what happened to those poor duped Tibetans.

\* \* \*

Similarly, the press refrained from publishing rumors of the projected Bay of Pigs invasion. What we regarded as patriotism at the time looks now, in retrospect, like stupid cowardice.

This Senate committee report may be incomplete and overcautious, but it is bound to have a cleansing effect. It calls for new laws giving Congress more control over the CIA—a reform President Ford says he will veto. Many Americans will take that as still another reason not to vote for him in November.

adverse publicity against the agency reached its peak.

More revealing are statistics showing that interest in the agency is not just a last resort: College students' applications for government jobs in general went up only 10 per cent by comparison.

Some college officials attribute the renewed interest in CIA work precisely to the bad publicity. But the change in attitude among students should more properly be laid to a resurgence of pragmatism among job seekers.

A student who has spent four years in college and then perhaps another two in graduate school, perfecting his skill at higher mathematics or Russian, may find it a lot more palatable to decipher codes or translate obscure journals for the CIA than to sell insurance or collect unemployment insurance. The job market is tight, and it is squeezing idealism and moral considerations out of graduates.

Bob Dylan's early songs are now poignant anachronisms from more hopeful years. Better suited to today is the wry comment from Cicero on changing times and morals: O tempora! O mores!

BANNER, Nashville  
27 April 1976

# Baker: CIA Not Involved In Watergate

By FRANK VAN DER LINDEN  
Washington Bureau Chief

Washington — Sen. Howard H. Baker, R-Tenn., virtually gave up today his long attempt to prove that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the Watergate burglary that led to the downfall of President Nixon.

In separate personal views filed with the Senate Intelligence Committee's final report, Baker said he had been given access to secret CIA files denied to him in 1973 as vice chairman of the Senate Watergate panel.

"I wish to state my belief," he said, "that the sum total of the evidence does not substantiate a conclusion that the CIA per se was involved in the range of events and circumstances known as Watergate."

"The investigation of Watergate and the possible relationship of the CIA thereto, produced a panoply of puzzlement," the senator said.

"While the available information leaves nagging questions and contains bits and pieces of intriguing evidence, fairness dictates that an assessment be rendered on the basis of the present record."

"An impartial evaluation of that record compels the conclusion that the CIA, as an institution, was not involved

in the Watergate breakin."

Baker's stand today is a sharp departure from his statement on Sept. 19, 1974: "I believe there is no question that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in Watergate; the question is rather, on whose order and for what purpose?"

The Tennessee Republican said the following December that, because of the CIA's stubborn refusal to comply with his requests for evidence, he could only "guess" that its agents weren't involved in "a sinister plot by the CIA" to destroy Nixon.

In January 1975, Baker eagerly obtained a place on the Select Intelligence Committee, hoping that its subpoena powers might enable him to pry loose secret data that would link the CIA to Watergate.

Former White House aide Charles Colson had told him that convicted Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt had often delivered secret information from the White House "plumbers" to the CIA long after the agency claimed it had broken off with Hunt in 1971.

Colson had a theory that Nixon was forced to resign the presidency when caught in a web of intrigue secretly spun by veteran agents of the CIA.

Four of the burglars who broke into the Democrats' Watergate headquarters in June 1972 — Hunt, James McCord, Rolando Martinez and Bernard Barker — had CIA connections. The Rockefeller Commission last June said the CIA's failure to make "timely disclosure of information and its destruction of certain tapes has led to suspicions and allegations concerning its involvement in the Watergate operation or the subsequent coverup."

The Rockefeller panel said Richard Helms, then CIA director, had used "poor judgment" when in January 1973 he destroyed many CIA tapes and transcripts. Helms' act was one of several events that aroused Baker's suspicions.

The senator said the CIA gave "exemplary" cooperation to him in his new role on the Intelligence Committee. He expressed his appreciation to CIA Director George Bush and his predecessor, William Colby, "for cooperating to the fullest extent."

Much information that the CIA had withheld from the Senate Watergate Committee "was examined at the CIA's headquarters in raw form and without sanitization deletions," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES  
8 MAY 1975

## Taming the Beasts

In retrospect, there is a striking similarity in the problems Senator Frank Church's Select Committee uncovered in its separate inquiries into domestic and foreign intelligence. Presidents of both parties succumbed to the temptation to use intelligence agencies, with their capacities to act in secrecy, as instruments to perform political magic for the Oval Office. In both the domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, Presidents found officials all too eager to engage in secret and lawless activities for, as one F.B.I. man put it, "the greater good" of the citizenry.

The reports show from how many directions the foundations of freedom were being undermined. First, there was the growing tendency to ignore the Constitution and the laws. Second, over the years, more and more of what is legitimately the public's business was being conducted in secret, depriving the people of information they needed to govern themselves effectively. Finally, there were deep and often personally injurious intrusions into individual rights.

At the heart of the effort to re-establish the rule of law is the proposal to create a Senate committee with jurisdiction over both domestic and foreign intelligence, empowered to legislate and to appropriate funds, in addition to performing the oversight function of the Congressional watchdog. All other proposed reforms hinge on this proposal, rendered all the more crucial because the committees currently charged with this responsibility, principally Armed Services and Judiciary,

have exercised little or no oversight and seem unwilling to initiate the changes required to prevent recurrence of past abuses.

In the foreign area alone, the committee proposes that the Director of Central Intelligence be given coordinating and budget-making powers designed to improve his control over the whole range of intelligence programs and to make them more responsive to the President. Covert actions would be severely curtailed and, if declared essential, made subject to Presidential and Congressional review of each proposal for such action, followed by written approval of specific programs.

In the domestic field, the F.B.I. would be required to shut down its political intelligence operations. Preventive intelligence activities would be permitted only in case of a clear threat of foreign spying or terrorism. Domestic intelligence activities would be vested in the F.B.I. and the guidelines recently drawn up by the Attorney General to control the F.B.I. would receive the legislative underpinning required to make them effective.

Some critics of the Select Committee's work believe that it should have outlawed covert action and domestic intelligence entirely and that it is naive to believe that the agencies in question can be controlled by law. Such a view seems to us based on the defeatist assumption that the nation has passed the point where it can impose legal controls over its own arms. However the committee's work is itself proof that the rule of law still has strong defenders in Washington.

The legislative program recommended by the Church Committee is a test of the nation's will to be both free and secure. It is up to Congress to meet that test.



# GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST  
2 5 APR 1976

## For the Record

*From a statement by the Federation of American Scientists:*

The proposed threshold test ban treaty is worse than nothing. . . .

In the first place, it directly reneges on U.S. declaratory policy of more than a decade, which repeatedly emphasized that the only problem in the way of a test ban agreement was verification. The clear implication of this position was that any threshold agreement would be reached at a threshold level no higher than the capabilities of national verification demanded. This level is now somewhere around 10 kilotons or less—not the proposed 150 kilotons. . . .

In itself this situation does not make the treaty worse than nothing but only reduces its value to nothing. In addition, however, we doubt that this treaty level will ever subsequently be lowered. The threshold treaty will, if ratified, take the test ban treaty off the political agenda. If a dozen years of saying we wanted limits bounded by national verification capabilities could not lead to better than this, the present reversal of policy is likely to end the matter for the foreseeable future.

The treaty is also worse than nothing in its effect on the treaty's most important audience: the nuclear-tending powers. No treaty limiting tests would, of course, make much difference to the heavily armed superpowers. But the test ban was supposed to set an example of restraint to those who might build nuclear weapons themselves. . . .

Finally, . . . it advances the notion that peaceful uses are plausible. But our country believes there are no sensible peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Why then enshrine in a treaty elaborate methods of verifying them? This can only encourage new nuclear powers to justify bombs. . . .

WASHINGTON POST  
1 3 MAY 1976

## Paying International Dues

THE UNITED STATES a deadbeat? Embarrassing but true. This country is in arrears on its dues for the second half of 1975 and for all of 1976 to the International Labor Office, a venerable institution founded by Samuel Gompers in 1919 and a major channel of American influence on trade unions and worker-related activities abroad. The sum involved is small—\$25 million. But the damage to American interests and prestige, if the Congress does not promptly pay up, could be disproportionately large.

The basis of the trouble is simple. A while back, AFL-CIO president George Meany got fed up—not without some good reason—at the way Communist and Third World countries were undercutting the unique tripartite worker-employer-government structure of the ILO and manipulating it for anti-American political purposes. The Ford administra-

Monday, May 3, 1976

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

## U.S.: self-defeating prophecies

By Walter C. Clemens Jr.

Influence in this world is purchased by what people think rather than by objective realities. American spokesmen—inside as well as outside the government—have unnecessarily lowered the image of the United States by denigrating its power and upgrading that of its adversaries.

• Not only retired officers now running for public office such as Adm. Elmo Zumwalt and candidates of the right wing such as Ronald Reagan are charging that the U.S. is becoming a second-rate power compared to the Soviet Union. The same impression is created by CIA estimates of what it would cost the United States to field a military establishment like that of the U.S.S.R.

• Not only veteran distruster of the "third world" Daniel P. Moynihan but Henry Kissinger is warning that the United States will rue the day that Congress cut off aid to Western-backed forces in Angola. The picture they paint is not only that the Russians and Cubans are "in" but that they will remain influential in Angola for years to come.

• Secretary Kissinger, contrary to the advice of many specialists on Italian and world communism, warns that communist participation in the Italian Cabinet will make Italy unfit for NATO.

Each of the above arguments is unfounded and unwise. Though Russia is gaining on the U.S. militarily in some respects, U.S. and NATO forces still maintain a commanding lead in the key indexes of military power, including numbers and accuracy of warheads. The qualitative advantages rooted in Western technology are overlooked in quantitative assessments. The gross numbers that do favor the U.S., such as total tonnage of the U.S. and Soviet navies, are bypassed by the pleaders for panic.

Having spent fabulous sums and gigantic efforts to build a military force "second to none," Americans are foolhardy to downgrade

it merely to obtain a larger budget for the next years. Such talk—like the alleged bomber and missile gaps of the '50s—creates bargaining advantages for the U.S.S.R. not warranted by the military realities. Why should the U.S. Government talk so as to exaggerate Soviet power?

As to Angola, Soviet advantages there result primarily from Moscow's decision, taken some years ago, to back the national independence movement, while Washington tilted toward Portugal. There is nothing inevitable about a long-term Soviet presence in Angola, though Washington's talk could make it more likely. Rather than hinting that the Angolans are locked in the vise of the Russian bear, America might better go about extending the warm hand it should have proffered years ago.

What to do about Italy is less clear, but the administration might begin by clearing the decks and halting any remaining covert aid to the Christian Democrats, who have shown themselves so inept at governing their country in a progressive way. After 20 years the U.S. can no longer justify aid to them as an expedient to stave off a communist victory as in the chaos resulting from World War II.

Since Italy's Communist Party may some day come to power, why not prepare for the possibility of an accommodation at least as cordial as that which has evolved with Tito? The Russians, also confronted with the possibility of a "historic compromise" in Italy, have till now shown the sense not to attempt excommunicating the heretical Italian party.

If the Italian or other West European communists want to become independent of Moscow, Dr. Kissinger's line makes it more difficult for them to do so.

Prophecies can be self-fulfilling and even self-defeating. If U.S. leaders must prophesy, why not put their country's assets on the scales along with its liabilities?

Mr. Clemens is professor of political science at Boston University.

tion reacted, in a damage-limiting mode, by giving a two-year notice of withdrawal; that threat, it was hoped, would stir the ILO to start making some of the changes necessary to keep the United States in. And in fact some progress has been made. A cabinet-level committee including Mr. Meany recently pronounced itself guardedly hopeful of ILO change. An inattentive House nonetheless cut out all ILO funds. The Senate put the money in. The matter now hangs in the balance of an imminent conference.

The ILO funds should be, we believe, restored. Americans cannot expect to gain a fair hearing for their ideas on ILO reform while they are ignoring the ILO constitution's requirement to keep up on dues. The United States should not be playing games with international organizations, and setting a bad example for other nations. Moreover, valuable ILO activi-



ties are going on right now. Next month in Geneva, the ILO will convene another in the United Nations' series of social/economic conferences. The point of this one is to induce member governments and their bureaucracies and citizens to govern their pursuit of economic growth with a greater concern for distribution of the benefits to the poor. It would be a particular shame if the American delegation had to slink into that conference by the back door.

The larger issue of American participation in the

ILO remains. Our own view is that the provocation would have to be very great to justify a decision—at the end of the two-year notice period next year—to drop out. That would leave an important labor field to countries often unfriendly to American values and views. It would convey a signal of international flagging. Mr. Meany is quite right in believing, nonetheless, that it is up to the other nations in the ILO, if they wish the Americans to stay, to meet the United States half way.

BALTIMORE SUN  
11 May 1976

## Finer Points of Drug Suppression in Bangkok

By FRANK LOMBARD

Bangkok.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has been operating for more than 10 years in Thailand, the primary trafficking outlet for the world's largest source of illicit opium and a land where money and influence make things run.

DEA agents gather intelligence and unilaterally pay informers. They work closely with their own Thai Police contacts, exchanging information, interrogating prisoners, and making raids. Only Thai police can make arrests.

The consensus is that the DEA presence has kept heroin syndicates on the run, with probably less than 10 per cent of America's heroin coming through Thailand. The Thai Police can point to an impressive record of seizures.

On the darker side, not a single narcotics fugitive has ever been caught and not a single "drug king" has ever been successfully prosecuted. Many cases are mysteriously dropped for "lack of evidence." Trials drag on forever, witnesses vanish, and prisoners "escape."

Corruption and trust are the main problems in running a drug suppression operation in Thailand. A Thai Police rookie makes only \$50 a month, a general about \$500. The temptations are great, especially if it only involves looking the other way.

Thai society runs on a hierarchical clique system. Members of a clique are "friends" and develop ferocious loyalties, often transcending family and institutional barriers.

Outsiders are more or less mistrusted. Many a cynical foreigner has been given to remark that "the Thais do not trust each other."

With this backdrop, it is easy to understand that narcotics intelligence within the Thai Police flows along personal rather than organizational lines. Officials are disinclined to keep records and files for fear that they cannot preserve their confidentiality. They could be misused by jealous subordinates or copied by other government units.

Informers are reluctant to come forward. The policemen they confide in may not be the ones who arrest them. (The Thai police are national, and any policeman can make arrests nationwide.)

Police have a tendency to forget about a case after the arrest. They are mainly interested in the "body" and the "dope" and often lack the incentive to follow up on an investigation.

There is also no incentive to chase a fugitive unless orders come from "above." A bus driver can flee the scene of an accident in the middle of Bangkok and never get caught.

Narcotics police tell about a raid at a drug laboratory in which one of the operators showed up surprised and indignant: "What are you guys doing here? We just got through paying you \$10,000." They had paid a different set of policemen.

After the police prepare a case, they turn it over to the public prosecutor, a separate branch of government. Police feel that the prosecutor is not on their side. In any event, they do not coordinate well.

At this stage bribes are attempted, usual-

ly through defense attorneys. The police or prosecutor may respond by omitting key elements of evidence or by dropping the case altogether.

This sometimes backfires. State witnesses often are not prepared by the prosecutor, and they have been known to volunteer testimony on their own, thus surprising the judges.

Prosecuting a possession case is fairly easy. Getting at one of the financiers or "drug kings" is difficult, requiring many witnesses and a great deal of preparation. Plea bargaining is not allowed, though judges might go easier on a defendant who co-operates.

The financiers have money for bribes and the best lawyers. Police claim that even their competitors in the illicit drug business will help them financially.

While awaiting trial, they pay wardens for daytime liberty, returning to their cells at night.

During the day, they might work some drug deals or maybe look up unfavorable witnesses who, according to police, are threatened or bribed.

Another ploy is to play sick. If a critical witness is scheduled for trial, the accused gets sick or his lawyer gets sick. The trial is then postponed for at least another three weeks, because sessions do not run continuously. Things can drag on forever, with key prosecution witnesses slowly disappearing from the scene.

Mr. Lombard is an American freelance writer based in Bangkok.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Friday, May 7, 1976

### The Oceans' Use

## A Turning Point May Be Reached Today In the UNEffort to Draft a Law of the Sea

By BARRY NEWMAN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

NEW YORK—Negotiations to write the first law to govern use of the world's oceans may be reaching a turning point today as the third session of the United Nations talks comes to an end amid continuing friction between industrial and developing countries.

In two years of elaborate meetings, first in Caracas and then in Geneva, the 149 countries participating in the Law of the Sea Conference did little more than jostle in the starting gate of what has seemed like an im-

minent dash for the wealth of the oceans. It has been the knottiest international bargaining ever. It has also been, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said last month, "one of the most significant negotiations in diplomatic history."

During an eight-week New York session just closing, some hard compromises have finally been struck. There now is acceptance, for instance, of a 12-mile territorial sea (replacing the three-mile "cannon shot" of another era), and that has been coupled with a 200-mile "economic zone" where coastal countries would hold sway over commercial activity.

However, a crucial accord that was thought to be emerging on a way to organize the mining of copper, nickel and manganese on the floor of the deep sea, beyond the 200-mile zone, ran into trouble yesterday. The seabed mining plan—which would give the international community a share of the wealth—was offered as a major concession by the United States. The U.S. has been pushing for a largely free-enterprise mining system, but advanced the compromise partly to give the lethargic conference a jolt.

Developing countries, which have opposed any private exploitation of the seabed,

are finding the compromise hard to swallow. In reaction, many of them have come out against Secretary Kissinger's proposal to convene the conference with the hope of completing a treaty only two or three months from now in Geneva or New York.

#### Pitfalls Remain

As of late yesterday, the conference was still trying to decide in closed session whether to call the summer meeting. But even if the meeting is held, the law of the sea won't be home free. Numerous pitfalls remain, any one of which could trip up the conference. There is harsh disagreement over the composition of a council to oversee ocean mining. There is a standoff over the rights of one country to conduct scientific research off the coast of another. And a new coalition has arisen of landlocked and other so-called "geographically disadvantaged" states that are trying mightily to gain something for themselves from the sea. If these 52 countries don't get at least part of what they want, there are enough of them to block a treaty.

Moreover, even if every country in the world signs an ocean treaty, there are still substantial doubts that it would be universally ratified. The U.S. delegation, for example, is already getting adverse domestic reaction to its offer of a seabed compromise, and delegation members are clearly worried.

One of the more voluble opponents of the compromise, a law professor named Gary Knight from Louisiana State University, calls it a "dead giveaway" of seabed mining, and he predicts that "34 Senators could easily be brought together to refuse to ratify." A mining-industry representative who asks not to be identified insists the compromise has to be a "bottom line proposition;" any further movement, he says, would turn him against the treaty.

In Congress, a bill that would license U.S. companies to mine the deep seabed with or without a treaty is expected to be on the Senate floor by June. Last March, Congress passed a bill claiming U.S. control over fishing as far as 200 miles to sea. President Ford signed the bill despite appeals from his own diplomats. Treaty proponents fear that political considerations in an election year could similarly encourage unilateral action on mining, especially if the conference doesn't meet over the summer, and could turn Congress and the public against a treaty that doesn't measurably enhance U.S. interests.

#### Likened to Canal Issue

"Joe Six-pack doesn't know anything about the law of the sea—he never heard of it," says Sen. Mike Gravel, Democrat of Alaska, who is against unilateral moves. "As soon as extreme conservatives realize we're planning to cede sovereignty to an international body, they'll call it the worst treason. They're doing this right now in regard to the Panama Canal. You'll see the drawing of the line."

Hoping to head off legislation, the U.S. and other countries are asking the UN conference to give the treaty the force of law when it is signed, instead of waiting for wide ratification—a process that could take eight years. Otherwise, says a U.S. diplomat, "the whole thing could be for naught." A senior UN official, asked what effect U.S. ocean-mining legislation could have on the conference outcome, says, "I don't want to answer that question because I wouldn't want to sound gloomy and pessimistic."

The balance is delicate. Some people fear that the conference could explode if pressured too forcefully, or atrophy if not pressured enough. For this reason, conference leaders over the last two years have thought it too risky to take a vote on anything. Substantive bargaining has gone ahead in se-

cret, and all agreements have been reached through consensus. Records aren't even kept. Information about what's happening comes mainly from diplomats willing to talk without being identified.

In the last week, conference leaders have gone into seclusion to escape constant delegate lobbying and have drafted a tentative treaty that presumably reflects areas of agreement. The text will be revised at least once before a final treaty takes shape. The end product will be the result of alliances that have dissolved, and coalesced again, as each nation has struggled to sort out its principles and weigh them against its self-interest.

Early in the negotiations, for instance, more than 100 developing countries lined up in favor of total coastal-state control over activity in the 200-mile economic zone. It has since dawned on countries that are landlocked (or have short coastlines or coastlines that are close to other nations) that strong coastal states could squeeze them out of the sea for good. So these countries—including such unlikely couples as Bolivia and Singapore, Sweden and Uganda—have rebelled and erected one of the conference's biggest roadblocks.

Their diplomats realize that these states aren't likely to get a crack at oil and minerals in the coastal waters of other nations. But they are demanding continued freedom of transit for their ships in the 200-mile zone and some sort of access to fish and other living resources. If those rights are granted, an Asian diplomat says, "then we won't torpedo the conference."

Among other issues dealing with waters relatively close to land, a few more snags have developed, but they are considered minor. For example, there are differences over the definition of an archipelago. That may not seem important, but it is very important for archipelagoes. And while there is a good amount of agreement on broad rights of passage through straits (a major military concern of the U.S.), the straits states don't entirely like the arrangement. But it is believed they will ultimately come around.

A more novel issue—pollution from ships—has produced surprising unity. (One possible reason is that shipping states and coastal states are often one and the same, and only have to shake hands with themselves.) "We've come very close to reaching agreement on pollution in all aspects," says a Latin-American diplomat. The plan calls for establishment of international pollution standards for the economic zone. Coastal states wouldn't be allowed to exceed the standards with their own rules. That pleases maritime states whose ships wouldn't be closed out of areas where the rules are too stringent. In return, coastal states would be granted considerable powers of enforcement.

(The tougher issue of what to do about pollution that starts on land and ends up in the sea was barely grazed by the conference. Environmentalists aren't happy with that, and they also say the accord on shipping pollution seems too vague. One pollution expert on the U.S. delegation says reaction from environmental groups to such a pollution treaty would probably be "lukewarm to opposed.")

#### The Research Issue

Another novel item on the bargaining table hasn't been so gracefully handled. The same committee that has found a solution to pollution has been stumped by the question of scientific research. Advanced countries like the U.S. are asking freedom to do research in another country's economic zone. Coastal states want to control it, not because they don't like scientists but because some scientists could be soldiers in disguise. "Coastal states," a diplomat says, "have

felt threatened by certain scientific-research projects that in fact have been all sorts of things."

The U.S. has budged a bit on this, but not enough to satisfy coastal states. The positions now seem frozen. Some observers suspect the reason for this adamancy is that defense has become a "hidden agenda" at a conference that had expressly excluded military matters. The suggestion is made that the large U.S. concession on seabed mining was meant to insure that defense interests would get their way on issues they consider vital, such as freedom of "scientific" research. Top U.S. diplomats deny it. They say the seabed proposal was intended to accelerate talks that seemed doomed. "Nobody can have everything he wants," a U.S. negotiator says. "There's no point in a treaty that's completely one-sided."

Whatever the motives, the offer of a seabed compromise has reportedly been incorporated into the tentative treaty text with the hope that it may lead to a breakthrough.

Throughout the talks, developing countries, many of which export minerals, have been digging in against private mining of the deep-sea floor. They fear that minerals from the sea could glut the minerals markets, and they favor giving an international enterprise the exclusive rights to mine the seabed. But nobody has said where such an enterprise might find the technology, the expertise and the money to break into the ocean-mining business. (And some developing countries that buy minerals have evidently been having second thoughts about a system that would prop up prices for developing countries that produce those minerals.)

#### The U.S. Proposal

Until now, the United States was standing fast for a free-enterprise system for mining the seabed. Its compromise proposal offers to put two crucial constraints on private companies. It would create a method for handing over some, but not all, fully explored mine sites to an international authority, which would exploit them and share the revenue. In addition, the proposal offers a formula that would tie increases in sea-mineral production to increases in demand for minerals in general, so that prices wouldn't be eroded. The mining companies, evidently, are amenable to this middle ground. Whether developing countries are willing to drop their ideological opposition to private exploitation remains to be seen.

There is another unresolved seabed issue, and it goes to the heart of the law of the sea. It concerns the make-up of the international council that will operate the deep-seabed authority. The U.S. wants a disproportionately strong voice on the council. Its representatives are convinced that developing countries will use a one-country one-vote system to advance their own views. Developing countries are just as distrustful of the U.S. and other industrial countries, and similar worries abound at the conference about the fairness of the machinery being constructed for the settlement of all disputes that arise after a treaty is achieved.

The mood confirms a feeling shared by many conference participants: that the original high-sounding notions about preserving the seas as "the common heritage of mankind" have long since gone by the boards and been replaced by the hard-nosed pursuit of property and power.

"We are convinced that our common progress requires nations to acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community," Secretary Kissinger said in his speech about the seas last month. But a diplomat from an island state is skeptical. "When we are finished," he says, "we will have buried the common heritage of mankind."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, May 11, 1976

**UNCTAD and Beyond**

Henry Kissinger, who has long professed to be bored by international economics, last September unveiled before the United Nations his master plan for dealing with the economic demands of the developing "Third World."

If you'll recall, he proposed creation of enough new international bureaucracies that locating them all in New York City would balance Mayor Beame's budget. They included: A Development Security Facility (DSF); an International Energy Institute (IEI); an International Industrialization Institute (III); an International Center for the Exchange of Technological Information (ICETI); a World Food Reserve (WFR); Consumer-Producer Forums (CPF's); an International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); and an international organization "to coordinate and finance" technological assistance in nonfood agriculture and forestry, to which we applied the acronym: IOCTANAFP.

The UN's bureaucrats, of course, were wowed by all these bold and innovative jobs, er, ideas. Never one to quit while he's on a winning streak, the Secretary of State last week went before the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi with something new. Out of his sleeve came the International Resources Bank (IRB), which Jack Bennett of Exxon—who a year ago was Treasury undersecretary—has mildly described as "one of the worst ideas to come out of the State

Department in a long time."

The IRB, we're told, will kill two birds with one stone. It will get capital flowing into vitally needed mineral resources and it will virtually end Third World expropriation of development projects. Private capital, you see, isn't going into such projects as easily as it might because companies fear expropriation.

The bank would be capitalized at \$1 billion, with the United States putting up a fifth, the other industrial countries and the oil producers putting up the remainder. The bank would sell up to \$10 billion in bonds, lend the money to governments for mining projects and such, with the future output of the ventures pledged as collateral for the bonds. There's a vision of a company buying the IRB bonds, the money going to a Third World government, which then uses it to buy the company's services in developing the project.

Because the developing nations really want the industrial nations to put up \$3 billion to stockpile commodities as buffers against price swings, they're not exactly enchanted with the IRB idea. And for some reason Mr. Kissinger's IRB is being portrayed by the United States as a "free-market" alternative to the stockpiling idea, although we fail to see how an international bureaucracy that parcels out subsidized loans bears any resemblance to the free market.

And why should U.S. taxpayers

support a bank that lends money to countries that expropriate private investments? If Third World countries want increased capital investment that is in fact discouraged by the threat of expropriation, they can easily work out iron-clad assurances not to expropriate, or simply build a reasonable history of non-expropriation.

Mr. Bennett fears now that Mr. Kissinger has put forth his scheme local governments will be tempted to wait for these subsidized loans, halting negotiations with private companies who are now trying to find ways to continue development. But only the most foolish of Third World governments would do this, we think, not only because the subsidized loans might never come, but chiefly because they'll always be better off with private direct investment. A state-run development project will inevitably chew up three, four or 10 times the value of any subsidy, simply through bureaucratic inefficiencies.

There's no reason why Mr. Kissinger should be making any proposals at all in this area, except that it wins cheers from the international bureaucrats and a few others with day dreams about world government. Indeed, the floor of the State Department that is given over to economic affairs could easily be collapsed into a medium-sized valise and given over to the folks at Treasury, who will know what to do with it.

WASHINGTON POST  
10 MAY 1976

*Treating World Poverty*

**H**IS AFRICAN TRIP provided Secretary of State Kissinger with two occasions on which to respond to the less developed countries' aspirations to reduce the real economic gap and the felt psychological gap between the world's rich and poor. This is a concern ever more central to American foreign policy, since there is in the country a certain sense of guilt about global poverty, reinforced by forebodings of OPEC-like reprisals by producers of commodities other than oil. Ending too long a period of neglect, Mr. Kissinger joined the issue last fall in what was widely taken as a constructive response to "Third World" demands for major changes in the world economy. But the Third World's intemperate attacks on Zionism and on other matters of American political concern subsequently dissipated much of that incipient spirit of accommodation. The result was that Mr. Kissinger went to Africa realizing that, whatever the foreign policy considerations at stake, he did not have much political room.

His first pronouncement was a dramatic proposal to "roll back the desert" in the sub-Saharan drought-prone region of the Sahel. The price tag given was \$7.5 billion and the impression given was that of a huge American initiative. Actually, the plan, which experts deem a promising one, had long been in the

international works. The money is to be provided by many sources and spent over a period of 10 years. The American share amounts to the annual \$100 million-plus that the United States had already said it would provide.

The more important occasion was the Nairobi session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the leading forum in which the poor, very poor and newly-rich members of the Third World (no monolith) have tried to work out their own differences and lean on the developed states. Most countries of this "bloc," finding self-reform difficult, instead seek resources primarily from the United States: commodity agreements to support the price of their main exports; cheap technology unencumbered by patents; debt relief, including relief of the immense debts run up to Third World oil states; easier access to Western markets; and Third World power in global economic decision-making.

Skipping the touchy matter of self-uplift, Mr. Kissinger bore down principally on commodities. But where many producers want the assurance of steady and consumer-subsidized markets, he proposed a new "bank" to funnel private capital into resource development. Few people outside the State Department see much need for a new bank. The idea is not strong-

ly supported by other executive departments. The Congress will probably pay more heed than the Secretary to corporate misgivings. The controversial record of Western corporations, in precisely the extractive industries that the proposal would most affect, is bound to be revived. All this does not necessarily mean it's a bad idea. It means the United States is engaged in a negotiation. The Third World's purpose in initiating the negotiation, with a demand for a "new international economic order," is nothing less than to refit the world economy to new political forces themselves still in a molten stage. It will go on for years.

There is something more immediate to do. The first American installment of \$375 million to replenish the World Bank's window for the very poor, the Interna-

NEW YORK TIMES

5 MAY 1976

## Why Was the Dragon Slain?

PARIS—Something very unusual is going on in Britain's nuclear program. It is difficult to conclude from available details on this highly classified subject whether recent developments should be linked to London's strategic planning.

They are more probably related to efforts at supporting the economy, to preparations for a "European" atomic weapons pool with France, or even to political fears that United States neo-isolation may curb access to vital materials on which the United Kingdom has hitherto depended.

Consider the following apparently unrelated facts: (1) London's Ministry of Defense announced it would halt imports of weapons-grade tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen gas, purchased for twenty years from the United States; (2) it became known that a seven-nation London agreement, controlling export of nuclear materials, was running into trouble with the Common Market's nuclear agency, Euratom; (3) and Britain last Thursday formally interred in the Organization of Economic Coordination and Development (O.E.C.D.) "the Dragon," a unique installation.

Tritium is a component of H-bombs derived from many ores although often associated with aluminum. In the West it is now produced by America and France. It is not only costly but decays rapidly, with a half-life of 12.5 years as compared to millions of years for uranium and thousands of years for plutonium. But fusible tritium is enormously more explosive than either of the above fissionable elements. It is also far lighter and therefore capable of propulsion by smaller weapons systems.

tional Development Association, fell due last February. The full amount has not yet been authorized; the incomplete appropriation was in the aid bill just vetoed. It is true that some countries seem more interested in exacting fresh psychic revenge from the United States than in seeing real resources transferred through familiar channels like the World Bank. But this does not absolve the United States of commitments undertaken in the past; on this particular commitment, moreover, the commitments of other donor nations hinge. The international community has good reason to be skeptical about American words while this country's obligations to IDA remain unfulfilled.

### FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By C. L. Sulzberger

Why were the British giving up their guaranteed American source of tritium and constructing their own facilities at Chapelcross and Galloway in the U.K.? Britain is broke and curbing almost every other expenditure including the Dragon—of which more later. Is the change to create jobs, to save money by saving dollars, to make a brand-new secret weapon, or to safeguard against the fear of a sudden American cut-off?

Or is it to free Britain from U.S. restrictions, thus allowing it to go ahead with an oft-mentioned, never-agreed plan to join France in building a "European" nuclear force pooled by the two countries? Fusion warheads like those based on tritium have virtually no fallout, unlike fission weapons based on uranium and plutonium. This is vital in considering the defense of tiny, populated Europe.

As for the Common Market flap: Washington inspired secret meetings last year to work out a secret accord between three Euratom members (Britain, France, West Germany) and four other nations (the U.S.A., Russia, Canada and Japan) restricting exports of specialized nuclear materials.

But the other six Common Market partners were told nothing about their three partners' deal, until last week. Why not? Also, why were they informed last week? Above all, why did London and Paris spurn a Bonn suggestion that reference to Euratom (Common Market nuclear branch) be made in the original pact?

Finally there is the strange Dragon case. This is a unique nuclear reactor built in Britain for the benefit of O.E.C.D. members. It is the world's only versatile high-temperature experimental nuclear facility and could attain temperatures of 1,000 degrees centigrade as compared with 300 to 500 achieved by ordinary nuclear reactors.

With the Dragon's technology it would be possible to produce metals like iron or aluminum directly from their ores by heat itself—like global creation—instead of by indirect electrical processes. The Dragon potentially could gasify coal or produce hydrogen as a fuel.

In the nuclear energy field the Dragon's demise is compared by scientists with the kind of faulty judgment which in the political field led to Watergate. The remarkable facility itself, born in 1959 thanks to an O.E.C.D. protocol, came into operation five years later in Winfrith Heath, England. It was named for the renowned hot breath of the mythical dragon.

Why was it killed? The slaughter was allegedly pushed by Britain's energy minister as a money-saving gimmick. Is it worth the price to international knowledge? It will delay for years the advance of some types of beneficial research. Will another Dragon have to be constructed at far greater expense later on?

And what has the Dragon's death got to do with other nuclear developments? British manufacture of tritium may cost more than is saved by murdering the Dragon. And why the argument about excluding Euratom from a secret nuclear agreement, largely at London's request? These events approximately coincide. Something seems peculiar.

# Eastern Europe

THE ECONOMIST MAY 1, 1976

## Russia

### How big will the giant get?

Is the Soviet military ogre growing to be 10 feet tall or only nine and a half? Or is it possible that he is not growing at all, and that the recent brouhaha over increased Russian defence spending is nothing more than gross misrepresentation by American militarists who want to get the biggest possible defence budget through congress for next year?

The answer to the first question is that nobody really knows accurately just how much Russia spends, or what effect the spending will have on its armed forces a few years hence. The answer to the second is that the CIA and several other organisations have produced estimates to serve as a rough guide to what the Russians are spending. They normally do two of these, a "rouble" estimate to measure the burden on the Russian economy, and a "dollar" estimate that tries to compare Soviet spending with that of the United States, or all of Nato. The problem is that both of these figures are admittedly imper-

fect, and both have been used at various times without qualification, and sometimes confused with one another, by advocates on both sides of the spending debate, to prove their own parochial points.

So when it became known a few weeks ago that the CIA estimates might have seriously underestimated Soviet spending and were being reworked, some American sceptics got their calculators out. One of them, Congressman Les Aspin of Wisconsin, pointed out that the dollar estimate in particular made the Russian military budget look bigger than it actually is. This is because of the "market basket" effect, well known to economists: to compare a basket of British groceries with the same products bought in another country usually makes the foreign ones look more expensive. This does not mean Britain lives more cheaply; it means that the foreigners have different tastes and needs, and their marketing system is more efficient at delivering what they want. So to put a cost on the Soviet military establishment as if it were produced by the United States—which is roughly what the CIA does—tends to exaggerate its real cost.

But Mr Aspin has found other problems as well, the most important of which is that the Russians seem to be using a lot of their military men to do things civilians do in most western countries—internal security, civil defence, research and work on civil construction projects. Not only does this tend to skew the dollar estimates even further, but it also makes the recent growth of Soviet military manpower look a lot less menacing than if it were all pumped into the combat forces. Mr Aspin's figures are generally confirmed by estimates released last week by the American Defence Intelligence Agency, which frequently differs from the CIA on fundamental military issues.

But there is another issue that is often overlooked in the numbers game. This is that the pay of conscripts in Russia bears almost no relation to the economic burden on the country of having its men in uniform instead of growing wheat or making television sets. Russia is paying an economic cost for its large army that is far greater than can easily be measured by either dollar or rouble comparisons. Sorting out this particular tangle will be one of the major problems the CIA must face as it produces its revised estimates later this year.

Christian Science Monitor  
13 May 1976

## U.S. views on Soviets disputed

### Strategic Survey: no expansionist policy

By Takashi Oka  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

London

Does the Soviet Union's continuing military buildup justify assumptions that the Kremlin has embarked on a new era of expansionism?

No, says the International Institute for Strategic Studies, one of the world's most prestigious private research organizations in the defense field. The institute's annual Strategic Survey thus takes issue with leading American officials such as Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and his assistant, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who said publicly last June that the Soviet Union was just beginning "its truly imperial phase."

At a press conference unveiling the survey last week, the institute's director, Christoph Bertram, also disputed some Western contentions that detente had favored the Soviet Union rather than the West.

#### Soviet exclusion

The fall of South Vietnam did not bring Indo-

China into the Soviet orbit, Dr. Bertram noted Hanoi might be leaning toward Moscow, but Cambodia seemed to be favoring Peking. Throughout Asia, the Chinese-Soviet confrontation has caused difficulties for Moscow. To take one example, no sooner had Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko paid a visit to Tokyo than Prime Minister Takeo Miki was declaring that Japan would go ahead and sign a friendship treaty with China, including an anti-hegemony (i.e., indirectly anti-Soviet) clause to which Mr. Gromyko had taken exception.

The Soviet Union has been effectively excluded from Middle East peacemaking: It is not participating in several significant international conferences seeking to rearrange relationships between the advanced industrial countries of the West and the countries of the developing world. The Conference on European Cooperation and Security has been a disappointment likewise, for the Soviet Union has failed to reap from it the propaganda advantages in the West that it had hoped for.

On the military balance between East and West, the strategic survey, coauthored by Dr. Bertram and his colleagues, finds that while numerical superiority rests with the Soviet Union and its allies, the North Atlantic allies still lead in the quality and sophistication of their weaponry. However, Dr. Bertram and his colleagues warned that if the NATO allies continue to pinch pennies on defense, the equilibrium between Soviet numbers and Western quality could be changed in Moscow's favor.

#### Advanced vehicle

One institute official pointed out that in cer-

tain limited fields—for instance that of armed vehicles—the Soviet Union already deployed the world's most advanced vehicle, the BMP, carrying a 73-millimeter gun and an anti-tank guided-missile launcher. The BMP is better than either the United States M113 or the West German Marder, the official said. However, as production and deployment of such sophisticated weapons proceeds, Soviet defense costs will require a dramatic increase. How will Moscow, already pushed for resources, respond to this need? The institute did not answer the question, but noted the heavy economic burden a Soviet decision to push for quality as well as numbers would demand.

Whereas the American defense establishment emphasizes the Soviet military buildup and especially Moscow's vast increase in naval strength over the past two decades, institute officials here note that even last year they recorded an American edge over the Soviets in tonnage and number of vessels recently built. In other words, the Soviet Union must face the problem of an increasingly obsolescent and outmoded Navy with large numbers of smaller vessels, while the United States is building a more modern Navy with larger ships. A recent Library of Congress study reaches similar conclusions.

Of course, Dr. Bertram and his colleagues note, there are worrying implications for the future in the Soviet Union's military buildup. Certainly Moscow will take advantage of any target or opportunity that may present itself. But so far, the institute judges there is insufficient evidence to justify conclusions that the Soviet Union has already embarked upon a confrontational policy of expansionism.



# Western Europe

THE ECONOMIST MAY 1, 1976



## Eagles at odds

The German-American connection which now holds the Atlantic community together is being bent by an argument over weapons that needs to be settled swiftly



Germany is much the most important country in western Europe. It has therefore begun to develop a special relationship with the United States: not quite like the one Britain used to have, with the British-American ties of language and alliance in two world wars; but close enough to reflect Germany's economic strength and military power, and its pre-eminence in both the EEC and Nato Europe. The prospect of a part-Communist government in Italy will certainly make the Americans work even more directly with the Germans on defence matters, rather than through the joint institutions of Nato. This American-German relationship is the present linchpin of the Atlantic community. It is also coming under severe strain, at just the wrong moment, because of three arguments now going on between Germany and America.

The first is the matter of "offset" arrangements, the purchases Germany makes from the United States (and services it renders to it) to offset what it costs America's balance of payments to keep American forces in Germany. Germany was willing enough to do these things when the United States was running a large trade deficit with Europe and some members of the American congress were campaigning to bring their troops home. But last year America's trade account perked up, and when the most recent offset agreement expired Mr Schmidt, the German chancellor, said he did not plan to negotiate another one. He then changed his mind, and negotiations started again. One of the main bones of contention this time is the cost of housing the new army brigade the Americans brought to Europe last year and want to station in northern Germany, where they also want the Germans to pay for a lot of its barrack rooms.

This is an old story. The second argument is not. This is about the airborne early warning system, the radar-stuffed aircraft that Nato badly needs to detect and identify low-flying intruders and send fighters to intercept the suspicious ones. Everybody agrees that the Americans' Boeing E-3A is the only aircraft to do the job. But the Germans are being asked to put up a large share of the money for it. Mr Georg Leber, their defence minister, will ask the Bundestag this month for authority to spend money to buy some early production material. If he gets it, most of the other countries involved will weigh in too.

So far, so good, it might seem. But the third argument could undo the whole ball of wool. This is the growing quarrel about whether the Germans or the Americans should provide Nato's next main tank.

### Are the Americans weaselling?

The United States is now testing two of its own prototypes of a new heavy tank, and will select the winner this summer, recording the result of the tests. It will then allow a prototype of the Germans' new Leopard 2 tank to show its paces next autumn, and compare the result with the American winner's recorded performance. The United States originally said it would buy the ultimate victor, even if it is the German tank. But many German officials—and some Americans as well—

have begun to have their doubts. They believe the only true way to get a real comparison between the Leopard and the American tank is to test them side by side. The doubters also point out that a project like a new tank tends to develop a life of its own. The Americans make no secret that they will continue to develop their own tank through the summer, and even after the Leopard tests start. This sort of thing, the Germans argue, makes it almost impossible for the Leopard to be chosen. Recent testimony before congress by Mr Malcolm Currie, the defence department's research director, suggests that the Americans' willingness to buy the Leopard if it beats their own tank is a lot less firm than it first appeared to be.

These growing doubts have made the Germans angry. Germany buys much of its military equipment from the United States; now that Germany has a good product of its own, they say, it is time for the United States to come across and prove it is really serious about sharing the arms market more equitably with Europe. Some of them also believe the time has come for Germany to use its political weight to try to bring this about. Mr Karl Damm, a Bundestag member, said in America recently that Germany will not put up its share of the early-warning aircraft money unless the United States buys the Leopard.

That is an extreme view, and will probably not be the Germans' last word: they can hardly demand a fairer tank-versus-tank competition and then say the United States must buy the Leopard regardless of its outcome. But Mr Damm's remark has drawn attention to the Germans' new tendency to put all of these military negotiations in the same basket, and their growing readiness to argue toughly with America about them.

This is no bad thing if it makes the Americans realise that these issues are political as well as military. There is more at stake than a few details of tank construction. The United States has to accept that it cannot forever sell weapons to Europe just by demonstrating that they are cheaper and technically superior; the Europeans want to be able to produce good, cheap weapons for the alliance too. This should be both sides' ultimate aim. But the danger of putting politics into military matters is that the wrong military decisions can get made.

### Separate is best

Both Germany and the United States can help to stop this happening. First, the three things should not be allowed to trip each other up. The argument about German offset payments for the new American brigade in north Germany is a basic one: whether Germany should continue to provide some sort of compensation for the balance-of-payments costs of American protection. The answer is probably yes, because it can afford it. The early warning aircraft is harder to keep separate, because Germany's final decision about that will not be taken until well after the tank competition is over. But it is probably a mistake to think of this as an American project that Germany is supporting. It is

in reality a project to defend Nato Europe, to which the United States proposes to make a generous contribution both by its direct investment in the aircraft, and by a handsome write-off of its research and development costs. The German part in defusing the dispute would be to accept both of these basic points.

But it is reasonable for Germany to ask for, and America to accept, changes in the tank competition. These should certainly include the side-by-side test the Germans want. Each country should then say, publicly that it will buy the winner, or build it under licence: some-

thing the Germans will not do under the present competition rules. It is important not only to get the best tank for a large part of Nato's armies in the 1980s, but for both Germany and the United States to believe that the best tank has been fairly chosen. Side-by-side tests would delay the American tank programme a bit, but that is a small price to pay for persuading everyone that the right decision has been made. That German-American connection is too important, when so much of the rest of western Europe is so weak, to let it be cracked by nationalism over the instruments of the common defence.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Friday, April 30, 1976

## Possible Italian Communist victory poses problems

# Tough U.S. decisions due in

## Mediterranean

By Guy Halverson  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The possibilities of Communist Party victory in the upcoming June Italian general elections presents Pentagon strategists with a number of tough decisions:

- Since Italy is the home of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and fills a key role in the defense of central Europe, should the U.S. military share NATO defense secrets with an Italian Government — even a coalition government — including Communists?

- Should Defense Department officials be speeding up possible "pull-back" plans to Spain, or U.S. East Coast ports?

Because Italy remains a strategic link in NATO's European and Mediterranean defense plans it is not surprising the upcoming electoral test between the ruling Christian Democrats and the 1.5-million-member Italian Communist Party (the largest in Western Europe) has stirred up the U.S. defense and intelligence community.

### Pentagon consensus

The consensus in Pentagon corridors is that whatever the outcome of the upcoming elections, ways will be found to maintain the large (13,000-man) U.S. military presence in Italy, while shoring up Italian military links within NATO itself.

Some defense officers note that Communist Party government participation in Iceland and Portugal, for example, has not meant irreconcilable military breaks with the U.S. in past years.

Nevertheless, the military importance of Italy is not underemphasized here:

- It is the home of NATO's southern command and home base for the large U.S. Sixth Fleet, which daily patrols the Mediterranean Sea.

- The world's seventh-largest industrial power, Italy is opposite Yugoslavia, which defense intelligence experts believe will face possible Soviet take-over plans after the passing of

President Tito.

- U.S. bases in Italy include Camp Darby at Livorno and Camp Ederle at Vincenza, both Army bases in the north; a Navy base at Sigonella in Sicily; the Sixth Fleet home port at Naples, and a Navy support base at La Maddalena in Sardinia; and Air Force installations at Aviano Air Base below the Austrian border and San Vito facing Albania.

If the U.S. were ever forced to pull back its military presence in Italy, one likely option would be Spain, says some experts.

### New base treaty

A new, five-year base treaty for Spain, now before the Senate, would allow the United States to maintain its important military links on the Iberian Peninsula. The U.S. currently has two strategic air bases in Spain — at Torrejon and Zaragoza — and a major submarine base at Rota, on Spain's southwest coast below Portugal.

The Sixth Fleet, now rivaled by an equally formidable Soviet Mediterranean fleet, usually consists of 45 vessels. Navy officials say that if the fleet were to be moved out of Italian waters, such as back to the U.S. East Coast, fuel and maintenance costs would rise quickly.

It is for that reason, say Defense Department officials, that it is expected that even with Communist Party inclusion in the government, ways will be found to maintain the U.S. presence in Italy.

Several other reasons why Italy looms so importantly in defense thinking: a major manufacturer of machinery, Italy has a large and important merchant marine.

Moreover, there is the fear that a swing to the Communists in Italy would dramatically accelerate the coming to power of Communists in France — again — most likely in a coalition government with French Socialists.

NEW YORK TIMES  
7 May 1976

## CHINESE EXPRESS DOUBTS ABOUT U.S.

Its Commitment to Europe Is

Questioned, Britain Says

PEKING, May 6 (Reuters)—The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland, said tonight that Chinese leaders had expressed doubts about the United States commitment to West European defense.

After meeting here with newly appointed Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, he said at a news conference that he had been questioned about the reliability of the American commitment to use a nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Crosland said the Chinese were under a misapprehension about United States reliability and he had tried to allay their "unnecessary doubts."

Peking's leaders had hammered home their concern about the Soviet military threat to Europe and need for West European unity, Mr. Crosland said.

He said the two sides had differed in their interpretation of East-West detente, which China sees as a Soviet plot to lull the Western alliance.

But Mr. Crosland added there was agreement on the need for a strong NATO and for the United States to "remain committed and determined."

The news conference concluded Mr. Crosland's three days in Peking—the first visit here by a West European minister since last month's changes in the Chinese leadership.

Tomorrow he leaves on a provincial tour before flying on to Japan on Sunday.

The Foreign Secretary said it was stressed by every Chinese minister he met that the leadership changes would not seriously affect foreign policy or trade.

He reported his 75-minute meeting with Mr. Hua today covered the global balance of power and Chinese anxiety about detente with Moscow.

The Japan Times Tuesday, April 27, 1976

## An Untenable Aspect of Detente

There seems to be a firmly implanted suspicion, rightly or wrongly, in Europe now that American foreign policy under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is based on acquiescence of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in exchange for political noninterference by Moscow in Western Europe.

A furor of speculation erupted after a leak to the press of a speech given by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, U.S. State Department counselor and close confidant of Dr. Kissinger, to U.S. ambassadors in London last December. The first accounts, later said to be inaccurate, quoted Mr. Sonnenfeldt as saying "permanent organic union between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is necessary to avoid World War III."

In the United States and Europe, charges were made that a new Sonnenfeldt doctrine had been proclaimed that abandoned Eastern Europe to perpetual "Soviet enslavement." Such independent-minded Eastern European nations as Yugoslavia and Romania voiced their uneasiness if not distress over what was considered a sellout. And the Sonnenfeldt briefing became a campaign issue in U.S. election year politics.

Later Mr. Sonnenfeldt explained that what he had said in London was that Soviet domination in Eastern Europe rested on power and that this was dangerous and could lead to an explosion. He said "organic relationship" was used to contrast with a relationship based totally on power, force and repression.

He denied that the U.S. was abandoning attempts to influence events in Eastern Europe. He said U.S. policy supports "independence, autonomy and various aspects of sovereign independence" in Eastern Europe while, of course, recognizing the fact of Soviet influence.

Some commentators said Mr. Sonnenfeldt was only stating what everyone knew about U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and no one should have been shocked even by what Mr. Sonnenfeldt said were distorted versions of his speech. Obviously, the U.S. has no intention of fomenting revolt in Eastern Europe since it would not aid the rebels. This was proved in the uprisings against Soviet domination in Poland, East Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Then the U.S. did nothing and would do nothing in the future. So in reality, the United States has been acquiescing to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe since World War II.

And Mr. Sonnenfeldt's promise of support for independence in Eastern Europe convinced no one that the U.S. really would or could do very much to help.

However, in the past several years the United States and the Soviet Union have been trying to establish a new relationship. And every time detente appeared to be working, there were

flickerings of suspicion in Western Europe that the two super-powers were, if not by diplomatic agreement, then tacitly in accord on dividing up the world. After the Sonnenfeldt explosion Dr. Kissinger emphatically stated that the U.S. recognized no "spheres of influence."

However, Dr. Kissinger's almost frantic campaign to beat back the spread of Communism in Western Europe indicates that he considers Western Europe an American preserve. He has approached Socialist parties, warning them not to permit the participation of Communists in government. He is particularly concerned about Italy where Communist participation in the Government of this NATO ally is almost a foregone conclusion.

Dr. Kissinger has been criticized for not recognizing the independent nature of Communist parties in Western Europe. However, the secretary of state apparently believes that no Communist party once it has attained power will ever relinquish it.

Dr. Kissinger's activities do not prove the point alone. However, many question the strange behavior and attitude of Moscow toward the Communist parties of Western Europe. Last year, Moscow seemed indifferent to the fate of the Communist Party in Portugal when it attempted to seize power. In 1974 during the French presidential election, the Soviet ambassador called on Valery Giscard d'Estaing just before the voting. Many believed this act swung votes away from the Socialist-Communist coalition.

At the same time, the Kremlin is actively feuding with the Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties. This, of course, stems from the Russian desire to keep ideological leadership on them. However, many believe that Moscow values detente, shaky as it is, with Washington more than Communist victories in Western Europe, which most certainly would anger the U.S.

Even if the United States and the Soviet Union are acting on some tacit understanding, however, it is doubtful if either will really succeed in holding onto their zones of dominance. In the U.S., public opinion against any such deal is too strong. Also, a policy of trying to hold back independent Communist Parties in Western Europe seems doomed to failure. And the changing style of national Communism in the free societies is having its influence in Eastern Europe.

It is likely that both the Soviet Union and the United States will have to acquiesce to political changes within their own spheres of influence eventually since the trend toward political fragmentation appears irreversible.



THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Wednesday, May 5, 1976

## U.S. Apparently Favored Building Base Over Eviction of Soviet Troops in Somalia

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON—The U.S. last year rejected a chance to get Soviet troops evicted from Somalia because it feared this would remove justification for building a controversial new military base, testimony before a Senate subcommittee indicated yesterday.

The U.S. base in question is on Diego Garcia, a remote Indian Ocean island where a "logistical support" facility is under construction. The main reason for building the base, Pentagon officials told Congress last July, is that the Soviet navy has established a major presence in Somalia, an African state facing the Indian Ocean.

According to James Akins, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the Ford administration had a chance to get the Russians thrown out of Somalia but declined to try. He said he assumes—but doesn't know for sure—that the reason was an administration fear that Congress would then refuse to finance the Navy's Diego Garcia base, which already faced strong opposition.

"One would have to be pretty dense not to get this connection," Mr. Akins told the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. He also said a State Department official told him later that that was the reason, though Mr. Akins said he couldn't be positive that the official in

question knew why the decision was made. Saudi Arabian Offer

The offer to get the Russians evicted came from Saudi Arabia, where Mr. Akins was stationed at the time. He said the Saudis shared U.S. concern about the Soviet presence, so they discussed the matter with Somalia, a poor country just across the Red Sea.

The Saudis offered to take over economic-aid projects being financed by Moscow, and to buy U.S. arms for Somalia as substitutes for Russian weapons then being delivered, according to Mr. Akins. He said only \$15 million of U.S. weapons would have been needed—at Saudi expense—to make the effort.

However, the former ambassador said he couldn't get any Washington response, either positive or negative, to the offer. Nor could he get an official explanation for this official silence. But Mr. Akins testified that the Ford administration may have been afraid that evicting the Soviets would remove the official rationale for building the Diego Garcia base, so it didn't dare encourage the Saudis to go ahead.

### Preferred Soviet Threat

If true, this makes it seem that Washington preferred a Soviet threat and the means to counter it, rather than no threat and no base. Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho), subcommittee chairman, called it "disturbing"

and Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) termed it "outrageous." Sen. Church, a presidential aspirant, promised further investigation of the matter.

Saudi officials told Mr. Akins that Somalia was ready to make such an agreement, the former ambassador said. However, he cautioned the subcommittee that the attempt mightn't have worked—it's possible the Somalis couldn't or wouldn't have thrown out the Russians even if Saudi Arabia provided economic aid and U.S. weapons.

However, Mr. Akins testified that he strongly favored making the effort, and he recommended it to the State Department. It was embarrassing, he said, that he couldn't tell the Saudis why the U.S. didn't respond to their offer.

Mr. Akins, one of the more outspoken State Department officials, was fired by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger last December after assorted disagreements. He said yesterday that he never received any explanation for this, but assumes Mr. Kissinger found him too abrasive. Mr. Akins for years was the department's senior expert on petroleum matters.

Although yesterday's testimony didn't say specifically when the Saudi offer about Somalia was made, Mr. Akins and Sen. Church said it occurred about the time the Senate was considering the Diego Garcia matter. Last July 27 the Senate voted 53 to 43 to finance construction of the naval base there.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, MAY 6, 1976

## KISSINGER'S VIEW ON SOMALIA ASKED

Senator Calls for Comment on Reported Saudi Offer

By ROBERT M. SMITH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5—Senator Dick Clark, chairman of the Senate African Affairs subcommittee, asked in a letter sent to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger today why the State Department reportedly ignored a Saudi-Arabian proposal to diminish Soviet influence in Somalia. Mr. Kissinger is now in Africa.

Senator Smith, who is an Iowa Democrat, called the allegation made by James E. Akins, the former American ambassa-

dor to Saudi Arabia, "a serious matter."

Mr. Akins told the Senate Multinational subcommittee yesterday, under oath, that the Saudis had offered to give Somalia the amount of economic aid promised Somalia by the Soviet Union if the United States would furnish Somalia with arms also promised it by Moscow. According to Mr. Akins, the Saudis even offered to pay for the American-supplied arms.

The former ambassador said the State Department had failed to respond to the Saudi offer.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, noted yesterday that the Saudi offer came about the time that Congress was considering the Administration's request for a naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

The Administration had

linked its case for a Diego Garcia base to the Soviet naval presence in Somalia.

Mr. Clark said that Mr. Akins's allegations were important "not only because of the way in which the Soviet presence in Somalia was used to justify development of the U.S. base at Diego Garcia, but because an important opportunity for countering Soviet influence and re-establishing Somali ties may have been missed."

The Senator told Mr. Kissinger that he had spoken with representatives of the Somali Government on several occasions and had come to believe that Somalia "is a government which would prefer genuine non-alignment."

Alluding to the Saudi offer, Mr. Clark said, "The alleged failure to react to the suggestion raises serious doubts about the genuineness of U.S. concern about the Soviet presence there."

At the State Department today, Frederick Z. Brown, director of the Office of Press Relations, said inferences drawn from Mr. Akins's testimony were "misleading."

During a news briefing, Mr. Brown refused to confirm that the Saudis had made the offer described by Mr. Akins, and insisted that "the Saudi issue has no relationship at all to our decision to build up Diego Garcia."

Mr. Brown said the former ambassador, a 22-year veteran of the Foreign Service and specialist in Arab affairs, was "not aware of all the facts," but he refused to say what the facts were.

"The situation is far too complex for me to go into in any detail," Mr. Brown declared. In response to another question, he said that he could provide no assurances that he would ever be able to offer more information on the subject.

NEW YORK TIMES  
6 MAY 1976

## Kissinger's Call for Ban on Chrome Ore From Rhodesia Stirs Congress Debate

By STEVEN RATTNER

Last week, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger announced during his swing

through Africa that he would seek to end imports of Rhodesian chrome into the United States.

The speech prompted what has become an annual ritual in Washington—a debate among legislators, with help from business and social ac-

tion groups, over the five-year-old amendment devised by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Independent of Virginia, to circumvent the United Nations embargo against Rhodesia.

At the heart of the debate is Rhodesia's position with two-thirds of the world's reserves of highest grade chrome and as one of three

major suppliers — Soviet Union and South Africa are the two others.

High grades of chrome, a dull black ore in its natural form, put the "stainless" in stainless steel. Chrome is also important in the production of jet engine parts, cast iron and alloyed steel. Lower grade chromes, such as those used to make automobile bumpers shiny, are available in abundant supply from alternative sources.

#### U.S. Is Key Importer

But with no domestic supply of high-grade chrome, the United States last year was forced to import 570,000 tons of ore and 275,000 tons of ferrochrome, the purified form. Of this, 17 percent of the ore and 28 percent of the ferrochrome came directly from Rhodesia. The majority of the imports came from the Soviet Union.

This has spurred Senator Byrd and his allies to assert

that the United States must not become dependent on a Communist country for a raw material essential to national security.

Opponents of the measure contend that supporting the United Nations resolution is proper and in the long run would prove fruitful if a black regime came to power. At the same time, they calculate that an import ban is likely to have minimal economic consequences.

The business community stands solidly behind Senator Byrd's efforts, at least partly on the argument that a return to the ban that existed between 1966 and 1971 would only exacerbate existing supply and price problems.

#### Price Changes Traced

"Whenever the amendment has been up for reconsideration, the Russians have doubled their price and cut shipments by 35 percent to reduce American invento-

ries," charged E. F. Andrews, a vice president of Allegheny Ludlum Industries, which is a major user.

According to a spokesman for Union Carbide, the price of Soviet chrome moved from \$27 a ton in 1966 to \$56 at the height of the ban in 1971, then to \$38 in 1973. Today the price is \$170. Prices for both South African and Rhodesian chrome have remained lower.

Moreover, according to F. Perry Wilson, chairman of Union Carbide, "there are indications that the Russian ability to supply is less than in the past." By every estimate, the Soviet Union is believed to have less than 5 percent of the world's resources.

While in the long run, American producers expect to become more dependent on South African supplies, the ore is not so good as the Rhodesian variety and the

availability of South Africa's high-grade chrome is limited.

During the previous ban, however, according to opponents of the Byrd measure, few dislocations of consequence occurred. They attributed the price increase to the general upward trend of commodity prices and contended that domestic industry was never shut down for lack of chrome.

Moreover, American stockpiles are high—no one seems to know precisely how high. When combined with growing South African supplies, this suggests to Byrd opponents that the United States could safely withstand an end to Soviet chrome even without Rhodesian supplies.

The recession has also meant a sharp drop in the demand for stainless steel and that has in turn reduced the need for chrome. As a result, despite the price increases by the Soviet Union, supplies of chrome on the world market are plentiful.

SUNDAY TIMES, London  
2 May 1976

## Dr K reads it right

QUITE a case can be made out against Henry Kissinger's speech last week in Lusaka. He, like his compatriots, knows very little about black or white African affairs. For years the United States Government has had no identifiable African policy. Now, humiliated by the set-back in Angola, and fearful of further Soviet and Cuban intervention in African "wars of liberation," Dr Kissinger barnstorms his way round black Africa, giving warm encouragement to those African countries who oppose the white minority regime in Rhodesia. He may well have succeeded, the critics could claim, in unleashing fresh violence and unrest south of the Zambesi.

It is undeniable that the American Government's awareness of African issues has been sharpened by the Angolan experience, and by the wish to prevent a repetition of foreign intervention elsewhere in Africa. To this end, Kissinger underwrites the cause of black nationalism, to ensure that that nationalism does not turn to Moscow, Cuba or elsewhere. He is certainly not to be blamed for this. Indeed, allowing for the rhetoric and show-business aspect which is an inseparable part of his travelling diplomacy, it is difficult to know what other speech Kissinger could have made at this moment if the American and Western position in Africa, in general, is to be strengthened. Nothing could exceed the folly of those, in Britain and elsewhere, who think that the white minority governments in Southern Africa are the surest bastion

against present and future Communist threats.

A more pertinent approach to the new American policy is to ask whether it is likely to work. By promising substantial aid to the nations surrounding Rhodesia, as well as to "newly independent Zimbabwe," that policy will presumably encourage and strengthen, politically and financially, the guerrilla forces ranged against the Smith regime. How far and how quickly that will lead to their pressures on Rhodesia reaching a point where the white minority finally hauls down the flag, is anyone's guess. But after years of obdurate refusal by the Smithites to face facts, any new effort to make them realise that time, history, geography and demography are not on their side, is to be welcomed.

There is one risk to the West in the Kissinger style of diplomacy. For all its power, the United States does not have a great capacity to influence men or events in Africa. The manufactured build-up to a speech formulating a new policy, which unavoidably is long on ends and short on means, may produce a dangerous disillusion. It is not even certain that Kissinger's pledge to seek the repeal of the arrangement which enables Rhodesia to export her chrome to the United States, will be honoured by Congress. That would make a practical farce of the initiative. For all that, in its unequivocal expression of support for legitimate African aspirations, the Kissinger speech is a welcome, if belated, sign that Washington is reading the African portents aright.



## East Asia

Sunday, May 2, 1976 THE WASHINGTON POST

# Australia's Rift With Indonesians Over Timor Troubles U.S.

By Peter Costigan

Special to The Washington Post

CANBERRA—A bitter dispute between Australia and Indonesia over East Timor, the internationally forgotten tail end of Portugal's abandoned empire, is causing U.S. officials in the area deep concern.

Both the rightist military government of Indonesia's President Suharto and the rightist democratic government of Australia's Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser have reluctantly acknowledged their dispute.

But both maintain that they will not let the argument—generated by growing anger in Australia over Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in November and its determination to incorporate the tiny territory into Indonesia—disturb the basic friendship between the two nations.

American concern over the dispute has deepened in recent weeks with signs of a possible long-term split between Australia and Indonesia. The two nations militarily and economically dominate the confluence of the Indian and Pacific oceans.

With the State Department and Pentagon watching closely, American diplomats in the area have worked overtime since early April to contain the dispute.

Indonesian and Australian officials have gone out of their way to avoid any reference to the American interest in their dispute.

The death of five young journalists from Australia—three of them Australian citizens, one British and one a New Zealander—in October has threatened to escalate the dispute into confrontation. They were killed near East Timor's border with the portion of Indonesia that shares the same island.

The five television journalists went to East Timor last September to cover the exploding civil war there after the Portuguese administrators left the island.

In October they disappeared and the Indonesian government originally claimed that they accidentally burned to death when mortars set fire to the house they were in during cross-fire between warring Timorese factions.

At the time, the Labor Party government of Gough Whitlam was in the middle of a constitutional crisis that resulted in Whitlam being sacked in November.

On Dec. 13, Prime Minister Fraser's conservative government was elected by a landslide majority. Australians paid little attention to the fate of the five newsmen.

But suddenly the mood has changed. Newspapers and the Australian journalists' association generated parliamentary pressure that pushed the government into ordering an inquiry.

Australian concern was heightened by the realization that Indonesian "volunteer" forces had invaded East Timor while Australia was consumed by its December domestic political crisis and had set up a provisional government that planned to supervise the incorporation of the 600,000 people of East Timor into Indonesia.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik added fuel to the fire of Australian anger last week by announcing that President Suharto would have an "important" announcement in August, that there would be a new national day and that Indonesia would then invite foreign correspondents to visit East Timor.

Nobody doubted what he was talking about—the incorporation of East Timor.

Even more infuriating for Australians, Malik proposed a very Asian answer to the problem of the five journalists' deaths.

"Let us forget them," he

told a press conference in Jakarta attended by Australian correspondents, "and we will erect a monument to them."

Jose Martins, the leader of one of several small political parties in East Timor that until recently encouraged the Indonesians to move into the tiny country, last week gave a detailed version of how the journalists allegedly were gunned down by Indonesian troops.

Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock managed to persuade the Indonesian government to allow three Australian officials to visit East Timor in an effort to find out what happened.

But government officials in Canberra are pessimistic about how much they will find out.

Since the late President Sukarno was eased out of power beginning in 1965, Australian-Indonesian relations had been stable. Despite cultural and economic contrasts. But Australians have always been extremely nervous about events to their immediate north.

Australians have regarded Papua-New Guinea, immediately to the north, and Indonesia as buffers, against the more powerful nations of Asia farther north.

During the Sukarno years, Indonesia demanded control of the western part of New Guinea, known as West

Irian, and annexed it. This made Australia worry about Indonesia, and later it ordered American F-111 jets, fitted as strike aircraft, as a deterrent.

Australians are beginning to believe that the Indonesian invasion of East Timor is part of a pattern of military expansion by their most powerful neighbor.

The Fraser government has called for withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor and supports U.N. initiatives calling for self-determination for the people there.

That aggravates the Jakarta government, which believes that Australia gave it the diplomatic go-ahead with its invasion of East Timor in the pragmatic interests of maintaining stability and keeping out any leftist rule on the island—which is only 96 miles from the northern Australian coast.

Both nations are allies of the United States, and Australia is formally linked to it through the ANZUS treaty. Both Australia and the United States have been involved in efforts to develop Indonesia's largely untapped resources and to tackle poverty among its 120 million people.

The last thing American diplomats in the area want is a split between the two friends, especially one that current Australian emotions could force into a confrontation in which Washington would be asked to choose sides.

TIME, MAY 10, 1976

## VIET NAM

# Anniversary Two-Step to the Polls

It was trumpeted North Viet Nam's official daily, *Nhan Dan*, "a festival of the completion of national reunification." In Hanoi and Saigon, as well as scores of other cities, towns and hamlets in between, streets and squares were festooned with banners and painted

maps that showed North and South with all demarcation lines removed—and Hanoi prominently marked as the capital. Called out by Communist ward bosses—and, in Saigon, by the pealing bells of the city's churches—some 11 million Vietnamese trooped to the polls clutching pink voter-registration cards to elect the new, 492-member National Assembly that will serve as the legislature for a formally unified Viet Nam.

With characteristic reverence for calendar milestones, the Communists scheduled the election for the eve of the first anniversary of the North Vietnamese triumph of April 30, 1975. That was the date on which Hanoi's tanks rumbled through the gates of former President Nguyen Van Thieu's palace in Saigon, completing the military conquest of South Viet Nam that had been the Communists' goal ever since Ho Chi Minh drove the French out of the North in 1954. Also characteristically, the victors took no chances with the outcome of the Assembly election. In Saigon, local party chiefs lined up families, 20 or so at a time, for roll call, then marched eligible voters off to the polls, where their political choice amounted to striking a few less favored names from a list of preselected candidates. Under such conditions, participation tends to be high: in Saigon, officials proudly announced, the voter turnout was 98%, almost as praiseworthy as Hanoi's 99.82%.

**Figurehead President.** Reflecting the demographics of the unified country, which will have a population of 44 million people, membership in the Assembly is weighted slightly in favor of the North; it has 249 representatives v. 243 for the South. Sitting in Hanoi, the Assembly will be mainly a rubber stamp to the ten-man Politburo of North Viet Nam's Lao Dong (Workers' Party). The legislators, warned Politburo Member Pham Hung, who is the party's chief rep-

resentative in the South, will be expected to carry out Lao Dong policies "most scrupulously."

Hung himself is an Assembly member, as are most of the important North Vietnamese Communists. When the legislature convenes for the first time, possibly around May 19, it will choose a figurehead President for the unified country, plus a Premier and a Cabinet. Most likely choice as Premier is North Viet Nam's Premier Pham Van Dong. Others who will probably hold top leadership posts include Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong, and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, who was chief negotiator for the Viet Cong in Paris.

The Assembly's agenda includes ratifying a new constitution and choosing a flag, national anthem and a new name for the unified country. While the legislators may also be allowed to consider a new five-year plan, which will set the pace and nature of social and economic reunification, the real work will be done by the Lao Dong chieftains at a party congress, the first in 16 years, scheduled for later this year.

So far, the Communists, who remain mildly astonished by the lightning success of their 1975 spring offensive (see box), have been cautious in their treatment of the South. The new government claims that 90% of the officials, civil servants and army members of the Thieu regime who were packed off to country camps for *hoc tap* (re-education) have since resumed normal lives. But many top officials remain in the camps; one estimate of the current total, by Italian Journalist Tiziano Terzani, is 150,000 to 200,000.

Saigon itself still retains much of what the puritan Northern Marxists decry as its decadence. Prostitution has made a comeback, bars are busy and rock music can still be heard on downtown streets. A curfew exists—which of-

ficials lifted for a day-long anniversary celebration "to allow the people to move about freely and make merry." Though there has been little official pressure on them to leave the overcrowded city, about 500,000 people out of Saigon's peak wartime population of 3 million have done so. But there are signs that the regime may become less gentle about effecting its plans for social and political reforms. Recently, the remaining foreign news organizations in Saigon were told they must close down their offices by the end of this month.

**Bad Shape.** Hanoi has been almost as equivocal in its postwar foreign relations as it has been—up to now—in dealing with the South. Rhetorically, the regime has been truculent, urging more guerrilla activity among its non-Communist neighbors. On the other hand, last month a polite Vietnamese delegation turned up in Jakarta for a meeting of the Asian Development Bank. The Vietnamese, says one Japanese official, "openly admit that their economy is in bad shape and that they need outside help. They are very interested in joint ventures in which they would guarantee private foreign capital."

So are some U.S. corporations, especially banks and oil companies that held concessions in the oil-rich waters off South Viet Nam's coast. But Washington has adamantly opposed congressional proposals that the U.S. embargo on Vietnamese trade and aid be lifted experimentally. The Administration has repeatedly requested information from the Communists on the 2,518 Americans still officially listed as missing in action in Indochina. But Hanoi has held out, demanding \$3.25 billion in reconstruction aid promised by Richard Nixon—subject to congressional approval—in conjunction with the 1973 peace talks. Thus the conflict, at least on a level of dollars and diplomacy, still drags on.

TIME, MAY 10, 1976

## The Final Days: Hanoi's Version

*Two Hanoi newspapers have lately been publishing a serial account of last year's conquest of South Viet Nam. Written by North Vietnamese Chief of Staff General Van Tien Dung—second in military command to Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap—the remarkably candid narrative offers an intimate glimpse of North Vietnamese thoughts on the successful offensive. Some of Dung's main disclosures:*

► The planning for the final offensive began fully a year before the attacks that signaled the end for Saigon. During a series of meetings in the spring of 1974, Hanoi's generals decided that the balance of military power in Viet Nam had swung in favor of the North. Though they were confident of eventual victory, the North Vietnamese did not expect the offensive to reach a climax until 1976. The abrupt collapse of Saigon's forces surprised Hanoi almost as much as it did everyone else.

► Dung admits that beginning in 1974, Hanoi broke the Paris accords by

transporting massive reinforcements to South Viet Nam: "Great quantities of such matériel as tanks, armored cars, missiles, long-range artillery pieces and antiaircraft guns ... were sent to various battlefields." In addition, a 1,000-kilometer all-weather supply road was built to the south, as well as a concealed 5,000-kilometer gasoline pipeline. Accompanying the supply effort was a recruitment drive in the North that funneled "tens of thousands" of new troops into Hanoi's army.

► Hanoi recognized the reduction of U.S. aid to the Saigon government as a key factor in the war's outcome. Says Dung: "Nguyen Van Thieu was forced to fight a poor man's war." He adds that Saigon's "firepower had declined by nearly 60% because of bomb and ammunition shortages. Its mobility was reduced by half, owing to the lack of aircraft, vehicles and fuel."

► A "heated discussion" took place in Hanoi regarding the possibility that the U.S. would reintervene in the South. In the end, however, Hanoi determined

that the U.S. would probably stay out. One important factor: Watergate. Says Dung: "The Watergate scandal had seriously affected the entire U.S. and precipitated the resignation of an extremely reactionary, imperialist President—Nixon."

► Hanoi knew the South Vietnamese expected the first attack of the offensive to be either in Tay Ninh province, near the Cambodian border, or farther north in Pleiku. Hence the Communists' decision to launch the initial thrust against the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot. That came as a complete surprise to Saigon and led President Thieu to his hasty decision to withdraw his forces from the Central Highlands. Dung calls Thieu's decision a "grave strategic mistake." Thereafter, he says, Hanoi's main problem was moving fast enough to maintain the military initiative. For example, the Communists sent a commander from Hanoi to take charge of the battle for Danang on March 26. Much to Hanoi's astonishment, the city fell only three days later—without a fight.

# Latin America

WASHINGTON POST  
2 MAY 1976

## Terror Army Chief Resurfaces in Haiti

By Greg Chamberlain  
Manchester Guardian

LONDON—A right-wing palace coup in Haiti has wrecked years of careful U.S.-backed efforts to give the 18-year-old Duvalier family dictatorship a less bloodthirsty international image as a way of keeping the political situation stable in America's Caribbean backyard.

Extensive changes this month have brought to power as interior and defense minister Pierre Biamby, the late Francois Duvalier's former private secretary, who first gained notoriety as the supervisor of a massacre 12 years ago in the southwestern town of Jeremie in which about 100 persons were killed.

Biamby's success in the Jeremie operation led to the public execution of two anti-Duvalierists in the capital which was watched, on

"Papa Doc's" orders, by 2,000 schoolchildren. The date, Nov. 12, 1964, has been an emotional rallying cry among the exiled opposition ever since.

Biamby, 54, a former soccer star, rose to be a chief of the old dictator's prime terror army, the Tontons Macoutes. His victory in the political battles inside the gleaming white presidential palace in Port-au-Prince, capital of Latin America's poorest country, follows the return to work of some Tontons Macoutes warlords who were sacked a few weeks after Papa Doc died and was succeeded by his teenage son, Jean-Claude, in 1971.

They include the reappointment of Rosalie Adolphe, a gun-toting woman who was a favorite of Papa Doc, as chief of the Fort Dimanche prison, where hundreds of political prisoners have been tortured and ex-

ecuted. The Macoutes have also received new weapons over the past year, to the muted annoyance of the regular army.

The palace coup appears to have been organized by secret police chief Luc Desyr, a former taxi driver, acting with Papa Doc's widow, Simone, and Henri Sicalit, who heads the state agency which handles much of the country's food and staples and controls an unaccounted-for fund of some \$20 million annually. The trio comprise the core of the regime's old-guard hardliners.

They apparently moved out of fear that relative liberals in the government might destroy the dictatorship with even minor reforms. The coup also follows a reported assassination attempt on President-for-life Jean-Claude Duvalier in January after which he is said to have been flown secretly overnight to the nearby U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, for treatment and a check-up.

[State Department officials denied the report that Duvalier had been flown to Guantanamo for treatment. They said they had no evidence of any assassination attempt against him in January.]

The purge swept away In-

terior and Defense Minister Paul Blanchet, who had pushed a largely unsuccessful nationalist line against foreign companies over the past two years; Transport Minister Pierre Petit; and Social Affairs Minister Max Antoine, who had tried to get the dozens of mainly American light assembly industries to obey labor laws on pay and working conditions. Another victim was Aubelin Jolicœur, the diminutive deputy tourism director, whose role as an eccentric socialite and informer earned him characterization as "Petit Pierre" in Graham Greene's novel, "The Comedians."

The role of the 24-year-old president is thought to have been minimal in the face of the resurgence of these who are known in Port-au-Prince as "the dinosaurs."

The first, tiny glints of press freedom had begun to appear under Blanchet, who never managed to establish himself as the strongman he had been expected to be. Foreign investment continues to increase from the United States and France, who are competing for influence in the former French colony, but recently the government has been hit by accusations from abroad of bribes being paid to officials by foreign companies.

dor Allende, an elected Marxist, from power.

The CIA at first denied participating in economic sabotage against the Allende regime but, three years later, was forced to confess that our story was true after the Senate intelligence committee published the proof.

The Nixon administration, meanwhile, phased out economic aid to the Allende regime on the grounds that the Chilean economy was unstable. Under Allende, the inflation rate shot up from 22 per cent in 1971 to 163 per cent in 1972, with a 4.4 per cent unemployment rate. Since the military junta seized power, the inflation rate was soared to a stratospheric 340 per cent, with a 16.6 per cent unemployment rate.

We have taken pains to point out, by the way, that the military rulers have oppressed not only the Marxists but the Christian Democrats.

Footnote: A spokesman for First National City Bank confirmed that the bank was studying the Chilean loan. A Bank of America spokesman refused to comment on our story. At the State Department, a spokesman acknowledged only that discussions had been held with OPIC. A Treasury official said the department was careful not to tell banks who should get loans but acknowledged: "They may have been encouraged by what our desk people tell them."

THE WASHINGTON POST - Saturday, May 8, 1976.

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

## Hidden Funds for Chile

In defiance of both Congress and the United Nations, the Ford administration has gone behind the barn to bolster the military dictatorship of Chile.

The United Nations, following up our own reports of repression and torture inside Chile, has condemned the junta for violating human rights. And only last week the respected Inter-American Human Rights Commission denounced the junta for its torture tactics.

Congress has reacted by imposing a \$90 million limit on economic aid for Chile this fiscal year. It was the intent of Congress, clearly, that the aid should go directly to needy people. Other nations have also refused to extend credit to the beleaguered dictatorship.

Nevertheless, the administration has shaken loose hidden money to bail out the junta. Here are the hush-hush developments:

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a quasi-official U.S. institution, has quietly agreed to begin insuring companies that invest in Chile. The State Department, according to our sources, twisted GIC arms. This should stimulate a flood of investment capital into the country.

Both the State and Treasury Departments have encouraged 14 U.S. and Canadian banks to lend the military dicta-

torship \$100 to \$125 million. The loan is needed to pay off short-term obligations to other countries. Britain and Italy have refused to re-schedule Chilean debt payments because of the regime's human rights violations. New York's First National City Bank will put up most of the money for the junta, with the financial support of the Bank of America, several New York banks and two Canadian banks.

U.S. advisers have also brought pressure upon the Inter-American Development Bank's President Antonio Ortiz Mena, who has promised that the bank will lend up to \$125 million to Chile. The first \$20 million already has been approved.

The State Department gave Chile a \$55 million housing guarantee that a House subcommittee believes exceeded the \$90 million congressional ceiling. "The administration clearly has sought to evade the spirit, if not the letter, of the congressional aid ceilings to Chile," declared Chairman Donald M. Fraser, (D-Calif.)

We have been chronicling the Chilean saga since we reported on March 21, 1972, that the Central Intelligence Agency and International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. were conspiring to undermine the Chilean economy. Their objective was to oust President Salva-